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
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
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# A REPLY

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TO THE

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ANGLO-CRISTINO PAMPHLET,  
LIBRARY

ENTITLED

“THE POLICY OF ENGLAND

TOWARDS

SPAIN.”

BY

WILLIAM WALTON, ESQ.

Author of the “Revolutions of Spain from 1808 to the end of 1836.”

LONDON:

PUBLISHED BY J. HATCHARD & SON, 187, PICCADILLY; BOOTH, DUKE  
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NEW YORK  
A REPLY TO  
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TO THE

ANGLO-CRISTINO PAMPHLET,

*&c. &c.*

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THE public has within the last few days been presented with a pamphlet, entitled "The Policy of England towards Spain," which, under colour of replying to a chapter in a contemporary work, takes up the defence of Lord Palmerston's Peninsular heresies, and almost assumes the confident and magisterial tone of a manifesto from the Foreign Office. Most of my readers must have the good fortune to be familiar with the work which has called into the field this anonymous pamphleteer. I allude to the interesting volumes which report attributes to the Earl of Carnarvon; it is to the last chapter, which treats of the social and political state of

the Basque Provinces, that the author of "The Policy of England towards Spain" professes to reply.

Had the pamphlet in question been nothing more than an answer to Lord Carnarvon's reputed work, I should have remained silent. If that nobleman should condescend to reply to an anonymous attack upon a production which he has not acknowledged, no one is more capable of doing so with effect, and I might justly be accused of presumption, were I to put myself forward as his champion and offer to break a lance in his behalf. But in reality the pamphlet is not so much an attack upon Lord Carnarvon, as a defence of Lord Palmerston. The latter statesman (if I may be pardoned such an abuse of the term) is in every other page the object of covert approbation, or open and fulsome panegyric; and his most unjustifiable acts and most deplorable blunders are alike bedaubed and plastered over by the determined and undistinguishing flattery of his nameless admirer.

The malevolence of common report has indeed gone so far as to libel the Noble Secretary, by attributing this eulogy of himself to no less distinguished a pen than his own. If we are to believe such a malicious rumour, we have to welcome, in this pamphlet, the offspring not of interested flattery, but of blind and in-

ordinate self-love; we have to listen not to "the bated breath and whispering humbleness" of some sycophantic echo, but to the soft and amorous murmurs of a political Narcissus.

It is, however, remarkable that whatever Lord Palmerston is supposed to be about, he is never supposed to act for himself. This wandering and versatile Ulysses, who has seen so many various administrations and travelled through so many different sets of opinions, is not yet thought capable of running alone. Thus when he signed the Quadruple Treaty, nothing would make the public believe but that the Prince de Talleyrand guided his hand. The Ex-Bishop confirmed the Ex-Tory in the faith of the *Juste Milieu*. The same report that has afflicted his Lordship with his recent fit of authorship, has not left him without an attendant. Señor Aguilar, the Cristino agent in London, has been appointed, it is said, to watch his go-cart, and to "nurse and dandle" him into a pamphleteer.

But there is no end to the spitefulness of common report. As if this anonymous publication were something beyond the united abilities of Lord Palmerston and Señor Aguilar, it is also whispered into notice as nothing less than the result of a combined movement from the two bases of London and Madrid. The British Legation and the Spanish Cabinet have



been bestirring themselves in the one city, the Spanish Legation and our own Foreign Office in the other. This is indeed gaining a purchase to lift a feather!

But I must beg for my own part to decline subscribing to the truth of these uncharitable reports. It is enough to have mentioned them; I cannot believe that any of the eminent persons above alluded to, have had the slightest share in a work that would discredit their humblest dependant. Whoever the author is, he has shown judgment in concealing his name. He is, probably, some official underling, who is seeking the favour of his superiors by an awkward attempt to defend them—one who knows little, and whose only talent is a knack of obscuring, distorting and falsifying the little that he may know. I shall, therefore, throughout my reply reduce him to unity, though in his own pages he usurps the style of Kings and Reviewers, and struts in all the pomp of the plural pronoun.

But whoever may have the right to the honours of this paternity, the foundling has met with a band of foster-fathers in the gentlemen of the ministerial press. They have rocked its cradle, held it up to the attention of the public, and neglected no art to invest it with an air of factitious importance. All who know any thing of the public must be aware how easily they

are misled by such artifices as these. The most contemptible production is not without weight, when it is believed, or even suspected, to proceed from authority. The pamphlet in question, particularly when regarded as the mouth-piece of the Foreign Office, is not ill put together for the purposes of deception, and if left without an answer, would certainly increase that ignorance on Spanish affairs, which the author affects to lament, and on which he impudently presumes.

I must however confess that he is not so mischievous as he means to be—the weakness of his ability cannot keep pace with the strength of his malevolence. It mostly happens that his sophistries are guiltless of deception, and his arguments prove nothing but what he wishes to refute. His mis-statements have at least the merit of frequently contradicting one another, and throughout his pages there prevails such a scuffle of conflicting assertions, that Lord Palmerston himself would despair of reconciling the angry combatants, and would decline to interfere in such an obstinate civil war.

But with all this author's powers of refuting and contradicting himself, he has left the good work incomplete. The poison is stronger than the antidote. There are still some of his fallacies that require to be unmasked—some of his arguments that should have their weakness ex-

posed, and many assertions that he has left for others to contradict. I found it to be the general opinion of those with whom I conversed, that this useful but irksome task naturally devolved on me. They represented that I was the first Englishman who had introduced the subject to the notice of the public,\* that

\* "*Spain! or Who is the lawful Successor to the Throne.*"

This pamphlet went to press early in 1834, and I was induced to write it by the circumstance of Cristina's agents being then, and for some time previously, engaged in active labours to make the British public and some of our leading men believe that the right lay on the side of Queen Christina's daughter, and as far as I had an opportunity of judging, I was of opinion that the case was the reverse. As stated in the Preface, the speech from the throne (Feb. 4, 1834) and the debates which thereon ensued, convinced me that a strong delusion upon this interesting point prevailed among us, which I thought it was desirable to have removed. Not being provided with all the materials required, I obtained them from abroad and, without consulting any one, published my pamphlet at the beginning of May. This humble effort in the cause of Spanish Legitimacy I had the honour of presenting to Don Carlos, at Gloucester Lodge, and he appeared equally surprised and delighted at the idea of a foreigner and a perfect stranger having voluntarily stepped forward in his defence, at a time when there was little probability of his visiting our shores. He seated me near him and conversed with me for upwards of an hour, particularly mentioning the kind treatment experienced by himself and family on board of the *Donegal*, for which he felt desirous of thanking our most gracious sovereign, if an opportunity presented itself. When I visited him at Oñate, in the winter of 1835, General Pinheiro introduced me as a friend of his own. Don Carlos, in the most

having passed much of my life with Spaniards, and been in personal communication with many prominent characters on both sides, and with the very highest among the Carlists, I had met with peculiar opportunities of obtaining information, and of making myself acquainted with the merits of the case; that I had already done something to remove the prevailing errors, and it was therefore my duty, as an Englishman and a friend to truth, once more to step forward in the same cause and expose this new and malignant attempt to mislead the unwary.

I yielded, but I must confess with reluctance, as I had just risen with debilitated health from the laborious composition of two volumes on the "Revolutions of Spain;" and I was aware that either in that work or in two tracts previously published,\* I had refuted by anticipation the greater part of the pamphlet which I was now called upon to answer, for either from

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amiable manner and with a smile which bespoke his kindness of heart, turning to the general and pointing to me, said, *este es mi defensor*, "this is my defender," and then in the most friendly and condescending manner welcomed me to his little court. And, in a country like ours, shall such a Prince as this not find an advocate when he and his adherents are assailed by a nameless slanderer?

\*The second tract, not bearing my name, is "Legitimacy the only Salvation for Spain," published in the middle of 1835.



want of candour, or want of information, it is the constant practice of my nameless antagonist to put forward, as something novel or uncontested, matter both of fact and argument which has been already disproved. I trust therefore that my readers will excuse me if I occasionally refer to my former works.

After this apology, I proceed to my task.

Of the innumerable errors of my anonymous opponent, that relating to the Catalonian insurrection of 1827 is the most venial. It would indeed have been wonderful if such a writer had succeeded in unravelling an intrigue which, even now, is a mystery to many well-informed Spaniards—if one, who is always missing the plainest track, had gone right in such a labyrinth. But amidst all the obscurity of this transaction, one point is perfectly clear. Don Carlos, though his name was made use of, had no part whatever in the intrigue. This has been already shown at page 363, vol. i. of my work on the “Revolutions of Spain,” where I have given an account of these commotions, without however mentioning their original instigators. What I shall now relate is the result of extensive enquiries diligently prosecuted in France and England, as well as in Spain.

Those who know any thing of Ferdinand VII.'s real character, are aware of his turn for intrigue, and of his propensity for travelling by

crooked paths even when the straight were surer. . He passed his life in balancing parties, and ended in disgusting all. His conduct in 1826 was a strange instance of his unkingly passion for indirect means. At that time his cabinet contained several liberals, who were of course unpopular with the royalists, particularly with those of Catalonia. Of this feeling a strange advantage was taken.

In Ferdinand's own camarilla (of which Don Carlos never formed a part, and where he was not regarded with good will) with the King's full knowledge and approbation, was the plan of this ultra-royalist insurrection laid, the object of which was to enable one section of the cabinet to overthrow the other. By this complicated scheme he possibly expected at once to gratify the royalists and excuse himself to the liberals. But when men's minds are violently excited, the game of agitation is playing with edged tools.

The insurrection spread throughout the principality and probably far beyond the intentions of its instigators. The liberals took advantage of the general ferment to promote their own ends—the exiles flocked to the vicinity from their different retreats, and, in order to divide the royalists, it was given out that the object of the insurrection was to raise the Infante to the

throne. This calumny, as I have already stated, they unblushingly supported by manifestoes and other documents, printed abroad and circulated in Spain. I could name the liberal who managed the scandalous manoeuvre in England, and I am in possession of one of those papers, which was printed in the vicinity of London.

Whether it was this interference of the liberals, or the unexpected extent of the insurrection that alarmed the King, and made him shrink from the consequences of his own acts, is more than I can venture to assert. Tranquillity was finally restored by the most unparliamentary measures—royalists and liberals suffered from the same vindictive severity, and this was the end of disturbances, discreditable to all concerned in them and deeply disgraceful to some. In this transaction I cannot see why the Infante should have defended himself before he was accused. Such conduct would have been a very equivocal proof of innocence; but as soon as his name was mentioned he went beyond a disavowal; he indignantly demanded an enquiry; a rigid investigation was instituted and conducted by men not his friends, some indeed his personal enemies, and after more than a thousand examinations of persons in Catalonia and elsewhere, it was pronounced that nothing appeared to implicate the Infante—

and the same result was reached in the

not an act was disclosed that had any reference to him.

This insurrection and the affair of Bessieres, which sprung from the same source, but in which Don Carlos was never even suspected, were the only two royalist movements directed in appearance against Ferdinand. What therefore is meant at p. 5 of the pamphlet by accusing Don Carlos of countenancing the intrigues of his "*cuarto*," being privy to a series of plots, and constantly refusing to disavow or reprobate the acts of the conspirators? If the author alludes to the countless plots and insurrections by which the *liberals* disturbed the throne of Ferdinand, I may safely leave such an accusation without an answer.

If however he refers to any thing that happened between 1820 and 1823, a period when Ferdinand was the unwilling prisoner of the triumphant liberals, far be it from me to deny

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\* The liberals wished it to be believed that Calomarde was implicated with the Infantes, perhaps the most preposterous of all their libels and inventions, in consequence of which he urged an inquiry, when by the King's orders and for the mutual satisfaction of the aggrieved parties, a commission was appointed to carry on the investigations, composed of counsellors of Castile and distinguished magistrates. I have this fact from Señor Calomarde himself, and it has been confirmed to me by others concerned in the inquiry; but it is well known that the King deemed this an unnecessary step.



that Don Carlos may have participated in such plots and conspiracies as those. I dare say he favoured them whenever he had an opportunity, for he has shown himself through life a faithful subject, and an affectionate brother. When disaffected and turbulent subjects take the cabinet by storm, trample on their sovereign, and pervert the power of the crown to the destruction of the prerogative, resistance becomes a loyal service. This is one of those few Spanish mysteries which an Englishman can comprehend in a moment.

But one would imagine, from p. 4 and 5 of the pamphlet, that from 1814 to 1827 there were no plots in Spain but such as were hatched in Don Carlos's *cuarto*—no military mutinies but that which broke out in his regiment in 1822. How does it happen that this candid author, with all his laudable abhorrence of plots and mutinies, passes over in profound silence the great plot and mutiny of La Isla—the mutiny not of a regiment but of an army, a mutiny that produced a révolution, stripped the King of his power, and placed him at the mercy of the constitutionalists? I will explain the motive of this *suppressio veri*.

It is his purpose to represent Don Carlos as plotting in 1822 against the King's authority, and therefore he keeps out of sight the awkward fact that the King had then no authority

at all. To reinstate him in that authority was the object of all the plots and insurrections in Spain from 1820 to 1823. They were directed not against the King, but against the constitutionalists who had enthralled him; they were rebellions against rebels, and mutinies against mutineers.

In 1822 Don Carlos was certainly colonel of the carabineer guards, and that regiment rose at Alcalá against the Constitution. This is what the author of the pamphlet miscalls a "Carlist mutiny." If, as this writer says, "neither threat nor persuasion could induce the Infante to punish the offence, or to disavow his connexion with its authors," such firmness and loyalty would have done him honour. But the pamphleteer, in his blind eagerness to malign the Prince, does injustice to his enemies. With all their faults and crimes the liberals of 1822 were more capable of governing than he would have us believe. They were not, like the present rulers of Madrid, at the mercy of their officers; they could act against a disaffected regiment without first applying to the colonel to punish or disavow. Is this writer really ignorant that the regiment in question, which seemingly he could not name, and whose impunity he appears to insinuate, was disbanded for the mutiny, and the officers compelled to assume plain clothes, a civil mode of cashiering?

In that year I happened to travel from Madrid to Badajoz with one of these officers, and this has served to impress more strongly on my memory the particulars of the whole transaction. From the barrack, the pamphleteer jumps to the drawing room, and offers to the Infanta, wife of Don Carlos, and the Princess de Beira the homage of an invective. Alas! for the luckless constitutionalists! at one time threatened by the sabre, at another by a lady's fan! Don Carlos's carabineers were bad enough, but they were nothing to his *cuarto*. It was this formidable *cuarto* that, according to the pamphleteer, produced innumerable conspiracies against the authority of Ferdinand VII.—conspiracies which, I allow Don Carlos neither disavowed nor reprobated, and of which he no doubt approved, for they were conspiracies against his brother's enemies.

Don Carlos never made a mystery of his political opinions; his aversion to the liberals was notorious and avowed, and it certainly was not in his apartments and among the circle of his familiar friends that we should look for panegyrists of the Constitution of 1812, or the revolt of 1820. But it is preposterous to attribute the royalist insurrections to the chit-chat of his *cuarto*; they were provoked by the measures of the revolutionary government, who assailed

the church, trampled on the throne, and outraged the best feelings and strongest prejudices of the nation. No doubt the Infante was hated and feared by the demagogues of 1820; these men knew that had he been allowed to act, their insurrection would never have succeeded; no doubt his *cuarto* was unpopular enough with the clubists and anarchists of the day. Their stifled resentment at last broke out into invectives, first uttered in the clubs and next in the cabinet. It was even determined to impeach him as an enemy to the Constitution; legal proceedings were commenced, and a room prepared for his reception in the *Carcel de Corte*, or Court Prison, when his enemies on a sudden shrunk from the execution of their design, and abandoned charges which for months together had resounded within the walls of their conclaves.

It is indeed believed that Ferdinand would have been better pleased had the Infante been less popular, and this jealous feeling was fostered and kept alive by the enemies of the latter. But the brothers were never more candid than at the very period when, according to this veracious pamphlet, the regiment of the Infante was disturbed by a Carlist mutiny, and his *cuarto* teeming with seditious intrigues. At that time the King and the Prince were united more closely than ever by the bond of

their common danger. When, as was their habit, they were smoking their evening cigar together, they probably made themselves merry with the democratic invectives against the intrigues of the *cuarto*,\* intrigues (if they must be called so) as well known to one brother as to the other. What a pity that no demagogue of the day ever thought of adding to their amusement by denouncing those intrigues as disloyal plots, and the royalist movements as insurrections against the King! But that valuable discovery was reserved for fifteen years afterwards, to reward the diligence of a British pamphleteer.

It is not my intention on the present occasion to describe at length all that occurred at La Granja in 1832, or to enter fully into the question of succession. For complete information on both points I refer the reader to my three former works. But here, as elsewhere, the author of the pamphlet is faithful to his system of deception. He tells us, apparently for the purpose of producing a false impression, that the King was induced to "settle the crown upon Don Carlos, as if the latter acknowledged the King's power to settle the crown on any one,

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\* The *cuarto* was so unpopular among the liberals that one of the men in power was constantly heard to say, *es necesario tapar to con cal y canto*—it must be shut up with bricks and mortar.

or was willing to take as a gift that which he claimed by right.

On this occasion, as throughout his life, the Infante never swerved from the straight path of duty. While he respectfully declined the request of his brother, first to renounce his own claim, and then to share the Regency with the Queen, he peremptorily rejected the advice and solicitations of powerful supporters to take upon himself the Regency during his brother's illness, and thus secure the public tranquillity and his own succession. It was in such a state of things, under the immediate apprehension of

a civil war, to sustain which she was utterly unprepared, that the Queen yielded, and recommended the revocation of the Pragmatic Sanction.

The "generosity which," according to her anonymous eulogist "has few parallels in history," consisted in reluctantly giving up what she felt herself too weak to retain. Afterwards, when she found herself strong—when she had occupied with her adherents every civil and military station, and secured the assistance of foreigners to destroy the laws of Spain, this *generous* princess forgot her generosity and readily maintained her daughter's illegal claims through all the horrors of a civil war.

I should add that the ministers, far from being in the interests of the Infante, acted with

the Queen throughout. Both she and they yielded from the same motives, but when the King for a time revived, and the Queen recovered her influence and forgot her apprehensions, the ministers suffered for having shared her fears. This was their only treason.

The author of the pamphlet goes on to say, "although Lord Carnarvon declines to investigate the delicate question of the succession, we deem it expedient to say a few words upon a matter which appears to us extremely simple; but he does not add his Lordship's reason, namely, that the question had been discussed already, and as far as Don Carlos's claims were concerned, in one of those works to which I have already been obliged to refer my readers.

His Lordship's opinion of my pamphlet entitled "Spain is expressed in terms which it would ill become me to repeat. They are such as more than console me for the silence of my anonymous opponent.

I shall not follow my antagonist through the whole of this simple matter, in treating of which, *simple* though it may be, he has been *simple* enough to fall into numerous errors. Most of these it would be tiresome for me to expose a second time, but when he tells us (p. 8) that the Cortes of 1719 was struck down by Philip V. disregarded the remonstrances of the Council of State—that he proclaimed the

Salic law to be the law of the land by his sovereign will and pleasure," and that "this arbitrary and insolent decree was not registered in the usual form, he must pardon me if I decline to admit these new discoveries in Spanish History, on the mere *ipse dixit* of a gentleman without a name.

I hope he will not be offended with me for disputing his right to annul "by his sovereign will and pleasure" a law that disturbed no vested right, that secured the independence of the country, that was the pledge of European peace, that remained on the Statute-book of Spain for 117 years, and was as regularly enacted and as firmly established as our own Act of Settlement.

The law of Philip V. certainly modifies the rule of succession sanctioned by the code of the *Siete Partidas*, but though the author of that code had the surname of Wise,\* I am not aware

that Alonso might justly acquire the name of Wise from his general proficiencies in learning, and especially in astronomical science, if these attainments deserved praise in a King who was incapable of preserving his subjects in their duty. As a legislator, Alonso by his code of the *Siete Partidas*, sacrificed the constitutional rights of his crown to the usurpation of Rome, and his philosophy sunk below the level of ordinary prudence, when he permitted the phantom of an imperial crown in Germany to seduce his hopes for almost twenty years.—Hallam's *Middle Ages*, v. 2, p. 17.



that his wisdom was of so divine and unerring a nature that whatever it enacted was unalterable by succeeding legislators. The Code of this Spanish Solomon was in fact set at naught by his own son, and indeed was not observed, even in Castile, till it was sanctioned and published by Alonzo XI. at the Cortes of Alcalá de Henares. In point of authority it only occupied the fourth place after the Laws of Toro, the Statutes passed in Cortes, and the Recopilacion, and all four codes, like all laws in all States, were liable to be altered, as occasion required, by the adequate legislative authority.

This legislative authority was exercised by Philip V in the Cortes of 1718, and his law could only have been set aside by an equally valid proceeding. The Cortes of 1713 were openly and regularly summoned for the express purpose of deliberating on the Law of Succession, and the members furnished by their constituents with the requisite powers to that effect. Ferdinand, or rather Christina, well knew that such Cortes would never consent to rob the Infante of his right, and therefore they preferred to assume the validity of the secret and abortive proceedings of 1789, proceedings so manifestly illegal, that the author of the pamphlet has not once ventured to allude to them.

The Cortes mentioned at p. 9 of the pamphlet were not called by Ferdinand "to confirm his act" for his act, according to Cristino law, required no confirmation, but itself resuscitated and confirmed the proceedings of 1789. They met not to deliberate, but merely to take the oath to his daughter. The question of succession was never once mentioned in their presence, but on the contrary studiously avoided. Yet the writer, who, to produce a false impression on English readers, appeals to this assembly of mutes, has the effrontery to talk of the "mock Cortes" of 1713!

The motives of the latter Cortes, and of Philip V. are sufficiently obvious, and who can deny that they were laudable? The course of events had been such that Spain had been exposed to all the evils without enjoying any of the advantages that belong to the rule of female succession, and in consequence the country was strongly in favour of an alteration. The current of European opinion ran in the same direction, for the nations were yet smarting from the wound of a bloody war, which had arisen from the same cause.

The law of Philip V. gave effect to the stipulations of the treaty of Utrecht, and the object of both was to prevent the union at any future period of the crowns of France and Spain on the same head. It is consequently

part of the international law of Europe. It is however an error to confound it with the Salic law, for by the latter, females are utterly excluded, but by the law of Philip V. on the extinction of the male line of that monarchy, the daughter of the last reigning male is to succeed to the throne, and transmit to her descendants according to the same rigid agnation as before. By the limitations of this law the "innocent Isabel" herself, and her equally innocent sister take precedence of the House of Savoy on stairs.

The pamphleteer pronounces at p. p. 18 and 9 a pompous panegyric on the Cortes of Cadiz, a panegyric which contains a mis-statement in every line. This arrogant, disloyal, corrupt and revolutionary body certainly established their right of female succession; among various illegal acts, and it would have been strange if the men who stripped their absent King of his prerogative, seized his power and usurped his very style, had spared the rights of his brother. But why has he not stated that the King on his return to Spain annulled all their proceedings, and that their acts were afterwards non est regarded than the acts of the Commonwealth and Cromwell are with us.

Through the whole paragraph he never once mentions the word "Constitution," though this was the name which his favourites, the "mock Cortes" of Cadiz, gave to their act of usurpa-

tion. This caution (to use one of his own phrases) "is not without its object." It would appear from his next paragraph, that by the time of Ferdinand's death the Spaniards were so far from feeling grateful for what the Cortes of Cadiz had done for them, that "nobody dreamed of re-establishing the Constitution; the memory of which was held in general aversion," and he quarrels most unjustly with Lord Carnarvon for talking of the Constitutionists as an existing party.

He has been pleased to bring before us the Cortes of Cadiz, a body whose acts were acknowledged neither by Ferdinand, Christina, nor Don Carlos. Why then does he pass over in profound silence the Cortes of 1789, a mock Cortes I allow, but still the Cortes on whose secret, imperfect and abortive proceedings, after they had lain concealed and unratified for forty-one years, Ferdinand chose to rest his illegal Pragmatic Sanction? I have elsewhere given a full account of this strange affair, which it would seem, the author of the pamphlet could not make up his mind to defend. His silence does honour to his discretion. It was not for the advocate of Isabel to lay bare the rotten foundation on which her claim reposes.

At p. p. 9 and 10 of the pamphlet Lord Carnarvon is taken to task for saying that "the Constitutionists warmly professed their alle-

giance to the Queen, from a well-grounded conviction that the questionable nature of her daughter's title would eventually compel her to look to them for assistance and consequently embrace their views." Now what does the pamphlet say of the matter? "Men, who wished to be no longer governed despotically, and those who thought Spain fit for some form of representative government, professed their allegiance to the Queen, because the political system which it was evident she would be obliged to adopt, was in harmony with their opinions and the only one by which both she and they could combat the party who for years had been making war on the insufficient despotism of the King."

Surely this is the same thing in other words; the only difference is, that Lord Carnarvon is clear and concise, while his censor is diffuse and obscure. The latter, however, acknowledges, as far as his meaning can be discerned through the mist of his *verbiage*, that "the men who wished to be no longer governed despotically (for he will not allow them to be called 'Constitutionalists') supported the Queen, not because they thought her cause was just, but because they expected she would serve their purposes. This is true liberal morality! It is the same flagitious disregard of justice which runs throughout the pamphlet and which

I shall soon have occasion to reprobate and expose.

I shall embrace another opportunity of discussing the nature of the civil war, and shall at present proceed to take into consideration the Basque privileges, as they now exist. On this subject Lord Carnarvon is accused in the pamphlet of having written a *Romance*. This is a strange accusation to come from the author of the pamphlet. Lord Carnarvon's picture, with all its glowing colours, is a correct likeness; it is the pamphlet that is the *Romance*, and a romance too that has not even the merits which belong to a well-conceived work of fiction, for it teems with improbabilities and inconsistencies, and has no resemblance whatever to the truth. The author maintains (p. p. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21) that the privileges of the Basques have of late years existed merely in name; it is my present purpose to show that they have retained their original vigour to the present day.

To prove my case, the first witness I shall put into the box is my antagonist himself. He says, speaking of the privileges, their nominal existence has not been attacked, though often threatened, and probably for a private object; for the Deputy from the Provinces, who came to Madrid to watch over their interests on such occasions, usually found some solid arguments for convincing the Minister of the inexpediency

of his measure. The Kings of Spain, we repeat, with a view to the maintenance of absolute power, have always deemed it expedient not to abolish the privileges.

This is indeed *Much ado about nothing*. Here we have the Minister threatening nominal privileges for the purpose of extorting a real bribe; upon this, up posts to court the Deputy of the provinces, (unlike the author of the pamphlet) well provided with *solid arguments*, to interpose in defence of the endangered nonentities; but, after all, he might have spared his pains and his purse, for the kings of Spain have always considered these shadows to be of service for the maintenance of absolute power! What a rabble of contradictions are banded here to make war upon the truth! Did it never strike the author of the pamphlet that there could not be a stronger proof of the substantial existence of the privileges, than the fact that they were the object of popular interest, ministerial bribery and court intrigue?

At p. 19 he promises to give us a few instances, "to show how in latter years the Basque privileges have been virtually set aside with the tacit consent of the people." His *few* instances are *two*; and I will give the first in his own words. "In 1818 a general levy of troops was made, for the purpose of sending an expedition to South America. The Basque

provinces, notwithstanding their privileges, were ordered to furnish their quota; no resistance was offered, but the Basques offered money instead of men, and the money was more acceptable to the King. They tendered six millions of rials, and were ordered to pay ten, which they did."

Now if the King ordered the Basques to furnish a quota of men, he violated their privileges, in form as well as in substance, which is more than the author himself contends for; but how did the Basques obey this order? Their task was simple enough; they had only to do as they were bid. This however they did not do; they presumed to deliberate, instead of obeying, and when they were asked for men, made an offer of money. But "the money was more acceptable to the King." Indeed!—Then why not ask for it at once? Why run the risk of being taken at his word by men to whom his word was a law? However, the King preferred to talk in riddles, and was fortunate enough to find every Basque an Oedipus; but these people, who had the sagacity to discover that the King wanted money, when he asked for men, could not divine that ten millions of rials would be more to his mind than six!

Here is an incongruous Romance indeed! Facts, we are told, are stubborn things, but in the hands of this unskilful Romancer fictions



are as stubborn as facts. Even if his assertions were correct, I might claim them in favour of the Basques. Despotism moves in a straight path; management, shifts and roundabout ways are the resources of limited power. The transaction, which this writer sets before us, never could have occurred between an absolute King, and subjects whose only privilege was to obey. It is a clear matter of bargain and compromise between sovereign and subject, the usual characteristic of free states. But the King ordered the Basques! This is rather a free translation of the Spanish verb *pedir*, but the author seems to have been conscious that his facts were insufficient to support his case, and therefore brought forward a stout, burley, imperious word to uphold their weakness. He has thus reduced the matter to an absurdity. To order and to be disobeyed are the lofty prerogatives of this absolute King. The Basques may have paid ten millions of rials in 1818 to the King, when he asked for money, but I deny the mandate and compulsion. Whatever they give, they have the right to refuse, and I shall presently show that they have exercised that right within the present century. Nor do I deny that a general levy of men may have been made in the year named, but the levies even in the provinces subject to them (which the Basque provinces are not)

are never made for a particular expedition, but for the general service of the army, the navy and the public works.\* The Basque provinces are on another footing. There, in a time of danger, every man is a soldier; but the only regular force they were bound by *fueres* to maintain and recruit was the regiment of Cantabria.

The mention of this regiment reminds me of a modern instance of the grasping spirit of Ferdinand's cabinet, and the independent conduct of the Basques. After the restoration of 1823, the whole Spanish army was dissolved, and the provincial regiments alone detained. On this occasion, the regiment of Cantabria was disbanded with the rest. The next year, the ministers made a claim upon the Basque Provinces for arrears due to the government for the maintenance of this regiment, which they alleged had been employed at a distance during the war of invasion, and consequently had not been supported by the Basques. The latter replied, that though they had not supported their own regiment, during the period in question, they had maintained at different times the divisions of El Pastor, Longa, Mina and others, to whom they were bound by the *fueres*.

The several expeditions destined for South America were furnished with arms from various regiments, and not from recruits.

besides suffering from the French, and that the expended for the general defense a far larger sum than the regiment would have cost them. On this ground they resisted the claim of the government. The latter urged their demand for several years to no purpose, but never ventured to enforce it, and it was at last dropped altogether after the affair of La Granja.

Their conduct, before the war of invasion, bore the like free character. In 1804, Godoy sent down to Biscaya a number of stamps, and directed that they should be used, and duty on them, decreed, in aid of the general revenue. On this the deputation (not declared the proceeding) of the minister an innovation, and proclaimed it inadmissible. The government threatened, but this only produced an insurrection, and the people signified their tacit consent to the "virtual" infringement of their privileges by burning Godoy in effigy, seizing the obnoxious stamps, setting fire to some under the tree of Guernica, and employing others in the most unseemly service. It was in vain that General Taranco crossed the Ebro with a body of troops, and penetrated into Biscay. After apprehending and punishing a few individuals, he found it expedient to withdraw, and the proposed stamp duty was abandoned. This affair is still called *La Zamacolada*, from the name of the principal ringleader, Zamacola, an

*escribano*, a relative of the Basque historian and a man of great influence in the province. To this day, the order for the execution of any warrant from a superior court is, in Biscay, always made out on plain paper, "*En papel blanco* (as the wording goes) *por no usarse sellado en esta mui noble y mui leal provincia de Vizcaya*,"—stamps not being used in this most noble and loyal province of Biscay.

The *second* and *last* instances of the *few*, by which the author of the pamphlet has promised to prove the *virtual* violation of the Basque privileges by the "despotic sovereigns of Spain," can scarcely be called an instance at all. If the establishment of the Inquisition (the instance in question,) is to be considered a violation of the privileges, they would have been violated rather by the Pope than by the King; nor do I see what could have been gained in point of *form* by attaching the Provinces to Logroño; it would rather have been an additional degradation, and an unnecessary hardship to have been made amenable to a Castilian tribunal.

But we must not confound questions of civil and ecclesiastical power. The Basques of course submitted to the authority of the Papal See, in matters wholly unconnected with their *fueros*, and as they had always been under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Castilian Bishop of Calahorra,

it was natural that, on the establishment of the Inquisition, they should be attached to the tribunal of a neighbouring town, at which the representative of the diocesan sat as a member. It was probably a mere matter of local convenience, and certainly had nothing to do either with the form or substance of the *fueros*.

Indeed, so far was the Inquisition from being virtually established in the provinces, that the reverse seems rather to have been the case. Inquisitorial power was substantially in the hands of the native parochial clergy, a body full of all the peculiar feelings of their countrymen; and, whether from this, or any other cause, it is certain that the "Holy Office" exercised its authority in these provinces with so much lenity as to be little more than a name.

As a convincing proof of the state of public feeling in the Basque provinces on the subject of the Inquisition, it may be observed that, in the sitting of the 18th of May, 1836, and towards the close of the protracted debate in the *Procuradores* on the electoral law proposed to be established by virtue of the *Estatuto Real*, one deputy spoke of the domination of the Inquisition in the Basque Provinces, when Señor Gaminda, another deputy and a Basque, rose up and indignantly repelled the charge, by replying that the direct power of the Inquisition was never tolerated in those provinces, and that

men who had been persecuted in other parts of Spain and of Europe, sought an asylum there; adding that even Rousseau at one time thought of taking refuge in that sanctuary. Señor Marthe de los Heros, deputy for Bilbao and one of Mendizábal's colleagues, also spoke and told the Chamber that he was a Biscayan and gloried in being a native of a country in which legal liberty and the equality of rights had existed from time immemorial. This deputy asserted that the rights of the Basque provinces are not privileges, as usually understood, and added to the bandied question of Biscayan nobility, observing that in Biscay the principle of nobility was equality, while in every other country it was the reverse. The only answer given, in the course of the debate, by the ministers was, that the Basque liberties were incompatible with the existing order of things, and this is the only plea the pamphleteer can now allege for their abolition; but ought not the Basques to be parties to the compromise by which this abolition is to be effected? The privileges of the Navarrese were in many respects less extensive than those of the Basques, but according to the irrefragable testimony of the pamphlet (p. 20) they were equally disregarded. To prove this, we are told a strange story of the manner in which the Viceroy of Navarre, before he can get any

money out of the Coortes of that Kingdom, and  
 compelled to sign a declaration that all his  
 violations of their privileges have been arbitrary  
 and illegal, but as soon as he has received  
 absolution and forgiveness in the shape of a  
 subsidy, for this full confession of his sins, the  
 graceless Viceroy, we are told, immediately sets  
 about running up a new score. My readers, I  
 trust will readily pardon me for not detaining  
 them longer on the subject of this silly tale,  
 particularly as I am about to produce a decisive  
 testimony as to the virtual and vigorous ex-  
 istence of the privileges in question. I must  
 however allow, that whatever may be the case  
 with the Basques and Navarrese, the author of  
 the pamphlet maintains in full vigour and re-  
 peated exercise a certain privilege of his own  
 the privilege of self contradiction. To con-  
 vince us that the Coortes of Navarre have no  
 power, he describes them as "compelling" the  
 Viceroy to sign before they consent to pay.  
 I have already perhaps said enough to refute  
 the strange notion entertained by the author of  
 the pamphlet, that the privileges of the Basques  
 and Navarrese have of late years been virtu-  
 ally set aside with the tacit consent of the  
 people. To do this, I have not dived into  
 ancient chronicles to find materials for  
 modern history, but have kept myself within  
 the present century and the memory of the ex-

isting generation. If my recollection had failed me, it would have been no matter for the solitary instance, which the author of the pamphlet has so rashly produced, would have proved all I could desire.

But perhaps the public will not think it unreasonable that one disputant at least should say something of his authorities; and those which I shall produce are such as I am sure must satisfy the champion of a liberal minister; some of them indeed have attracted the favourable notice of my antagonist himself. I hope however, that in bringing forward my witnesses, I shall not incur the displeasure of Lord Carnarvon. Whatever may be the other merits of his *romance*, I shall be compelled to deny its claim to the praise of original invention; for I have to produce an American republican, the Cadiz Cortes, and Cristino Basques, all before him in the same "tale." They and his Lordship are all romancers alike. Lord Palmerston's champion is the only historian. Truth, rejected and expelled by Conservative Peers, American Republicans, and Spanish Liberals, nestles only in the sheltering pages of the ministerial pamphlet. Some may consider my first authority rather antiquated for it is of no less than fifty years' standing. This is however the nearest approach that I shall make to "ancient chronicles."



Mr John Adams, formerly President of the United States, and one of the founders of their Independence, in his defence of the American constitution, says of the Basques: "While their neighbours have long since resigned all their pretensions into the hands of kings and priests, this extraordinary people have preserved their ancient language, genius, laws, government, and manners without innovation, longer than any nation of Europe." Active, vigilant, generous, brave, hardy, inclined to sea and navigation, they have enjoyed for two thousand years the reputation of the best soldiers and sailors in Spain, and even of the best frontiersmen, many of them having, by their wisdom and manly spirit, raised themselves into offices of consequence at the court of Madrid. Their valuable qualities have recommended them to the esteem of the Kings of Spain, who have hitherto left them in possession of those great immunities of which they are so jealous. Many writers ascribe their flourishing commerce to their situation; but, as this is a case better than that of Feroe or Greenland, that advantage is probably due to their liberty. If riding through this little territory, you could handle your sword in Connecticut; instead of miserable interruptions of your journey, you would have the country full of men. The contradictory discourse

and farms of the farmer, the lands well cultivated, and a wealthy happy peasantry. The author of the pamphlet has eulogized the Cadiz Cortes for despoiling Don Carlos of his rights; he cannot therefore find fault with me if I produce a select detachment of that pious and patriotic body to testify in favour of the Basque and Navarrese privileges. (My own opinion of that assembly I have already had occasion to record;—but, in the present case, its members are witnesses beyond suspicion, for they had the strongest inducements to depreciate those privileges; which nevertheless the force of truth compelled them to praise. They were preparing at the same time to depress the power of the crown, and to subvert the privileges in question; what therefore could have better served their purpose (had they only possessed the requisite effrontery) than to put forth so substantial truths as provisions like those of the ministerial pamphlet?—to represent the Kings of Spain as having long since virtually annulled the privileges, and only retained such empty forms as might serve the ends of arbitrary power? They would have shifted from their own shoulders a load of odium, could they have made this *romance* pass for real history; but they knew Spain too well to attempt so gross an imposture. The document which I am about to quote is the Preliminary Discourse

to the Constitution of 1812, is a document drawn up by a select committee appointed by the Cortes. After giving a sketch of the former vigour and present nullity of the Constitution and these privileges, the discourse proceeds as with the following contrast, overthrowing in the very first sentence the theory of the English pamphlet: "The Constitution of Navarre, being still in existence and in full force, cannot fail to seriously fix the attention of the Congress. It offers an irrefragable testimony against those who persist in believing that policy to be foreign which is observed to the present day in one of the most fortunate and civilised provinces of the empire." Then after stating that the Cortes, which originally assembled every year, had been reduced to occasional meetings, the discourse goes on thus: "These Cortes, or States General still possess very great authority. No law can be established but with their free assent, and for this end deliberations are carried on without the presence of the Monarch. When the assembly has adopted a bill (which is called in Navarre *Real Cédula* or *Real Decreto*) then the King approves or rejects it. If in the former case, the law, after having been drawn up and sanctioned, is examined afresh by the Cortes, who reject it if they find it con-

any one prejudicial to the subject of their de-  
 mands, making representations on the subject,  
 till the King and Kingdom come to an agree-  
 ment. But the latter may at last absolutely  
 forbid the petitioning and enrolment of the  
 law, should it appear contrary to the public  
 interest. The discourse then notices the similar pre-  
 cautions taken with regard to votes of supply,  
 and the extensive authority of the intermediary de-  
 putation that was constantly assembled while  
 the Cortes were not sitting, and the indepen-  
 dence of the judicial power. The whole mes-  
 sage is too long to extract, but throughout the  
 Navarrese institutions are represented as ex-  
 isting in full vigour, and no hint is given of any  
 ill-governed despotism, or "juggles to subvert in  
 effect what is maintained in form; in a word,  
 every thing that the lie direct to the author of  
 the ministerial pamphlet. The discourse goes on to  
 inform Navarre the discourse turns to Biscay,  
 and passes over the affairs of that country in  
 a single sentence, which contrasts strangely  
 with the assertion in the pamphlet (p. 118) that  
 the history of the Basque Provinces is not  
 known. The Provinces of Biscay, it says, the  
 Discourse, "enjoy in like manner an infinite  
 number of rights and privileges, which are so  
 well known that it is not necessary to specify  
 them. But they reject it if they find it

The author of the pamphlet, at p. 18, and 19, refers to the ancient constitution of Castile and Aragon, and asks "What would this prove as to their actual state?" of them; shortly after, adds "Thus it has come to pass in the Basque Provinces, where the greater part of the privileges have been annulled *de facto*, though the despotic sovereigns of Spain were too wise to do so by formal decrees." Now what says the Disputist on these points? "The union of Castile and Aragon was soon followed by the loss of liberty, and the weight of the yoke increased to such a degree, that we had lost (it is painful to say so) the very idea of our dignity, with the exception nevertheless of the fortunate provinces of Biscay and those of the Kingdom of Navarre." But it is useless to multiply quotations from the Preliminary Discourse. The public can easily judge from what has been brought forward already, whether it is Lord Carnarvon or the author of the pamphlet, who (to borrow the words of the latter) has endeavoured "to take advantage of the ignorance of his readers."\*

\* Even now the Christian government does not venture to enforce that part of Navarre occupied by their troops to enforce commands at variance with the liberties of that kingdom. In April, 1836, Baron de Meer, the viceroys, holding his government at Pampelona, arrested and sent away the President



history preserved its rights and privileges un-  
 impaired."—that, "if they had the sense, when  
 those rights were threatened, they would be  
 warring alike (for zeal for the good) of their  
 country and for the lawful things of the civil  
 decent world"—that "it would be neither just,  
 nor economical, nor politic, to abolish their  
 franchises and privileges, which are advantageous to the pro-  
 vince, and prejudicial to the nation, founded  
 on rights acquired by Guineas in the conquest  
 made at its incorporation with the Crown, and  
 highly valued by its hardy and industrious  
 inhabitants."—Not did they stop here, but declared openly,  
 "in the same document, that if an army must be  
 always kept on foot to compel them to submit  
 to the loss of their privileges."—What must  
 have been the real feelings of these men, who  
 were, though they were, when they could dare to  
 make such a demonstration at this critical moment  
 of the Queen's foreign mercantile commerce.  
 But the privileges next gave itself so much  
 trouble to the Kings of Spain, as to the author  
 of the pamphlet. At p. 19 he had "virtually  
 met them aside with the tacit consent of the  
 people, &c." at p. 20, "they had long since ceased  
 to have any real and practical existence," but  
 at p. 21 they rise from their graves, with re-  
 newed life and vigour, and oblige their per-  
 severing opponent, to lay a fresh host of trumps,

down a second time. Though the Junta of  
 these very provinces have frequently com-  
 plained (as we are told at p. 28) that no proper  
 laws have been passed to hinder the privilege of  
 through every province "internal" (if we may so  
 call it) trade has diminished the population, it  
 is confessed at p. 28, that "the most nu-  
 merous party are clamorous in their support,  
 preferring of economic and privation to all  
 the blessings of Castilian finance. He cannot  
 understand that this most numerous party do  
 not "venture to put forth their real motives  
 against the change of a commercial system  
 which is manifestly injurious to their country!"  
 But under the name of patriotism they make  
 their right to "fill their own pockets by any  
 -giving of these feelings of these men-  
 to if this were true they would not be the only  
 persons who would suffer that many fill their pockets  
 by commercial intercourse. He has not, however  
 found it need to explain how a system can be  
 manifestly injurious to a country while it fills  
 the pockets of the majority of the inhabitants.  
 Making no general objection he has no objection  
 to sustain such an injury as this. We know  
 how even so far better authority than that of  
 the pamphlet, that these provinces formed one  
 of the most flourishing portions of Spain when  
 they were united (at p. 28) that the provin-



oak assemblies are willing to give up their  
 right of importing goods duty free; and that  
 throughout the provinces every variety of  
 opinion prevails on the same subject, the most  
 cursory reader cannot but wonder how a House  
 thus divided against itself has stood so long.  
 But in truth it has never been thus divided but  
 in the deceptive pages of the ministerial pam-  
 phlet. The intrigues of the Spanish cabinet  
 have at all times kept up a small court party  
 inclined to its policy; and the seaports of Bilbao  
 and St. Sebastian's naturally differ on many  
 points, from the inhabitants of the interior, but  
 the great mass of the population are devoted  
 to their privileges, and the project of amalga-  
 mating the provinces with the rest of Spain  
 was protested against, only last year, by Christiano  
 authorities at St. Sebastian's itself.  
 It is indeed self-evidently ridiculous to sup-  
 pose that a divided province could have been  
 either able, or willing, to maintain, against the  
 whole power of the Spanish crown, a set of  
 privileges injurious to its own prosperity.  
 It has always been a favourite project with

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"Will the amalgamation of these provinces with the other  
 parts of the monarchy produce any advantage to the whole  
 nation? And, granting this, will these acquisitions be large  
 enough to atone for the evils which are likely to result from  
 such a measure?"—Vide Christiano address from St. Sebastian's

the Spanish ministers, to abolish the *fueros* all together, and particularly to establish custom-houses in the seaports, and advance those on the Ebro to the frontier of France. A vigorous effort to carry this into effect was made in the reign of Ferdinand. At the beginning of 1823, just after the Catalonian insurrection, that Prince and Queen Amelia, accompanied by Calomarde, left Barcelona, and proceeded by way of Zaragoza to the Northern provinces, where they visited the principal towns. The King and his consort entered Bilboa in a car of polished steel, which had been constructed for the purpose at Durango as a specimen of the manufacture of the province, and were entertained with all the magnificence that the inhabitants could display. It was expected, as is customary on such occasions, that they would ask in return for some mark of royal favour, and after due deliberation they requested the King to make Bilboa a free port. But this request, as also that from St. Sebastian's alluded to in the pamphlet, proceeded from the municipalities of those towns, not from the provincial deputations.

Their petition was referred to the ministers, and rejected. It was indeed preferred at an inauspicious moment. In the midst of the provincial hospitalities, the members of the government were occupied in collecting informa-

tion and forming a party on the spot, with a view to carry into execution a plan for the general establishment of custom-houses, in despite of the *fueros*. On the return of the court to Madrid, Ballesteros the financier took up the affair with a very natural eagerness, for whatever difference of opinion may prevail as to the merits of the proposed change, or the justice of enforcing it, there can be no doubt at all that it would have added very considerably to the patronage of the minister.

The measure, however, in itself unpopular, was rendered odious by the insidious and stealthy manner in which the cabinet attempted to effect it. The Basques made no secret of their determination to resist by force any such attempt, and during the whole of 1830, 31 and 32, such a spirit of discontent and defiance prevailed through the provinces, that the government was obliged to give way. It was in this irritated state of men's minds that the attempt was made by Ferdinand to alter the Law of Succession, and the zeal with which the Basques have since maintained the cause of the rightful heir, has been no doubt strengthened by their knowledge of his honourable and upright conduct in opposing the meditated encroachment on their *fueros*.

It is natural enough that this, or any other honourable conduct of Don Carlos should be

utterly incomprehensible to such a person as this Downing-street reviler. The latter accordingly declares, that Lord Carnarvon's account of the transaction is "further removed from reality than any other part of his 'romance,'" and then with his usual consistency proceeds to admit his Lordship's facts. He allows that the Infante presided at the Council which rejected the ministerial plan, but then "the Council reported that with reference to the general circumstances of the kingdom, it would not be politic to make the proposed change," and the Infante "took no more part in the discussion than the other members," and this is his reply to Lord Carnarvon!

Why has he not told us what the Infante really said? Because he knows that Lord Carnarvon's account is true. He endeavours by hints and insinuations to produce a false impression, but when we come to examine facts, he never contradicts and even partly confirms the account that he professes to refute. A measure that is impolitic with reference to any kingdom generally, may at the same time (as this did) involve a breach of faith to a particular province, and I should like to know the country where the opinion of a popular heir presumptive, even if he took only an equal share in the discussion, would not have far greater weight than that of an ordinary subject.

But in truth, the Infante did take no prominent share in the discussion, and it was owing to his strenuous opposition that the project was dropped. He knew that the natives were attached to their *fueros*, that the country preferred anarchy to them, and (what seems to pass for nothing with his profligate calumniators) that the Kings of Spain were bound by oath to maintain them. These were the opinions which he professed, when presiding at the Council, and in declaring this, I speak from the authority of the Bishop of Leon, himself at that time a member of the Council. When news arrived in London of the early exertions of the Basques and Navarres in favour of the King, have I heard that Brelate yet claim with earnestness, *Moquele qingus*—“now they are repaying him,” and similar expressions, breathing both gratitude and devotion. These last year spontaneously uttered in my presence by elders, magistrates and officers of the spot. The liberals are hostile to the right cannot agree with my opponent, that the cause of the defence of Bilbao has “swapt away all the bonum et quicquid” which is talked about privileges and *fueros*; this pamphlet at least has escaped the general destruction. I am far however from contending that the violation of the *fueros* has been the principal cause of the war, even in the privileged provinces; in the rest of the population of course produced no effect, what-

ever! The war that is desolating that country is, in fact, at once a war of succession and a war of opinion, and now perhaps, whatever it may have been originally, is more the latter than the former.

The defenders of Charles V. uphold him as at once the rightful heir, and the champion of justice and religion. With respect to the question of succession, many of those who are in arms against him, are as convinced of the legitimacy of his claim as the warmist of his adherents. Some of these men are no friends to liberal opinions; but after France and England determined to support the infant Queen, they considered the cause of her uncle hopeless, and owing to the only loyalty that circumstances, as they imagined, permitted them to support. Many of these unfortunate persons are now exiles, without the consoling consciousness of suffering in a rightful cause.

The liberals are hostile to a Prince who has both the inclination and ability to check their disorganizing principles; they know how much easier it is to undermine the throne of a feeble infant, under a female guardian, than to succeed against a King of mature experience and determined character. But on the question of succession, the opinions of the greater part of them would be considered diametrically heterogeneous at our own Foreign Office. Not to mention

others. I have myself heard one of the most eminent among them, while he objected to the opinions of Don Carlos, confess that there could be no doubt of his right. This individual is now a conspicuous member of Christina's cabinet.

But to return to the *fueros*. "What" cries the author of the pamphlet, "did Zumalacarreñi care about them? What did Carnicer Cuesta,\* Cueyillas, Basilio, the Gura Merino and the ex-officers of the guard who flocked to the provinces?" Of course the *Cara Merino* and other Castilians could not have cared about the *fueros* of Biscay, but this writer, who would enlighten our English ignorance on Spanish affairs, seems himself to be ignorant that (not to mention many ex-officers of the guard) Zumalacarreñi was a Basque, that he was justly proud of his native privileges, and that, among the many victories which marked his glorious career, none were more gratifying to that hero than the two which he gained in sight of his birth-place. I have shown that even among the *Cristinos* a strong feeling prevails in favour of these provincial rights; and when we consider that it was only on condition that they should be religiously observed, that the Basques submitted to the superiority of the

These are the base, sordid, grovelling motives

\* Who, by the way, is the Cuesta? Perhaps Cuesta is intended.

Castilian Kings, every friend of justice must show that even if they were as pernicious as they have been proved by experience to be beneficial, they should not be modified but by the consent of the Basques themselves.

Before I dismiss this part of the subject, there is one point to which I must call the particular attention of my nameless friend. I am not going to say any thing of good faith, or right, or justice; such matters are, I know, in his opinion, mere *romance* or poetry; they are beneath his notice, or above his comprehension. But he professes to know not a little of pounds, shillings and pence, and commends our Spanish policy as a promising mercantile adventure. On this subject indeed the denouncer of romance and poetry grows himself romantic and poetical. "British interests," "sources of national wealth," outlay and return, market for our productions, profitable employment of surplus capital, church and national property for the investment of foreign capital, vast fields of combined political and commercial speculation—these baits to cupidity form the burden of his song; these are the glittering phantoms that, as we wander through his work, dance before our eyes, till at p. 141 we arrive at "mines of gold."

These are the base, sordid, grovelling motives which he expects to have weight with English.



Through his pages he preached the gospel of Mammon, and he is a living prophet after all! For whatever may be the variety of opinion respecting the privileges with reference to Spain at large and the provinces in particular, there is but one opinion as to the probable effect of their subversion on our commerce with Spain. The Bidassois papers admitted our goods duty free, and as the line of the Euro was difficult to guard, whatever the provinces themselves could not combine, was easily passed into the rest of the kingdom. The introduction of the Madrid tariff and the establishment of custom-houses would impose a duty equal to 75 per cent, which would be in fact a prohibition. This is self-evident to all Spaniards. The letter of Lord S. Mary to Cordova, in which he promised his co-operation against the Carlist ports, produced exultation at Madrid, and as soon as Evans took possession of Pasages a custom-house was established there, as well as at St. Sebastian's.

It is amusing to listen to the causeless complaints of some French papers against the introduction of English goods into the North of Spain, while the coast is thus closed against us, and the line of the Bidassois open to our rivals. In the winter of 1835, I visited the principal shop at Irun. It was crowded with articles of French manufacture, but not a

British pocket-handkerchief was to be seen. The owner pitifully observed to me, "the Madrid government excludes you from Catalonia, but how you exclude yourselves." Indeed it is evident that in the whole tirade against free trade and in favour of custom-houses, the writer of the pamphlet is the mere puppet of some Spanish promoter! We come now to that part of the pamphlet which possesses the greatest interest, particularly when we consider the production as an emanation from Downing Street. To be able to judge correctly between the contending parties in Spain, it is necessary first to obtain a just notion of the privileges of the Basques, and of those laws and customs which regulate the succession to the Spanish crown; but nothing that relates to the internal concerns of any foreign nation can have the same importance in the eyes of an Englishman as the views and conduct of his own government. This conduct has of late been so utterly incomprehensible, that we must listen to any defence of it with more than usual curiosity. The author of the pamphlet therefore may reasonably expect an attentive hearing while he initiates us into the mysteries of the Foreign Office; and I endeavour to reduce to light and order the cloudy chaos of Palmerstonian policy. Lord Palmerston, in the short space of six or

seven years, has intermeddled more frequently in the internal affairs of foreign nations than all his predecessors for the last century. With him interference has been the rule, and abjuring the exception. On this point, therefore, we should have looked for ample explanations from any zealous friend who might undertake his defence. These explanations, his present champion has not thought fit to give. In a passage, however, which I shall soon have occasion to quote, he has not formally laid down, but obscurely hinted at a doctrine that would fully justify Lord Palmerston, for it would enable any nation whatever to interfere in the domestic squabbles of any other.

If, in the silence of my opponents, I might presume to offer an opinion, I should say, that interference can only be justified in those cases which would justify a war. Now the principles of justice are the same for nations as for individuals, but as nations have no recognized superior, they are like men in a state of nature, and each is obliged to take the law into its own hands. When one man is wronged by another, he appeals to the tribunals of his country; but when a nation receives an injury, and all satisfaction is denied, there is no resort but to the terrible decision of war.

There is, however, one essential difference between nations and individuals. The latter

may generally wait till they are injured; and the law will be able to give them redress; but it is not so with nations. In that great society, where every individual depends on himself for protection, and there is no court to issue an injunction against an impending injury, cases constantly occur where it would be certain ruin to wait till your adversary's plans were matured, and he was ready to strike. In such cases there is no remedy but to strike the first blow yourself, and endeavour to crush the mischief in the bud.

I do not, of course, mean to say that the slightest fiction, much less the apprehension, of every trifling injury would justify a nation in arming forthwith, and falling furiously upon the offender. No wise and just government would appeal to arms but for serious and weighty wrongs; and if nations have often contended for apparent trifles, the only ground on which they can be justified is, that encroachments for the most part begin gradually, that success in one leads to another, and that if a state were to abstain from arms till it had sustained some monstrous and outrageous injury, it might run a risk of being ruined by dribblets. Even therefore in such a case as this, though the injury received may be slight, there is a reasonable apprehension of a greater to come. In a word, it may be reckoned a rule without an exception,

that no nation can be justified in waging war on another, but when its security is assailed or threatened.

It is indeed true that nations have often made war in support of their allies, and that they have often violated the obligations of treaties; the maintenance of the balance of power has also caused vast rivers of blood to flow; but in all these transactions (wherever at least they have been justifiable) their own security has been the ultimate object of the parties concerned. If independent nations were so utterly unconnected, that the internal transactions of one could have no effect whatever on the security of another, the interference would then perhaps in all cases and under all circumstances be improper and impertinent; but this is not the case. The internal policy of nations often produces results that seriously affect their neighbours, and leave the latter no choice but between interference and their own ruin.

In discussing this subject, it is unnecessary to speak on the present occasion of friendly advice and unarmed mediation; for our interference in the affairs of the Peninsula has been of quite another kind. A wise statesman, however, would be cautious how he interposed even with friendly advice, for between nations, as between individuals, the best means and motives are liable to be misinterpreted, and may be

persons are jealous of the interference of others  
 in their family quarrels; and are apt to turn a  
 deaf ear to the best advice, rather than appear  
 to be dictated to by the adviser. It thus hap-  
 pens that ill-matching but ill-judging friend-  
 ships multiply inflame the passions which it en-  
 deavours to cool, and leaves the disputants  
 whom it expected to reconcile more dangerously  
 hostile than before. Interference, however, is neither  
 more repulsive than a war, and a war too where  
 the interloper is sure to be as much distrusted  
 by his ally as by his enemy. The  
 latter feels himself more deeply injured than by  
 his ordinary war, and the former can never for-  
 give the friend who humiliates him by his as-  
 sistance. Queen Elizabeth, we all know, inter-  
 fered between the French Protestants and their  
 Roman Catholic enemies; the former accepted  
 the foreign aid which their weakness rendered  
 indispensable, but, as soon as they patched up  
 a truce with their enemies, they remembered  
 they were Frenchmen, and were as eager as  
 the Roman Catholics themselves to drive us  
 out of their country. If such was the conse-  
 quence of just interference, what must we ex-  
 pect from such as is altogether the reverse?  
 In Spain the liberals tolerate us at present,  
 because they cannot do without us, but we may  
 judge what will be the consequence of our

success in Spain, by the example of Portugal. There we have done our work; we have established a liberal and usurping government; and what has been the result? How do we stand in Portugal? What party there is our friend? Are we not hated by one, detested by another, and abhorred by a third?

For these reasons a statesman of ordinary prudence would consider an armed interference as the most delicate and dangerous of all wars, and would engage in such a quarrel with proportionate reluctance. But cases will arise when prudence herself leads the way in the most delicate and dangerous enterprises. The first War of Succession, for instance, was at once a justifiable foreign war, and a justifiable act of interference, the former against France, and the latter with regard to Spain, for the union, or even intimate connexion of those two kingdoms was pregnant with danger to the rest of Europe. We took up arms for the just and legitimate purpose of preventing the establishment of a French Prince in Spain, and of putting an Austrian Archduke in his place; but during the contest our candidate, by the death of his brother, succeeded to the Austrian possessions, and thus became more dangerous to the balance of power than his antagonist.

He had always been objectionable to the majority of the Spaniards, and now became an

object of just suspicion to many of his own adherents. In this difficulty, the administration of Hurley and Bolingbroke chose the least of two evils. They submitted to acknowledge the French Prince, and provided in the Treaty of Utrecht (as far as mutual renunciations and positive stipulations could provide) that the Crowns of France and Spain should never encircle the same brow. The Spaniards of course readily embraced a condition that was not more essential to our security than to their own independence, and confirmed the treaty that regulated the succession in the Cortes of 1712. The treaty of Utrecht, as is well known, excluded the princes of the House of Austria, who were descended from Philip the 3rd, and in preference called to the throne the Princes of Savoy, who were descended from Philip the 2nd. The law of agnation proposed in 1713, by Philip V. and sanctioned by the Cortes, though not the consequence of a positive stipulation with foreign powers, was calculated to establish more completely the independence of the Spanish crown, and afforded an additional security to Spain and Europe.

Though the treaty of Utrecht declares that the kingdoms of France and Spain ought not to be united under the same dominion, and acknowledges the inconveniences that would



attend such a union, there is nothing in the document to prevent a marriage, like that of Louis the 14th with the heiress of the Spanish crown, an event which, if allowed at any time to take place, would render all this part of the treaty a nullity. 'This defect the law of Philip V. in a great measure supplied, and if such an arrangement was not insisted upon in the treaty, it was probably omitted to avoid as much as possible the appearance of dictating to the Spaniards in a matter where they might safely be trusted, since their interests were the same as our own. The fault of Philip V's law is that it does not go far enough, and instead of excluding females altogether, prefers the female descendants of that monarch to the Princes of the House of Savoy. 'This is the more remarkable, as both the treaty of Utrecht and the law of Philip V. altogether exclude the females of that house, and therefore if the line of Philip were to fail and the House of Savoy succeed, a complete Salic law would be established in Spain. 'This defect probably arose from the paternal feelings of Philip, who, though he might have no objection to prefer some of his descendants to others, would naturally be reluctant to exclude any of his own race for the sake of admitting aliens.

It is not very probable that the Duke of Orleans should marry the "innocent Isabel."



a principal inducement for Louis Philippe to attempt it. Could he succeed in uniting one of his younger sons to a Spanish Queen, it would be the interest of all Europe that his elder sons should leave legitimate children behind them, and the reigning houses of Europe might no longer stand aloof from intermarriages with the "best of Republics." Their present coolness on this point must be the more mortifying, as the House of Orleans never found it difficult to ally itself with royalty, till its chief had usurped a throne.

For such an alliance, and for new family compacts in consequence, the Quadruple Treaty has smoothed the way. I allow that Lord Palmerston, with admirable consistency, has furnished at the same time both the bane and the antidote; the tottering dynasties with which he has allied us, may probably be overthrown by the revolutionary anarchists whom he has encouraged. This is the extent of his statesmanship, to cure one evil by another and a greater.

The hostility of our government to Don Carlos is the more unaccountable, because it is clearly contrary to our own interest and utterly unprovoked by any conduct on his part. We do not so much as pretend to have been injured by him, or to apprehend any danger to ourselves from his success, and in the records of civilized nations the present case is perhaps

the first in which one party has assailed another without at least alleging some real or pretended ground of complaint. We have not even had so much respect for public opinion as to seek by excuses to varnish over the rottenness of our cause, but have exposed our injustice impudently naked to the gaze of all the world without any veil whatever.

On what ground indeed can we rest our justification? It has, I know, been held by statesmen of a very different character from Lord Palmerston, that treaties are sacred things, and whatever may be the demerits of the Quadruple treaty, England is bound by what her minister has signed. Far be it from me to seek to loosen the ties of good faith, or relax the obligations of treaties. How could peace be maintained between States and quiet among individuals, if we could not rest in security on solemn engagements? But treaties are not more binding on nations than oaths are on individuals, and both lose their virtue when they are perverted to the purposes of violence and wrong. If it were otherwise, nothing more would be requisite to justify any crime, than to commit it in company, and there would be less guilt in entering into illegal combinations than in repenting and renouncing them.

In this perverted morality, our noblest feelings would prompt our worst actions, and good

faith would be the handmaid of injustice. When France and England made a league in 1672, to conquer and divide the United Provinces when in the last century Russia, Austria and Prussia combined to partition Poland would it have been a breach of faith, and a violation of treaties if any one of the allies had withdrawn from his comrades and refused to perform his part in such flagitious engagements? And in what respect were these flagitious engagements worse than the Quadruple Treaty?

I do not here insist on the glaring impolicy of the treaty. If it were simply a bad speculation, if it bound us to inflict injury on nobody but ourselves, then no doubt it would be our duty to fulfil it to the last tittle. That it exhausts our arsenals, that it wastes our blood, that it ruins our trade, that it facilitates the union of France with Spain—these might be excellent reasons perhaps for impeaching Lord Palmerston, but none for shrinking from our engagement. But if it is once proved to be unjust, our bonds are snapped asunder. No human compact can supersede the eternal principles of justice, and should we have unwarily contracted an engagement that militates against those divine and immutable laws we have not merely a right, but it is our bounden duty to break it. It is impossible to allow any treaty

to be binding, and at the same time to maintain it to be unjust.

I have dwelt the longer on the right of interference, because on that right, as it appears to me, depends the justice of our cause, and on the justice of our cause depends the obligation of the Quadruple Treaty. The writer of the pamphlet says very little on the subject; possibly he may think that to take the lives and seize the property of men who have never offended you, is so much in the usual course of liberalism that it needs no defence. He tells us however, at p. 41, that he does not consider that England, whatever may be her wishes or her interests, has a right, or that it is her policy, to meddle unasked in the internal affairs of other countries, but she has a right to rejoice, &c. A right to rejoice is no very important matter, and I leave to the writer of the pamphlet to explain what its practical effect may be, but a right to act is quite another thing.

This passage of the pamphlet is of importance, as it is, I believe, the only one in which the author favours us with any hint of his opinions on the right of intervention. This, according to him, depends on your being asked to interfere. This is the only justification which he has given us for our interference in the present Spanish quarrel, and it must be owned

that it is sufficiently comprehensive. If both parties in the dispute had requested our interference, then there would have been no doubt as to the right; whether we should have interfered or not, would then have been a mere question of prudence; but in the present case, one side only has invited us to intermeddle, and this, it seems, is an ample warrant to us for falling upon the other, and visiting with all the miseries of war men who have never injured us, and whose interests are in fact our own. But this warrant, as I have before observed, is comprehensive indeed, for it goes far to justify interference on every possible occasion. Which men are once thoroughly heated in civil wars, they are not ever nice in the choice of their allies; and the more they are pressed, the fewer scruples they feel in resorting to what my anonymous friend calls "the anti-national expedient of foreign bayonets." There never was I suspect, a party so supereminently national as to prefer destruction by their countrymen to victory by means of foreigners.

If therefore a request from one party justified intervention, what intervention might not be justified? Elizabeth of England and Philip of Spain had an equal right to interfere in the internal concerns of France, for the former was invited by the Huguenots, and the latter

by the League. The same rule that justified us in assisting the "innocent Isabel" and the chaste Christina, would be an equally valid warrant for the Holy Allies to interfere in favour of Charles V. What a pity it is, that the author of the pamphlet was not capable of wielding a pen towards the close of the last century! He tells us, in the same page, that he is far from advocating the cause of revolution any where! How he would have denounced the Polish Revolution of 1791 that called forth the eulogy of Burke; the revolution that abolished the *liberum veto*, and established hereditary rights! How he would have extolled the confederates of Targowitz, who took up arms to re-establish the fundamental laws of the kingdom, and justified the interference of Russia by their previous invitation! The champion of the innocent Isabel would then have worn the colours of the immaculate Catherine, and the yoke whose law and justice condemns every Carlist to the block, would have thought his Muscovite friends too merciful by half for sparing the rebel Kosciuszko.

It is indeed difficult to set any bounds whatever to so comprehensive a rule, for if we may interfere whenever we are asked, we may, with a very little management, continue to be always asked, whenever we wish to interfere. In this



manner might be called out all too readily  
 for an endless succession of Palmerstonian  
 -this convenient key we might use to close so wide  
 a gate as a gate and a not a gate of our  
 That with extended wings a banner'd host,  
 Under spread ensigns marching, might pass through,  
 With horse and chariots ranked in those array,  
 a gate that would open upon a turbulent stormy  
 where we might be tossed for seven on  
 the song of ascending intervention in a  
 But though the author of the pamphlet has  
 the discretion to clear over as much as possible  
 the question of right, this is not so reserved  
 as to the policy of our intervention. It is here  
 that he blocks the trumpets before his patron—  
 it is here that he shouts: "Great is the Rich-  
 -thieu of Downing Street!" Lord Palmerston  
 must be quite astonished to find himself so  
 unparalleled a statesman! His champion must  
 be drawn aside the veil from the faces  
 of the Foreign Office and shows in his mighty  
 character in the very act of political incubation.  
 There he sits thinking for his nest and hatch-  
 ing a confederation of constitutional govern-  
 ments in the West to make head against the  
 despotic confederation of the North and East  
 -and Europe! His panegyrist is quite beside  
 himself at the magnificence of the conception.  
 "A common interest, like measures, will

England, Belgium, France, Spain, and Portugal. No greater object has formed by statesmen. This single sentence, if Lord Palmerston has a spark of gratitude, should make an ambassador of our pamphleteer.

This original device of the greatest of statesmen has certainly revolutionized our whole foreign policy, and overturned the system of our vanishing alliances. Whether the new system will be more to our advantage, time will show, if indeed it has not done so already. Our jealousy of France was the result of the plainest dictates of common sense. She is our ancient rival, our nearest neighbour, — by far the most powerful of the continental states, and the only one whom we have any reason to fear. Her moral influence on our surrounding nations has at all times been even more formidable than her arms. The very friendship of such a state is not to be entrusted with implicit confidence, since few enemies are more dangerous than an over-powerful ally. Against this mighty neighbour we entreat you to disengage ourselves by cultivating the good will of the great military monarchies to which France was equally a subject of jealousy and of peril, and who could never be dangerous to us, either as friends or enemies. The policy of Holland, like ours, was in-

threatened by the same natural jealousy but  
 France, pressed between two great powers,  
 one of which could at the worst only destroy  
 her colonies and commerce, while the other  
 might swallow her up altogether, she wisely  
 chose to secure herself from that greater danger  
 by forming connections with England and her  
 allies. Whenever choice or necessity has placed  
 enmity between England and Holland, both  
 nations have had cause to repent of hostilities,  
 so contrary to their mutual interests. How all  
 these old-fashioned doctrines of blood  
 delighted ancestors are to fade before the dawn  
 of the great Western Alliance! We have  
 already despoiled and trampled on Holland,  
 as to the great military powers, every third  
 page of the official pamphlet teems with ex-  
 pressions of sanguine malignity against the  
 "tyrannical sovereigns" and "Holy Allies," while  
 we are to dismiss all jealousy of a state with  
 one hundred miles of our metropolis, with a  
 compact territory, and a concentrated, intelli-  
 gent and energetic population, our rival in every  
 art, with a navy and revenue only second to our  
 own and capable of striking at the heart of  
 our greatness, we are to tremble before a half-  
 peopled, half-civilized, half-European empire,  
 separated from us by several great kingdoms,  
 communicating with the Ocean, or rather cut  
 off from it by a succession of inland seas,

and unable to assail us even in our remotest possessions. For security against Russia, we are to throw ourselves into the embrace of France and her colonies and commerce, while these will be regarded as charged with the danger from which nothing can save us but the "greatest project that ever was formed by statesmen," viz. neither more nor less than the prospective obliteration of the Holy Alliance in general, and of Russia in particular. He will find it difficult to believe that hearts could conceive, or tongues utter, or hands indite such an atrocious and portentous absurdity, but I can assure him upon my honour that he will find it written at p. 44 and 105 of the pamphlet, *Answer to the Declaration of the 1st of June 1822*. In the former page he will be told "that, if Don Carlos succeeded to the throne, the Holy Alliance would be all-powerful in the Peninsula; and that Russia would become as formidable to us at Lisbon as at Constantinople;" from the latter he will learn that if we had not interfered, "the Peninsula would have become an outpost of the Holy Alliance in the West. It might have cost them some trouble and expense to maintain the colony, but the possession would have been theirs, and the East of Europe would have been the mother-country of the Peninsula." *quid enim non* When this writer has the indiscretion to re-

asked us: that Russia is formidable at Constan-  
 tinople, I cannot refrain from asking him who  
 made her so? Was it with Lord Palmerston  
 himself? When the Sultan implored your as-  
 sistance against the Pacha of Egypt, did he not  
 meet with a refusal? Was he not compelled  
 by his last resource, to take refuge under the  
 shield of Russia? No. Was he not in consequence  
 become the vassal of a Muscovite emperor?  
 And why was Lord Palmerston liable, for I  
 will grant that he was willing to interfere?  
 Why did he, who is now so absurdly alarmed  
 lest Russia should make a colony of Spain, why  
 did he then stand aloof, and permit the degra-  
 dation of that empire in the only quarter  
 where it can ever become dangerous? What  
 was it that held his hands? But his own prin-  
 ciple of liberal policy? We could not be every  
 where at once. We were so busy, fighting the  
 pirate by Holland, and the incendiary by Por-  
 tugal, that we could not do our duty to Turkey  
 and to ourselves. France, whose interests with  
 regards to Turkey were the same as those of  
 England, was, like us, engaged in fostering the  
 embryo of the Quintuple Alliance. But  
 though France neglected Turkey, she was  
 gaining an equivalent at home. She was re-  
 gaining a province, where she was discomfor-  
 ting an ally, and to these end I am of opinion  
 I have little doubt that the grand Western

Alliance will prove a losing speculation to the  
 principal shareholder. Deep and just resent-  
 ment from the allies whom we have deserted ;  
 jealousy, suspicion, and ill-controlled hatred  
 from those whom we have courted, but not  
 secured, are the only returns that we can gain  
 from this sudden adventure. Belgium owes  
 us no thanks for our gift of a nominal inde-  
 pendence. In Portugal your officers step ashore  
 into the perils of Spain, though a stage would be  
 behind Portugal, is travelling the same road ;  
 and as to France, what a rotten staff we are  
 leaning on there ! Every thing in that dis-  
 tracted country depends on the chance of a  
 bullet. And however they may be changed in  
 other respects, the French still retain all their  
 old jealousy of England. Lord Palmerston's  
 favours are thrown away on their obstinate  
 incredulity. He cannot gain their confidence,  
 though he has given them Belgium for a de-  
 partment and Africa for a colony. However I still suppose all difficulties to be  
 overcome, all jealousies lulled to sleep, and this  
 principle of Alliance in full operation. The  
 peaceful policy of Lord Palmerston will then  
 have divided all Europe into two hostile con-  
 federacies, fairly pitted against each other, and  
 ready to close in a desperate and unquering  
 war of opinion. The event of such a war who  
 can pretend to forecast ? But the manner in

which that war is to be conducted, will fit ap-  
 pears from this pamphlet) be a complete de-  
 parture from all ordinary rules. "The friendly  
 ports and geographical position" of Spain will  
 be of "infinite value to us." What!  
 in a war against the East of Europe? against  
 an confederacy of which Russia is the head?  
 He would be a long-sighted politician indeed  
 who would think of watching Cronstadt from  
 Fern and Sebastopol from Cadiz. But I sup-  
 pose the grand Western Alliance is to be re-  
 nounced in geography as well as government.  
 But, I exclaims the ministerial apologist, at p.  
 41, "we are far from advocating the cause of  
 revolution anywhere." Indeed! not even  
 where revolutions may be necessary. Not  
 where they may lead from tyranny to freedom  
 or from anarchy to order? Why this is a fight  
 about the most uncompromising ultra-toryism  
 particularly for an author who only just before  
 had approved of a change from despotism  
 to liberal institutions, "railed at the double  
 yoke of kingly and priestly despotism, with all  
 the train of degradation and corruption which  
 they bring with them," and in plain terms told  
 the "autocrats of the Continent" that they  
 should be compelled to listen to public opinion  
 and that they will should no longer occupy the  
 place of reason. And after all  
 All this is pretty well for a gentleman, who is

far from advocating the cause of rebellion  
 any where, but is (as I have said) his disavowal of  
 the cause of revolution. He is sober and sensible  
 in his manner, and with admirable consistency he  
 pours forth such a torrent of mistake. Jacobin  
 says as I do, "absolute monarchy and a popu-  
 lar baghead" and the arrival of the staid and  
 the happiness of the multitude is no longer  
 longer dependent exclusively upon the caprice of  
 one man, that he seems to be half afraid of  
 having gone too far, and acknowledged that  
 what he says may be well received as a genuine  
 call to a professed revolution. For here at  
 least he has stumbled on a truth. "We are not  
 now" cannot however refrain from asking, is this  
 Jacobinical and revolutionary, since he is bent  
 upon converting royalty from the error of its  
 ways, whether better words might not serve his  
 purpose better, whether he might not balance  
 his style on some judicious line between flattery  
 and rebuke, whether since he is determined  
 to thrust under the noses of despots and  
 flautocrats the flowers of his rhetoric, it would  
 not be more wisely to pluck his nosegay from  
 some other garden than that of Billingsgate.  
 A lecturing tone and bully's swagger are less  
 likely to persuade a spirited opponent than to  
 provoke him to bid us come on and do our  
 worst. And after all, instead of waiting till  
 "Holly Alliance" with a scolding lecture, or with



any lecture on the subject, should we not be wiser if we  
endeavour to convince by example rather  
than by precept, and by exhibiting at home  
the abhorring spectacle of an orderly, vigorous  
and consistent government.

How can we wonder that the Holy Rines  
should feel a discrimination to reform them  
selves, when they behold the scenes of  
Nottingham, Bristol and Lyons? Why should  
they cultivate a tree that bears such bitter  
fruit? Those princes know that the first and  
most sacred duty of governors is to protect  
the lives and property of those whom God  
has committed to their charge; they have  
no time for agitation; they are so blind as  
to discern neither honour nor advantage in per-  
mitting their principal cities to be burned about  
the ears of the peaceable inhabitants. The  
only Liberty worth possessing is the sister of  
Order. If the Liberals really wish that the  
"Mountain Nymph" should captivate the Kings  
of the earth, let them dress her out to more  
advantage, teach her better manners, and make  
her fit to appear in decent society. As matters  
stand at present, what respectable sovereign  
can debase himself by low tattle with the  
drunken and disorderly termagant whom they  
present to his embraces, or take such a des-  
tructive and incendiary Tans for the com-  
panion of his banquet?

The Northern powers, remembering no doubt that "evil communication corrupts good manners" thought it the most prudent part to stand aloof after the death of Ferdinand and let France and England, without any assistance of theirs, rock the cradle of Spanish revolution. While the "best of Republics" and "the greatest of modern statesmen" hastened to acknowledge the cradled majesty of Isabel the "despots" seem to have thought it reasonable to pause till they could clearly ascertain the sentiments of the Spanish nation at large. They therefore withdrew their ambassadors from Madrid instead of hurrying with breathless haste to declare for either party in the impending civil war. This cautious reserve is not admired by the adventurous author of the pamphlet.

The underling of such a statesman as Lord Palmerston fancies himself qualified to read a lecture on politics to the Metternichs and the Pozzo di Borgos. According to him they would have played a more advantageous game by "recognizing the Queen and extinguishing the bones of Don Carlos." They should have rested on the "enlightened despotism" (as he interprets it for the benefit of John Bull *despotismo ilustrado*) "of the Queen's early friends." Liberal principles would have made their way, but the *despotismo ilustrado* would have been modified gradually. In short

according to this eminent politician, it is wisdom to travel a sure road to ruin, as long as it is a slow one, and it is a foolish speculation to keep out of harm's way altogether. The notion has certainly the merit of originality.

Whether the Northern Powers might not have partly hesitated, from a belief that Don Carlos was the rightful claimant, is what the author of the pamphlet altogether passes over, but he really ought to have remembered that, though so liberal and enlightened a person as himself may have left in his nursery the antiquated notions of justice and duty, they may still be supposed to linger in the benighted intellects of legitimate Kings. It seems however, from the event, that even considering the matter as a mere speculation, the ignorance of the "despots" has served them better than the wisdom of their volunteer Mentor would have done. He would have drawn them up in a series of indefensible positions. Beaten from the *despotismo ilustrado*, they might have retired on the *Estatuto Real*, to be routed from that also with the loss of all honour and principle, and finally driven back on the Constitution of 1812, in the reputable society of Jew Jobbers and drunken sergeants.

The author of the pamphlet is pleased to talk, at p. 123, of the "ignorant masses," and

"bloody fanatics" by whom Don Carlos is supported, and modestly assures us that the contest is "between intellect and numbers," that "the Queen's is in reality the conservative cause," and "that of Don Carlos the cause of revolution." This is all of a piece with the usual arrogance and intolerable self-sufficiency of the liberals, who never can speak of the labouring classes with common civility, except when they seek to cheat and deceive them. Their humbler fellow subjects are never "ignorant masses" except when they are too knowing to be misled; they are never blind but when their eyes are opened to their real interests; they are never deaf but when they listen to the dictates of religion and loyalty.

The Northern powers seem to have suspected in 1833 what this liberal writer is reduced to acknowledge in 1837, that Don Carlos is supported by the majority of the Spanish People, and that the "intellect" of "the Queen's early partizans," in spite of "the anti-national expedient of foreign bayonets," might lead to nothing but disaster and ruin. They "read the signs of the times" rather better than to ally themselves with the intellectual adherents of the *despotismo ilustrado* and the *Estatuto Real*, those worshippers of God and Mammon, who, in order to crush the "bloody fanatics" of Don Carlos, fostered to their own destruction.

the ten thousand times bloodier and more fanatical faction of the movement—a faction however which, with all its crimes, has at least conferred one benefit on Spain, inasmuch as it has sent such mischievous and blundering “intellect” to gather wisdom and experience in a foreign tour.

The fate of M. M. Martinez de la Rosa, Torreno, Frias, Isturiz, Osuna, Miraflores, Cordova and others, now exiles from their country and the victims of more exalted liberalism than their own, forms the best justification of the policy of the Northern Powers. They have now reason to congratulate themselves on having declined to assist in persecuting the party with whom they could not but have sympathized, on having left to France and England the task of maintaining that “conservative cause” which has carried desolation and bloodshed into every corner of Spain, and whose members seem to have thought that the principal use of “ignorant masses” was to furnish materials for wholesale massacres.

With all his aversion to “the despots and autocrats,” their lecturer however declares, that he “will not do them the injustice to believe that they ever attempted to settle the affairs of Spain by a marriage between the Queen and the Son of Don Carlos,” and he professes to believe that both the parties, whom it would

most concerned, are too well convinced of their respective rights ever to entertain such a project.' This is undoubtedly true with regard to Don Carlos, whose sincere conviction of the justice of his cause is here acknowledged by a bitter enemy.

As to the merits of the plan, it is not my purpose to discuss them. The writer of the pamphlet says, that "its monstrous results might be exemplified in a thousand different ways, were the proposition any other than a crude notion thrown out for party purposes." I am infinitely obliged to him for sparing me the necessity of travelling through his "thousand different ways," but when he calls the scheme "a crude notion thrown out for party purposes," I must ask this reviler of "ignorant masses," whether he is himself really so ignorant as not to know that this "crude notion" originated in the inmost recesses of the Madrid palace? Is he not aware that Señor Muñoz, who, whatever may be his position, is at least a gentleman, and has given repeated proofs of his anxiety for the welfare of both queens, actually sent a messenger to Don Carlos with proposals for a family alliance, and that that Prince, though then an exile in Portugal and wandering almost alone on the frontier, rejected those proposals with disdain? Is it to be imagined that Señor Muñoz would have

made this offer without ample authority? I admit however that, be the merits of the scheme what they may, the Northern Powers were neither the authors nor encouragers of it.

I must now notice a point on which the conduct of our ministers, with regard to Spanish affairs, is strangely different from their domestic policy. At home they depend so completely on Roman Catholic support, that they profess their willingness to strike at their own church out of deference to their confederates. Indeed the position in which they stand with regard to those religionists is one rather of servitude than of alliance. It would therefore evince a singular union of impudence and hypocrisy, if any advocate of theirs should attempt to raise a cry of "No Popery" on the Spanish question. Yet so it is. "*Caelum non animum mutant qui trans mare currunt*," might have been very true of ancient Romans; but it is quite inapplicable to the British votaries of modern Rome. A voyage to the Peninsula restores our Protestant renegades to all the healthy fervour of their original faith. In Ireland they subscribe to the Rent, but they are zealous Protestants in Spain.

Nothing can be more laughable (if indeed falsehood and malignity are not always too hateful to be laughed at) than the affected ap-

prejudgments exhibited by the author of the pamphlet, lest Don Carlos, in the event of his success, should re-establish the Inquisition. This alarm is rung repeatedly by the Protestant advocate of a Popish administration. In this respect his *romance* is little better than the counterpart of Mrs. Radcliffe's "Italian;" but it would be tedious to examine his scattered passages, when at p. 120 they are all combined in one. We may here perceive the delicate print of a lady's foot. I cannot help suspecting that the raw material of the following passage has been supplied from the well-furnished store of Senora Albornoz, of Bow Street notoriety, and that it has been worked up and "done into English" by the noble Secretary for the Home Department. Let us listen to the Lady of the Black Chamber, speaking by the mouth of her English Interpreter.

"That the Inquisition in all its horrors would be re-established in Spain upon Don Carlos ascending the throne, is no longer a matter of doubt with those who are acquainted with the principles and the objects of the persons by whom that Prince is surrounded. It is notorious that when a short time since, and at a moment of his greatest necessity, Don Carlos was offered the assistance of Austria, (which would have been followed by that of other powers) but upon the condition of his



promising an amnesty, and not to re-establish the Inquisition, he refused assistance coupled with such conditions. Perhaps he did so unwillingly, for he is not a free agent," &c. &c. Again, "The Inquisition would be established in every village—its loathsome dungeons would be crowded with victims—new tortures would be invented for the friends of the Queen; their property and those of their remotest connexions would be confiscated; and the daily labours of the hangman, in every corner of the country, would attest the numbers of those who had declared against a system, built upon desolation and cemented by blood."

But I was wrong in calling this a romance; it is, alas! too true a tale. If these horrors constitute the re-establishment of the Inquisition, the Inquisition is established already. It reigns paramount in the first cities of Spain, and shoulders the innocent Isabel on her throne. But if the Inquisition has been re-established, it has not been by Charles V. It is not within the circle of his power that the property of the absent is seized, that their remotest connexions are persecuted, that every general is a provost martial, every soldier an executioner, that the authorities are at the beck of mobs, that prisons are filled by suspicion and emptied by massacre. Those blessings are peculiar to the prudent and vigor-

our government", which has been praised from the British throne, and armed from British arsenals.

It would be superfluous, on the present occasion, to enter at large into the history of the Inquisition. This tribunal was established at Toulouse, in 1229, and was soon after introduced into Aragon, while the civil liberties of that country were yet in full vigour. It was not till 1481 that it was established at Seville, when, as one of the best modern historians of Spain affirms, "it was introduced as a means to check the errors which had crept into the national faith through frequent intercourse with Mahometans and Jews."\* Under the same pretext it was extended to Castile by Ferdinand and Isabel, who however never attempted to force it on the Basques or Navarrese, as neither Jews nor Mahometans had ever been established in those two privileged sections of the Monarchy. After running a career which is known to all the world, it dwindled, long before its final abolition, to a mere political engine. The author however affects to tremble lest it should soon re-appear, "in all its horrors," when Don Carlos, I presume, (who at p. 120 is "not a free agent," at p. 88 is distin-

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\*Fúbrer, *Memorias de las Reynas Catolicas* (Reyna Doña Isabel), p. 799.

guished by "general nullity," and at p. 58 is allowed to have "kindly feelings and some amiable qualities") is, to rule in the Escorial, the Philip the 2nd of the 19th century. The author of the pamphlet should surely produce something better than his own most suspicious authority, when he ventures to palm this foolish fable on Protestant credulity. He appeals to those "who are acquainted with the principles and objects of the persons by whom Don Carlos is surrounded. And I have myself the honour of being acquainted with many of those eminent persons, and with the utmost deference to the superior knowledge displayed in the pamphlet, I must say, that so far from its being with me a no longer a matter of doubt that Don Carlos intends to re-establish the Inquisition," the very reverse is a matter of certainty. In England, in France and in Spain, I have conversed with numerous Carlists, of both sexes, and with men of every rank, profession, trade, and degree, and I can safely affirm that I never heard from one of them a wish to have the Inquisition restored, nor an opinion expressed that such a measure was in any degree probable. In the many documents relating to the cause of Spanish Legitimacy that have passed through my hands, I never met

with the slightest allusion to the revival of that tribunal. It is well known that, even at the height of its power, the Inquisition never succeeded in stifling the murmurs to which its encroachments gave rise. Its abuses were the subject of remonstrances from the Aragonese in the Cortes of Mazon in 1640, from the Catalonians in 1612, from the Castilians in the Cortes of Valadolid in 1518, from the Aragonese again in 1528 and 1564, and in the course of the same and the succeeding century various complaints were severally made by Bishops, Chapters, Corporations and Tribunals. The Inquisition was, in fact, always considered to be opposed to the national institutions, and as it is unquestionably the wish of Don Carlos to establish these in their true spirit, with the addition of suitable improvements, it is not to be supposed that he intends to revive a tribunal unpopular with the clergy, at variance with the ancient laws, and in every respect ill adapted to suppress revolutions organized according to modern practice.

In conversing with the Bishop of Leon, at London, I have sometimes alluded to this subject, and I have heard that prelate declare, that as a bishop he was naturally opposed to a tribunal which encroached on the episcopal jurisdiction, and that as a statesman he was

unfriendly to it on moral and political grounds. "Blood and vengeance," he would add, could not enter into either the moral, or political creed of the Spanish legitimists; neither is persecution agreeable to the views and feelings of him whom we have acknowledged as our lawful sovereign."

What I have said above may serve also as an answer to that portion of the tale, which relates to the interference and conditional promises of Austria. It is likely enough that Austria may have taken measures to ascertain what may be the ultimate views of Charles V; if such enquiries have been made, the result has no doubt been satisfactory, for it is notorious that Austria is at least as favourable (as she has ever been) to the cause of Spanish Legitimacy, but that any offers of assistance should have been made and refused on the condition mentioned in the pamphlet, is a notion that could only have arisen from the heated imagination and consummate ignorance of British Liberalism. Well—in the next sentence of

Austrian statesmen are too well acquainted with Spain to have required from Charles V. professions and disavowals which would have been thought absurd and superfluous both by his enemies and his friends. Indeed if this portion of the pamphlet (not to mention the rest) were translated and circulated through

Spain." I am sure that both Carlists and Christians would unite in a hearty laugh at the expense of the ingenious author. I trust it will be received with equal contempt by those whom it has been fabricated to mislead, our Protestants at home.

But the author of the pamphlet is never long without displaying his eminent talent of self-refutation. Like the besotted Lycurgus, who chopped off his own legs, mistaking them for vine boughs, he handles his facts and arguments in so awkward a manner that, instead of demolishing his adversaries, he leaves himself without a leg to stand upon. To prove for instance the fanaticism of Don Carlos, he follows up the tale of the Inquisition, by telling us at p. 121, that, "when Gomez, passed by Guadalupe with his prisoner, General Plinter, the monks issued from their convents, armed with gun and knife, and entreated of Gomez to lend them Plinter for half an hour that they might drink his blood." *Ecce monachos* but nothing.

Well—in the next sentence of course the bigotted general of a bigotted King falls down on his knees and gives up his prisoner, after begging absolution for having kept him so long, and the paragraph closes with a cannibal flourish. No such thing! If any reader of the pamphlet should have a turn for supping *deu horross*, like the monks of Guadalupe, he

must go without his banquet. The candid author says nothing of the event; but Elmer we know is safe and sound in the castle of Guayana, and Gomez (therefore) must have been willing and able to protect him. Had Christina a Gomez at Madrid or Barcelona? *Bozoin* holds that "the above," says the pamphlet, "is an exaggerated specimen of the conduct that the church party would pursue, the day—the moment they had the power." "This must be gratifying news to every friend of humanity! We must all rejoice to know, from the positive admission of a Cristiano writer, that, should the Carlists prevail, the King will be able to protect his prostrate enemies, and check the rage of his friends; that the turbulent violence of bloody passions will be repressed by the rebuke of order, that though much may be threatened, nothing will be performed, and that a few hard words are all that the vanquished will have to fear.

If however we examine the account of this monkish riot at Guadalupe, there is such evident inaccuracy about its details as to throw some doubt on the truth of the tale altogether. There was never more than one convent in the town; the writer therefore who tells, us that "the monks issued from their convents" must surely have taken up his pen after dinner. It is difficult also to understand how all this

could have happened after the monasteries throughout Spain were suppressed and their inmates dispersed.

The Jeronite convent of Guadalupe, besides possessing extensive estates and valuable moveables, enjoyed since the time of John the 1st, a jurisdiction which rendered its members solely dependent on the Papal See. This and other reasons rendered the establishment peculiarly obnoxious in the eyes of the liberals. The church and monastery moreover contained some excellent paintings, which could scarcely have escaped the notice of certain amateurs, who are at present forming, or enriching their collections from the treasures of the suppressed convents. An establishment that held out such various baits to every kind of cupidity could not have been spared so long. Its inmates were probably in last November (when Gomez happened to be in that part of the country) begging their bread in different parts of Spain.

If this story should ever reach the Basque provinces, it is to be hoped that the Carlists may find leisure to apply to their prisoner for an explanation. General Flint<sup>er</sup>\* is a man of

~~There was not more than one convent in~~

Major Flint<sup>er</sup> went out to Venezuela in the Spanish service, and fought under General Morillo. Returning to England in 1814, he published a "History of the Revolution of Caracas" professing to give an impartial narrative of the atrocious con-



veracity, well known in London; and I am sure would not thank the author of the pamphlet for exhibiting him as a principal character in any of his melodrames.

I should now endeavour to follow the author of the pamphlet through that portion of his misrepresentations which relates to the mutual atrocities perpetrated in this dreadful war, but before I enter on that revolting task, I shall first examine what he is pleased to call the murder of Doña Mariana Pineda. At p. 89 he has woven together truth and falsehood into the following historical Romance.

“ Donna Mariana was a young and beautiful widow, of a highly respectable family, and the mother of two children; but for her misfortune, some of her friends entertained, or were suspected of entertaining, liberal opinions. In an evil hour she commissioned two embroiderers to make a flag, having upon it the words Liberty—Law—Equality; but she subsequently forbade the execution of her commission. The police, however, learned the circumstance, and having communicated it to the government, they received instructions to entrap the indi-

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mitted by the contending parties, and illustrating the real state of the contest, both in a commercial and political point of view.” What a pity our Foreign Office was unable to avail itself of his services on the present occasion.

visual from whom the order for embroidering the flag had proceeded. The police, by threats and bribes, induced the embroiderers to take home their unfinished work to the house of Donna Mariana. The bearer of it was followed by Alguazils and Escribanos, who, on searching the house of course found in it that which they had just caused to be deposited there. For this, or rather for her supposed sympathy with liberals, was Donna Mariana Pineda condemned to death, and publicly gibbeted at Granada, to the horror of the whole town, and to the eternal disgrace of the government of Ferdinand and of that party whose mild and paternal sway the Tories of England desire to re-establish in Spain."

"I have before, I think, observed, that the author of the pamphlet has one great defect as a Romance writer; he seldom thinks it worth his while to give his tales even the appearance of probability, and the present example is no exception to the general rule. His object being to persuade his readers that Mariana Pineda's only crime was her connexion with persons suspected of liberalism, he should have suppressed the flag altogether. To judge of people by the company they keep is an excellent rule when there is nothing better to depend on, but when there is the certain evidence of a person's own acts and deeds, what

more can be required. Ladies the are most  
often in the habit of endeavouring to make  
news for mere amusement; the most frivolous  
of the sex would have an object in shaming  
and in real life of which a well-constructed  
romance should always be a faithful picture  
the discovery of a treasonable flag would im-  
mediately make all the world suspect the ex-  
istence of a treasonable conspiracy. But it is  
enough to have noticed the general incompa-  
tibility of their romances. I will now give the  
real history.

Señor Rineda was a person of good connexions, and a native of Huesca in the province of  
Granada. After the death of his husband, and  
a colonel in the artillery, his family removed to  
his only son from the care of his widow. The  
latter, according to the odious testimony of  
the pamphlet, was a young and beautiful woman  
might have been adorned with equal talents  
she possessed attractive manners, ready wit, and  
consummate address, and by no means an  
austere virtue. It would indeed be a  
on the admirers whom her loveliness  
naturally gathered round her. One of these  
was a certain individual, whose name it is  
necessary to mention, was the reputed father  
of the daughter with whom she was engaged  
soon after casting off her widow's weeds.

Unfortunately for the widow, she did not

confined herself to such comparatively harmless intrigues. She mingled business with pleasure, and her numerous followers were nearly all liberals; she took an active part in their plots and practices against the government. These men had made arrangements for raising an insurrection at Granada, in concert with the refugees hovering on the coast. The festival of St. John (the 14th of March) was the day appointed, and their female confederate had undertaken to prepare the flag which was to be used on the occasion. She did not "commission the two embroiderers," as stated in the pamphlet; but took them into her own house, and there the flag was embroidered under her inspection, and partly with her own hand. The assertion in the pamphlet that she was entrapped by the police, after countermanding the order, is not true. She was indeed most wickedly and atrociously betrayed, but not by the government.

The preparations for the insurrection were far advanced, when a certain liberal, whose name and calling I could mention, one of the widow's most intimate friends, and himself involved in the plot, who had dined with her but a few hours before, admired the beauty of the flag, and seen and heard other evidence of her guilt, whether from jealousy or from a more sordid motive, laid an information against

her, communicated the plan of the conspiracy to Pedroza, the sub-delegate of the police, and pointed out the house in the street *del Aguila*, where all the particulars might be found. The officers in consequence entered the house at night-fall, and there seized Señora Pineda, the flag, and all her papers.

She was not carried to prison (as she might have been had the government been harshly inclined) but left in her own dwelling, under the care of two officers, and it was not till she had once escaped and been recaptured, that she was removed to the *Beatería* of Santa Maria de Egypciaca, a species of penitentiary, similar to ours at Pentonville, and here she remained till her fate was finally determined. She was publicly tried in the Chancery of Granada, and few minor events in the modern history of Spain have excited a livelier interest, or brought more party feeling into play than the proceedings in this case.

Doña Mariana was in no want of money, the ablest advocates were secured in her behalf, many volunteered their services, and she could reckon on the sympathy of some, even among the members of the magistracy, who were attached to her by the tenderest ties. Her defence moreover was conducted with profound skill and brilliant eloquence, but nothing could withstand the strength of the evidence that

was brought against her. The unfortunate woman was in consequence condemned to death, and the sentence, as is customary in similar cases, was transmitted to Madrid for the King's approval.

This of course caused some delay, and the interval was employed by the numerous friends of the culprit in the most strenuous efforts to save her. They hastened in crowds to Madrid; the strongest interest was used with the King, and Queen Christina received the most urgent intreaties to employ her powerful influence in behalf of one of her own sex. The Queen however declined to interfere in a case where the evidence was so clear, and the sentence so just. The applications to the King were equally unavailing. So powerful however was the interest exerted in her favour, that it might possibly have succeeded at last, but for two circumstances, which certainly were not calculated to recommend her to the royal mercy. She herself resolutely refused to reveal the names of her associates, and her ill-judging friends, not satisfied with employing prayers and entreaties, had the imprudence to threaten the authorities, and defy them to execute the sentence.

Finally, after a patient hearing by the Council, the sentence was ordered to be carried into execution. It was not till the arrival of the

warrant at Granada, that Señora Pineda was removed from the penitentiary to the prison, where she was put *en capilla*. On the third day she was brought out to the *Plaza del Triunfo*, the place appointed for her execution, where, after performing her religious duties with the assistance of the curate of Las Angustias, she confessed her guilt and the justice of her sentence, and finally suffered death with heroic firmness and resignation. Her last words were *Muero justamente por no delatar à mis semejantes*, "I die justly because I refuse to denounce my fellow-beings."

That she was "publicly gibbeted" is one of the numerous misstatements of the pamphlet. She suffered strangulation by the *garrote*, the customary mode of executing criminals in Spain, and her body was immediately delivered up to her friends for interment.\*

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\* At the solicitation of the late Queen Amelia, the use of the gallows was some years ago formally prohibited. Since then capital punishment has been inflicted by the *garrote*, or strangulation. A platform is raised, on the top of which is placed a seat for the culprit and close to a strong piece of wood, against which his back rests. Midway up this post is an iron collar, which is fastened round the culprit's neck and when pressed by a screw causes strangulation. This is the easiest and quickest death a human being can suffer. The expence of the platform and other preparations are borne by the municipality of the town where the execution takes place, and among

Since the liberals last came into power, they thought it incumbent on themselves to make a show of revenging so distinguished a martyr in their cause. They accordingly seized upon an alcalde of royalist opinions, D. Juan Pérez by name, and committed him to prison, pretending that he was the person who had informed against the widow Pineda, but never attempted to bring the charge home to him. Their innocent victim was released only by death from his unmerited captivity, while the real culprit, whom it was not perhaps convenient to expose, remained unmolested.

As the fate of Señora Pineda has no relation either to "the policy of England towards Spain," or to the conduct or character of Don Carlos, I might have passed it over altogether, had I not been willing to expose to my readers the scandalous disingenuousness of my opponent. They will observe that what he has the audacity to call a murder was an execution in consequence of a legal sentence, after a fair and even favourable trial; they will remember

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the economical plans fashionable in Spain, it may be mentioned that the municipality of Cadiz lately addressed a memorial to the Cortes, praying the abolition of the *garrate*, as being an expensive process, and recommending persons condemned to death by the civil tribunals to the cheaper one of being shot *a la militaire*.



that you owe to her, towards the same penalty to the same offence. ~~and I am sure that you would know it~~ Whatever may have been the follies and crimes of Doña Mariana Pineda, the heroism with which she perished in a great measure atoned for them; every generous mind, while admitting the justice of her sentence, must pity the woman who sacrificed herself for her country and by confederates. But what shall we say of the wretches who profited by her silence, who could stand round her scaffold, and see her die for a crime that was more theirs than hers? What shall we say of men who could purchase life by the death of a woman? and what shall we say of the writer who has suppressed all this, and rather than display the baseness of Spanish liberalism, has by his silence defrauded of her just praise the heroic victim whom he affects to lament? It had never to have at length arrived at that part of my subject which I approach with the greatest reluctance; but on which an imperious necessity will compel me to dwell at considerable length. It is my distressing task to discuss the nature of this bloody war; to describe the spirit in which it has been carried on, and to weigh in the balance of justice and impartiality the excesses of the contending parties. I know that, in the discharge of this revolting duty, I must allude to deeds disgraceful to humanity, and

peculiarly abhorrent to the feelings of Englishmen; I know that many turn with natural disgust from such sanguinary details, and are ready to condemn both Castles and Cristinos in the same impatient and undistinguishing obscurum magis propter magis non habet. But nevertheless I venture to attract their attention, and I must add too that it is their duty to attend to. Our country, it is true, has long ceased to be the theatre of such horrors as does now desolate Spain, if indeed they were ever carried so far among us, even in the most barbarous ages; but, alas! what return have we made to the merciful Providence for such a blessed immunity? Had not that very immunity rather hardened our hearts against the miseries of others, and caused us to bear with indifference of calamities which we have never had the wretchedness to endure? I fear, after all, that our boasted horror of blood partakes more of squeamishness than of genuine humanity. If we felt as we ought to feel, we should turn with more pity perhaps than anger even from the guiltier if by the two contending parties, and reserve your disgust and indignation for a third, more guilty than either, who without the least shadow of a provocation, and with no inducement but the mischievous thirst of propagandism and views of mistaken self-interest, without the excuse of anger, or

the apprehension of danger, has, with cold malignity and at a safe distance continued to feed this dreadful war, and supplied the more relentless of the combatants with the means of satiating every ferocious passion. But I will dwell no longer on the guilt and ignominy of my country; from so painful a subject it is a relief to revert even to the blunders of the ministerial pamphlet:—

This humane author professes to regard the atrocities in question with infinite horror, and at p. 61 arrives at such a pitch of liberality as to confess that “the Queen’s side having the greater power of repression has been the most to blame of the two;” but it is so difficult to conceive in whom this power of repression resided, for in the same page we are told that government was obliged to wink at the atrocities of the generals, and at p. 84 the generals are said to have been themselves equally unable to control the fury of the troops. Weakness in short, according to this description, is the universal characteristic of the “vigorous” government which we have been so eager to uphold.

Before, however, I speak of the severity by which the Cristinos have endeavored to reduce their adversaries to submission, it may not perhaps be out of place to examine the grounds on which, in all governments, the

ruling authorities claim the right of punishing  
 insurgents, and to point out the circumstances  
 by which that right may be modified, or even  
 altogether subverted. As the principal object  
 for which governments have been instituted  
 is to protect life and property, by upholding  
 the weak against the strong, and the peaceful  
 against the turbulent, it is reasonable that  
 offences of violence, even when merely directed  
 against individuals, should be visited with pe-  
 nalties of severity, but the utmost stretch of pun-  
 ishment is justly reserved for those ambitious  
 and ungovernable adventurers, who, by striking  
 at the ruling power, inflict an injury on every  
 citizen in the land. Every government has therefore, with ample  
 reason, considered treason the worst of all legal  
 offences, and punished it with death. We  
 must not, however, carry law beyond its ap-  
 pointed limits. Justice indeed is of perpetual  
 and universal obligation, but the proper region  
 of law is the circle of its own courts, and its  
 "peculiar maxims" should not be extended be-  
 yond them. In all civil commotions, the bold  
 enthusiasts who strike the first blows, hap-  
 pily fight with the rope about their necks;  
 if they fail, they have the least chance of es-  
 cape; if they succeed, they enjoy among their  
 partisans the glory of having led the way  
 to victory. But when a country is convulsed

from necessity to the other, when order, which  
 is the business of law to maintain is driven  
 from society by the violence of contending  
 factions, and a civil war is once established,  
 it is monstrous to talk of enforcing laws of  
 treason. The sword is put into their hands.  
 There are no armies of traitors. How idle  
 can a man inquire the guilt of disturbing the  
 general tranquillity, when tranquillity is al-  
 ready at an end, and order is completely  
 overturned, and confusion reigns in its stead?  
 In such a state of things, the only law which  
 justice can take for her standard is the law  
 of arms. An attempt to act on any other prin-  
 ciple must lead to the most horrible results.  
 Civil wars are dreadful things in their mildest  
 form; but what would it be if the strict  
 laws of treason were made the guide of camps,  
 and generals should take upon themselves the  
 duties of judges? How wish to search the report,  
 we have only to turn to Spain. The Northern  
 India may be doubted whether a govern-  
 ment has any right at all to enforce the penal-  
 ties of treason, when that government has not  
 the power of affording protection. It is certain  
 at least that no wise ruler would enact to  
 the letter of the law, when commotions have  
 become so formidable that they threaten to  
 overthrow all opposition. What would have  
 been the state of North America in the last

century, what that of England in the century  
 before, if the generals of Charles the 1st and  
 those of George the 3rd had taken upon them  
 to execute as traitors every soldier of  
 the Parliament, or of the Congress, that fell  
 into their hands? But the apostles of spurious  
 liberty and the same in all ages, when they  
 are encountered, they always ride on the  
 curb. The tragedy of Colchester might have  
 served as precedent for Rodil or Minas. What  
 The enlightened author of the pamphlet is  
 not behind his brethren in stretching the  
 power of government to the utmost, as long  
 as liberalism stands at the helm. Like them,  
 when it suits his purpose, he readily invokes  
 the light of the strongest, revives the doctrines  
 of passive obedience and non-resistance, and  
 assumes the highest tone of legitimate sov-  
 ereignty. The Holy Alliance is next to the  
 Inquisition, the grand object of his invective.  
 The Northern Despots, as he styles them,  
 appear in his pages as three monstrous and  
 outrageous giants, whom the Quixotes of the  
 movement may ought to pierce if they can, but  
 more so the traitor who dares to lift a finger  
 against the legitimate majesty of Louis Philippe,  
 even the innocent Isabel. "What is the terror of  
 it? Who would not have blasphemed?" says he,  
 "if an advocate of the Dauphin like Barris had  
 insisted upon claiming equal rights for that

Princess of the little war she waged against thinking of the French? And why should she not maintain them? Had she not as good a right to rise against Louis Philippe, as Louis Philippe had to rise against Charles the 10th, or Philippe Egalité against Louis the 16th? Why should recent violence be more sacred than ancient prescription? Harkent again to this Jacobin apostle of Legitimacy. "The Carlists are rebels in arms against their lawful sovereign, humanity and prudence forbids their being treated with all the severity applicable to their condition; but law and justice would permit it." And this from the man who at p. p. 15 and 16 describes the whole population of the Basque provinces as actively engaged in the cause, so that in consequence all the adults of both sexes would come under his law of treason, and he would have to fill the mountain forests with gibbets, unless indeed the Carlists were to unite their necks into one, for the special convenience of this liberal Caligula.

Why is compared with our energetic countryman; such of the Christiano generals as were satisfied with destroying the fighting men, may pass for patterns of lamblivity. To them possibly and their measures he may allude at p. 120, where he talks of "moderate men and a moderate system capable of regulating the progress

of improvement in the Peninsula." But I have forgotten this merciful "gentleman's" "humanity and prudence." The former is sadly out of place in such bloody company. It is his "prudence" that puts a bridle into the mouths of his "law and justice;" his prudence as he calls it, but in reality a lurking dread that, if he should give them their full range, the Carlists should let slip a little "law and justice" of their own.

But it is difficult for the best men to cultivate all virtues at once. The Queen's ministers and generals dedicated themselves with such inordinate zeal to the exclusive worship of "law and justice;" they were so occupied with offering up hecatombs at the shrines of those sanguinary deities, that they had no time to attend even to the safe counsel of "prudence," and it was quite out of the question to lend an ear to the whispers of *la humanidad*. And yet these men must have been warned from the very first, that they were not called upon to suppress trifling or ordinary disturbances. From the moment of the death of Ferdinand, insurrections broke out in every part of Spain; they comprised individuals of every rank and condition, the whole circle of the nation was black with the coming storm, and the most inexperienced politician might have seen that a civil war was at hand. A more selfish regard



for their own safety should have prompted them to pause, before they set to work an engine which might probably soon recoil upon themselves. They preferred however the harshest system, and their foolish and atrocious policy forthwith produced its natural consequences. Hunted down like wild beasts, or if they escaped themselves, more than murdered by the deaths of their dearest connexions, the Carlists repaid blood for blood, and the civil war was at once redacted to a succession of massacres.

When therefore my countrymen are told of the excesses of the Carlists, before they condemn them, let them consider the intolerable provocations they have received. The writer of the pamphlet indeed, in a note at p. 89, seems to consider a previous provocation to be no excuse whatever for a violent deed, but I suspect he will find few people to agree with him. It is a pity that he cannot prove the converse of the proposition, and convince the world that the absence of all provocation does not aggravate the moral guilt of an aggressor. Could he but succeed in this, he would deserve the warmest gratitude of Lord Palmerston.

I am not going to claim for the Carlists that divine and superhuman virtue that pursues its majestic and undeviating course, undisturbed

by the storms of earthly passions. I admit that they are men; that they are grateful for benefits and resentful of injuries; that oppression provokes them to resistance, and the smart of insufferable outrages maddens them to revenge.

The reader, I trust, will be satisfied if I show that they did their utmost to humanize the war, and only resorted to acts of retaliation when compelled by imperious necessity.

I shall first advert to the murder of Santos Ladrón, as this bloody deed was one of the earliest military executions, and it is not only excused, but absolutely justified by the author of the pamphlet. According to him, Santos Ladrón was an extraordinary person indeed, for he was not merely "a bold man of bad character," but "desirous of revolution for revolution's sake and for his own interest;" in other words, he was interested and disinterested at the same time on the same subject. Not satisfied with thus aspersing a character which was utterly blameless, he wholly at p. 82 misstates the circumstances of that officer's capture, and then justifies his execution as being that of "a rebel leader taken in arms against his sovereign." I have already disposed of this sanguinary writer's "law and justice," on that point; therefore I shall say nothing more, but I must ask him, whether he is really so ignorant as not to know that Santos Ladrón was entrap-

ped by Lorenzo, at a conference solicited by the latter, and acceded to by the former, in the hope that it might prevent the effusion of blood? If therefore Santos Ladron had been ever so much a rebel, faith should have at least been kept with him, and he should have been allowed to depart unharmed. His perfidious entrapper was immediately promoted, and thus the government adopted all the guilt of his treachery.

But the author of the pamphlet seems himself to have little confidence in his justification of Lorenzo: he otherwise would have thought it quite superfluous to attempt to excuse him. "The people," we are told at p. 82, "clamoured loudly for the blood of Santos Ladron and the commanding officers of the garrison informed the Captain General that if he assumed the right, which he did not possess, of delaying the execution, they would not answer for the subordination of their troops and the tranquillity of the town."

So, after all, we find by the very confession of this advocate of "law and justice," that it was not for treason, but to satisfy the vengeance of a Cristino mob that Santos Ladron was put to death. The "vigorous" government appears as vigorous as usual, ever ready to yield, like other reforming governments, to "the pressure from without." Yet this got

vermeant, so yielding to mobs, is so inexorable to rebels, as not to leave its Captains General the power of even delaying an execution.

ALL the tale about the clamours of the people and the insubordination of the soldiery, however in harmony with the conduct of the Cristinos in other cases, is in the present, I suspect, a pure fiction, invented for the purpose of palliating a deed which the writer, who would willingly defend it, feels to be incapable of defence. So far were the people of Pamplona from thirsting for the blood of Santos Ladron, that in the night after his execution no less than 500 persons, mostly youths of the best families, left the place and joined the Carlists at Roncesvalles, and so far was Lorenzo from desiring to spare him, that not satisfied with his death, he was base enough to have him shot in the back, as if his victim could be dishonoured by the infamy of his executioner.

After perusing the account of this cruel and treacherous murder, the reader will naturally ask what horrible revenge was taken for it by the bloody fanatics by whom Don Carlos is supported. I must refer him for an answer to vol. II. p. 88 of my work on the Revolutions of Spain. "The next day Colonel Benito Eraso, who had raised the valley of Roncesvalles, issued a proclamation to the inhabitants and an address to the soldiers. In the former,

after begging those whom he addressed not to be discouraged by the misfortune of Santos Ladron, he added, "No vengeance! oblivion of the past, and a religious observance of the decree of amnesty!" Such was the divine spirit of forgiveness in which the Carlists commenced the war. How have they been requited by the supporters of "law and justice?"

When the French Convention refused quarter to English and Hanoverians, the Duke of York, like Eraso, exhorted his army to abstain from retaliation, and his noble order had such an effect on the troops of France, that they never put into execution the ferocious decree of their government. In the height of their revolutionary frenzy they were softened and humanized by the conduct of a generous enemy, but Eraso had to deal with more pitiless and unsparing savages than the soldiers of the Convention.

It may however be urged that Eraso was only an individual, and that his glorious forbearance must have met with universal reprobation from "the bloody fanatics" with whom he was associated. On the contrary, he was so eminent a member of his party and such confidence was placed in his talents and loyalty, that when Charles V. was pursued by Rodil, Eraso was selected to command the personal escort of that monarch, an office scarcely second in dignity and importance to that of

Commander in Chief, and on the death of the great Carlist general, he was appointed to replace him, though then himself sinking under a mortal disease. We thus see that the officer who made an honourable, though fruitless endeavour to humanize the war, enjoyed on all subsequent occasions the highest credit and confidence with the King and his followers, and hence it is but reasonable to conclude that his particular sentiments were those of his party in general. Had this brave and amiable man fallen into the hands of an enemy, more cruel than the most unsparing disease, there would have been found, no doubt, some ruffian to shoot him in the back, and some wretched nameless underling to maintain that "law and justice permitted it."

It would have been the greatest of all wonders, if so eminent and illustrious a character as Zumalacarregui had escaped the calumnies of such a person as the writer of the pamphlet; but as most of these calumnies have been already publicly contradicted, and as the silence of the calumniator has proved the contradiction to be correct, it is unnecessary that I should do the work over again. The reader may safely set down to the account of fiction all that he will find in the pamphlet about the general ferocity of Zumalacarregui, his "despotic severity towards his soldiers," his "wan-

ten cruelty towards the people," and "his profound and undisguised contempt for his Prince." They may do as much with the females, "who were tarred and feathered and tied on asses;" with "the interesting young woman 22 years old," who was shot, because she was "suspected of having given information to some Cristinos," and with the child of 14 (the son I presume of the precocious damsel), who suffered with her for some reason or other, which the voracious historiographer to the Foreign Office has not deigned to record. All these children of imagination, born and bred in the pages of the pamphlet, have been dispatched already; why then should I play the Cristino and mutilate the slain?

I must however ask the consistent author of the pamphlet what he means by telling us, at p. 86, that Zumalacarregui "deserted from the Queen's ranks," and at p. 115 that he was "turned out." Will he condescend to state his authority for asserting that "Zumalacarregui, Villa Real, Torres, Gomez and the like" joined the Carlists because they had "lost their pay" and had "to seek their fortune elsewhere?" Certainly this is an excellent *liberal* reason for adopting any opinions, or going over to any party. But as to the officers in question, all the world knows that they did not take up Carlism, because they were "turned out,"

but were "turned out" on account of their well-known Carlism. Why! it might as well be said that Lord Palmerston embraced liberalism because he was "turned out" of the representation of his University, when we all know that he was "turned out" for his newly-adopted liberalism. I do not however mean to insinuate that the noble Lord (though not long before he had been "turned out" by the Duke of Wellington) was one of those "who, having lost their pay, went to seek their fortune elsewhere." It is enough for me to expose his lamentable errors and unjustifiable acts without speculating on his motives.

"In the month of March, 1835," says the pamphlet, "a party of 116 Cristinos surrendered to 900 insurgents upon promise of quarter. They were however stripped entirely naked, and after having been marched eight leagues in that condition, the whole of them were butchered." This anonymous author relates his anecdotes in so vague a manner, that it is difficult to identify them. Why could not he tell us the name of the place where this execution was committed, or that of the commanding officer, who, as he was at the head of 900 men, must have been a person of some consideration? What could be the reason that the prisoners were marched eight leagues, exposed to the chance of being re-captured, when



the "bloody fanatics" might have made an end of them at once? I would recommend my opponent, the next time he may desire to make a misrepresentation pass current for truth, to conceal particulars, and to deal in generals throughout. There is nothing like a date for detecting a fiction, or establishing a fact.

No event like that which he relates happened in March, 1835; but March, 1834, was distinguished by an occurrence, so strongly resembling the one mentioned in the text, that they are evidently the same. On that occasion the Carlists did put to death 120 prisoners, whom they had previously marched to some distance, and the commanding officer was no less a personage than Zumalacarregui himself. He had broken into Vitoria by surprise, but, after gaining at first an advantage, was finally obliged to retire, carrying off about 120 prisoners, and leaving 30 of his own men in the enemy's hands. The thirty Carlists were shot after his retreat by the Cristinos, and as soon as Zumalacarregui heard of it, he retaliated on the prisoners whom he had intended to spare.

Why the previous massacre was suppressed, and the formal capitulation invented, I leave for the reader to surmise. "The war from that time," continues the pamphlet, "bore a character of ferocious exasperation which it had not till then assumed." The object of this

assertion is evidently to throw odium on the Carlists, but it is directly contrary to the truth. Long before the affair of Vitoria, and indeed from the beginning of the disturbances, our good allies employed their keepsakes from Woolwich not merely in shooting every Carlist taken in arms, but in murdering unarmed peasants and butchering the wretched inmates of hospitals; so I must leave it for my ingenious opponent to explain by what refinements of cruelty such a war could assume any more decided character of ferocity.

At p. 84 of the pamphlet, we meet with an anecdote which would require notice on its own account, even if it did not possess this peculiarity, that an authority is produced to support it. Captain Henningsen, to whom the writer of the pamphlet refers, says that after Zumalacarre's victory of the 28th October, 1834, a Carlist captain with 30 men was encountered across the mountains 80 or 100 prisoners, who had been collected at the close of the pursuit. Two had already escaped, when the captain reported to the commander in chief that he could not answer for the safety of his prisoners, and received in consequence an order to bind them. But cords were not to be found in the deserted villages, upon which an order was given, in the first instance to shoot the prisoners, but afterwards to bayonet them;

less. Ituralde's division should be alarmed by  
 the firing. The captain upon this sent four  
 sergeants and 15 dancos, and forthwith ordered  
 out his borderers and the two companies of  
 Suches the substance of Captain Henningsen's  
 account. The author of the pamphlet  
 tells the same tale except that he supposes  
 all mention of the prisoners who were spared,  
 and transforms Ituralde's division into a body  
 of Christians. I need not express my own abhorrence  
 of such an action, but it is as completely  
 in accordance with Christian maxims of  
 "law and justice," that I wonder it has met  
 with reprobation from the author of the pam-  
 phlet. I must however confess my suspicion  
 that Captain Henningsen, who though present  
 in the two actions of the 27th and 28th, only  
 heard of the massacre from others, may have  
 been misinformed, or have misunderstood his  
 informant. This might easily have happened  
 to a young foreigner just arrived in the country.  
 It was not till after my return from the seat  
 of war that I saw Captain Henningsen's work,  
 and then for the first time became acquainted  
 with the anecdote in question. It not merely  
 had never been related to me in the oppo, but  
 it had not, as far as I am aware, ever formed  
 the subject of notice and expostulation from  
 the opposite party. As soon as I heard of  
 it, I made enquiries of various well-informed

Spaniards in London, about a week and a half, confirmed by one in particular, who had borne a command in the two actions, and was well acquainted with the plans and disposition of Zumalacarrui, asserted that the order to give quarter was neither violated, nor recalled, and that the last objects of any severity would have been privates, who had in the most part expressed a readiness to enter the Carlist service, and afterwards did so. Zumalacarrui at the time was not pressed by the enemy, had nothing to interrupt his march, and was without any inducement whatever to perpetrate a deed which would have been most offensive to the King. Not to insist on any objections, 47 armed men (and including the landlords this was their number) were an ample escort for 80 or 100 unarmed prisoners. My enquiries however, though they gave me no confirmation of the anecdote in question, brought me to the knowledge of another, of which I was not aware before. O'Doyle's division passed some time previous to his defeat, surprised at the iron Works of Legastia, on the opposite side of Vitoria, 60 unarmed Carlists, of whom 20 were sick or wounded, under the care of their female relations. The Carlists, by order, as the Carlists allege, of O'Doyle himself, fell upon these unfortunate

men with their bayonets, and massacred the whole of them; amidst the struggles and shrieks and mingled prayers and curses of the miserable women. It was the knowledge of this savage butchery that caused Zumalacárregui to direct no quarter to be given in the ensuing action; but when the rout began, and he saw what a dreadful carnage would have attended the execution of his order, he commanded his soldiers to cease the slaughter, and in consequence many hundreds of prisoners were made. Of these 600 entered the service of the King, who dismissed the rest on their parole. Such was the conduct of the "bloody fanatics" even before the Eñort treaty.

It has been suggested to me by a most intelligent Carlist officer, to whom I interpreted the narrative in Captain Henningsen's work, that the massacre of Legastia may, by some mistake or confusion, have given rise to the report of the other. This is not impossible, but whatever may be the fact, I have thought it right to state my own doubts on the matter and the disbelief of others. It may possibly draw Captain Henningsen's attention to the subject, and induce him to make additional enquiries, or to state his reasons for being satisfied with his present information. Nothing, I trust, would be more gratifying to his feelings, if he should in the end find himself mis-

taken, and should be relieved from the pain of seeing his authority turned against the character of his old commander by a writer whose sentiments are the reverse of his own.

I might relate many instances of Zumalacarrregui's humanity, if the limits of a hasty pamphlet permitted it, but I shall confine myself to two, which occurred while Mina commanded in the Northern provinces, and the exasperation of the Carlists was at its height. Having attacked and carried Los Arcos, he found in the hospital there a number of wounded Cristino officers. He immediately ordered every attention to be paid them, and the next day, having obtained the King's permission, had them removed to the Cristino garrison of Logroño, without exacting any condition whatever, an act of generosity rarely to be met with even in the most civilized wars.

Soon afterwards he attacked Echarri-Amanaz, and compelled the garrison to surrender at discretion. On this occasion also, the hero went far beyond the practice of the most humane commanders. Here were men taken with arms in their hands, after a desperate resistance, yet, like the inmates of the hospital at Los Arcos, they found to their astonishment that they were not even prisoners of war. Not so much as their parole was required; they were in every respect as free as their con-

querors. The privates to a man joyfully enlisted under the banner of their benefactor; the officers were dispatched under an escort to Pamplona.

The reader may possibly wish to learn how Mina was employing himself, while his adversary was engaged in these two works of benevolence and forgiveness. During the siege of Los Arcos he was at Lecaroz, a village which then contained five hundred inhabitants. Suspecting that Zumalacarregui had buried the cannon, which in reality were then battering Los Arcos, he commanded the villagers to point out the place of concealment. They of course could not tell him what they did not know, upon which he had the village burnt to the ground, every fifth male shot, and the rest hurried off to the dungeons of Pamplona. The commissioners of the four Allied Powers were then at his head-quarters, but on this occasion, I believe, every one of those gentlemen rigidly observed the rule of non-interference.

During the siege of Echarri-Aranaz, or at least about that time the Cristino general discovered some wounded Carlists in the care of farmers within the dependencies of Pamplona. All these unfortunate men, with every male person who had harboured them, or attended on them, or even expressed a wish for their recovery, were shot without mercy by his

orders. Such was Mina, such was the pitiless and unsparing monster, who shortly after the perpetration of these atrocities was removed to the important command of Catalonia, and with whom British captains were compelled by a British government to place themselves in friendly co-operation!

I have related these four occurrences together, as they all happened at the same time, and before either party was restrained by the Eliot convention. Let my countrymen look here, upon this picture, and on this. They will at least be able to take at its true value the following veracious paragraph which they will find at p. 84 of the pamphlet.

"To control the blind fury of the troops was equally out of the power of the respective commanders, for he who had first cried, 'Hold, enough,' would probably have been branded as a traitor, and have fallen a victim to his own humanity. The commanders on both sides were equally to blame, and both sides had the same sad excuse; but the Carlists had, for the reasons above stated," (the hostility of the rural population) "more frequent opportunities of wreaking their vengeance upon their enemies than the Cristinos, and those opportunities were never allowed to escape." After what I have just related, I may safely leave this specimen of accuracy to the judgment of the reader.



I shall close what relates to Zumalacarreguí by inserting below a proclamation, which has already appeared in my work on the Revolutions of Spain, but which cannot be too frequently perused by all who wish to judge correctly between the contending parties in that country.\* In it he shows that the Queen's

\* "At the moment the brave Navarrese raised the standard of glorious insurrection in defense of their legitimate sovereign, the rebel D. Manuel Lorenzo, proud and arrogant, stepped forward to repress it, and immediately evinced his barbarity by sacrificing the immortal D. Santos de Ladron in the ditch of Pamplona. For his atrocious conduct the self-styled queen-governess, from the rank of brevet-colonel raised him to a viceroyalty. The cruel Quesada and the incendiary Rodil were humane compared with the patricidal Lorenzo. The mere perusal of the proclamation which he issued on the 14th ultimo shows his bloody propensities, and his wish to exterminate the innocent inhabitants by his ferocious despotism.

How different has been the conduct which the defenders of Legitimacy have observed towards their enemies. Notwithstanding they were in want of fortified towns, and whilst incessantly pursued by a force four times as large as their own, they respected the unfortunate prisoner, they afforded surgical aid to the wounded, and took every care of them. Instead of corresponding with these acts of humanity, our obdurate enemies disregarded the laws of war, and their boasted philanthropy degenerated into the most detestable brutality; for, like tigers thirsting after human blood, not only did they shoot persons fighting under my orders, but with their daggers and encrimsoned bayonets put to death the sick and wounded, although respected by all civilized nations.

"Their inhuman proceedings at length compelled me to resort

generals were so far from being forced to yield

and did not submit to the right of reprisals; and, in order to check the effusion of blood, I decreed that for every royalist murdered by them, five of their prisoners should be shot. (This rigorous decree) did not prevent them from shooting the royalists who fell into their hands, and who, in cold blood, were immolated to their ferocious barbarity. Notwithstanding this, as the number of our prisoners greatly exceeded theirs, I could not resist the cries of so many unfortunate beings, and I either restored them to liberty, in order that they might return to their homes, or I placed arms in their willing hands, which they urgently solicited in order to fight against their own companions.

This prudent conduct has been disregarded by the rebels, who not only continue their atrocities, but also recur to all the revolutionary means of devastating the disturbed provinces. The rebel Quesada dictated cruel proclamations; the perfidious Rodil, besides adhering to them, published others breathing blood and desolation; and, lastly, the traitor Lorenz has just confirmed them, by his disgraceful circulars, even complaining that they have not been carried into the execution.

Wherefore, setting aside all delicacies and considerations which I have hitherto observed towards the enemy, and availing myself of the law of reprisals, I have decreed as follows:

“Art. 1. All prisoners taken from the enemy, of whatever rank or class they may be, shall be shot as traitors to their legitimate sovereign.

“Art. 2. In all the corps and battalions under my command the motto *Victory or Death* shall be adopted, and used ~~henceforth~~ *the enemy recall their order of not giving quarters*.

“Art. 3. Having had frequent proofs that in the enemy's ranks there are many devoted to the just cause, but who from distance or the vigilance of their oppressors are unable to present themselves; by virtue of the power vested in me by our sovereign, and in accordance with his beneficent intentions, I

to the "blind fury of the troops," that they reproached their relenting subordinates with the non-execution of their savage orders; he contrasts his own forbearance with the conduct of his opponents, refers to former unavailing efforts to humanize the war, complains that he was compelled to retaliate, and finally sets a term to the severities which he was obliged to ordain. I particularly call the reader's attention to the second article. It proves, beyond dispute, that the Queen's government might at any time have put an end to the system of mutual slaughter, and that, as far as the Carlists were concerned, a convention, like that which takes its name from Lord Eliot, might have been concluded without foreign intervention some months before.

It was easier however for Zumalacarregui to publish a rigorous decree than to carry it into rigorous execution. We can desire no better proof of this (not to mention others) than his conduct at Los Arcos and Echarrri-Aranaz. The Cristinos did not recal their order, and his decree was therefore still in force, when he dismissed the wounded at one place, and the

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make known, that I will not only receive those who may come over, but, I will distinguish and reward them according to their respective merits, &c."

Lecumberri, November 1, 1834.

garrison at the other. All this time the Christians were carrying on the war with unrelenting ferocity, and requiring his forbearance by the most abominable excesses. I have already mentioned two instances where hospitals were converted into slaughter houses; several more are recorded in my work on the Revolutions of Spain, and such abominable outrages were, in fact, of common occurrence. I doubt whether, during the whole war, a single Carlist commander has been guilty of a similar crime.

Up to this time we had gone on furnishing unlimited supplies of every kind of warlike stores to armies which, as we well knew, gave no quarter in the field, murdered every one whom they surprised, massacred the sick and wounded, and in a word treated a whole country as the most ferocious army would serve a town that it had stormed. We had been accessories before the fact to a mighty felony, of which thousands had been the victims. We had incurred all the guilt of the crimes which, knowingly and willingly, we had enabled others to commit.

This atrocious policy is justified in the ministerial pamphlet. Such cruelties," says the author at p. 17, "as are perpetrating now in Spain are abhorrent to British notions, but we were acquainted with them long for the first time?" So, it seems, the friends of law and

justice" massacre, by precedent. ... Why, by this rule, Cain would be the only murderer without a justification. Then (after telling us that in the war of invasion terrible atrocities were committed by the guerrillas and peasantry on the French troops, who on their part, for any thing that appears in the pamphlet to the contrary, poor harmless patient sufferers that they were, never touched a hair of a Spaniard) he asks whether we refused to co-operate with our allies on account of such cruelties? ... Most assuredly we did not, and for an excellent reason. Long before the rising of the Peninsula, we were engaged in a desperate war of our own with Napoleon Buonaparte, and had a right to attack our mortal enemy wherever we found an advantageous battle-field. The war, on the part of Spain, was a convulsive struggle against an outrageous attack on the national independence—an attack so wicked and unprincipled, that no Englishman of any party, however eaten up by liberalism, however bigotted in his admiration of Napoleon Buonaparte on other points, has ever ventured to defend him on this. Were we to leave a gallant nation to its fate, and permit our bitter enemy to appropriate its resources and turn them against ourselves, because, forsooth some unauthorized bands of irregulars, or peasants burnt out of house and home perhaps by these

very Frenchmen; turned upon their oppressors, and were hurried into acts of outrageous vengeance? These were but insulated unauthorized acts of lawless revenge; not such were those of which the Carlists complain, and in which our government has had the cruelty to assist. These latter were crimes committed by men in high command, in the confidence of the ruling powers, and armed with the public authority. The acts of such men are the acts of the government which they serve. Lord Carnarvon merely expressed the sentiment which every one but an utter savage must feel, when He called upon our government to withdraw from such a murderous alliance.

But, according to the pamphlet, the Queen's government was made up of mercy and mildness. With these amiable rulers, no doubt, The war on the north was a struggle for the sake of all was charity and tender heart.

The government, we learn at p. 91, "is not so culpable as it may at first sight appear."

Captain-Generals and military commanders exercised their despotic will, and justified their measures by the plea of expediency. (So by the bye does the author of the pamphlet.)

These were constantly disapproved by the government. The government had no other part left but to be blind to wickedness they could not chastise." None, says the proverb, are so blind as those who won't see. But will

this writer pretend that this merciful government, of whose *vigour* he has drawn so edifying a picture, was reduced to such an excess of weakness, that it could not so much as control its own gazette, that not merely its soldiers but its very printers were in a state of mutiny and insubordination?

In the Madrid Gazette was inserted a proclamation of Quesada's, dated 3rd Nov. 1833, in which he ordered all persons joining or who might have joined the Carlists, to be shot, and their property confiscated. On the following 18th of December, the same general published a proclamation in the Queen's name, which proclamation also was inserted in the Madrid Gazette, stating that "her Majesty, wishing to manifest *her maternal generosity* in favour of those misguided persons remaining in rebellion, postpones for twenty days the pardon granted;"

after which time her commanders are "to execute all persons, *be they who they may*, not availing themselves of this pardon, giving them no more time than is required to enable them to die like Christians, and not exceeding four hours."

This is, I presume, the document alluded to at p. 82 of the pamphlet, as an evidence of the Queen's clemency, and the author, it will be observed, acknowledges it (and indeed how could he do otherwise) as the act of the go-

vernment. "So far from taking other measures of severity, the government of the Queen proclaimed an amnesty to all who would lay down their arms and apply for pardon within a certain time. In December, 1833, this time was extended to twenty days." Here he prudently stops. Such equivocal amnesties, that

given with solemn hand, As blessings, drew a scorpion's sting behind, amnesties that were rather denunciations of vengeance and blood, were not likely to have much effect upon the Carlists. What confidence could be inspired by a government reeking with the blood of Santos Ladrón and his 32 companions, all shot at Pamplona—all except their leader buried in profound silence by the candid author of the pamphlet? Or why

Let it not be forgotten that the murder of Santos Ladrón took place on the 15th Oct. 1833, a fortnight after the death of Ferdinand VII. The second victim was Canon Echeverría, a man highly respected. He was taken at Medina del Pinar by General Wall, and in the middle of Nov. shot at Villarcayo. The third individual of distinction sacrificed by the Queen's representatives was D. Hilarion Rozas, commanding the royalist volunteers of Burgos, shot behind the cavalry barracks at the end of Nov. The archbishop interceded for him and received a promise that his life should be spared. The next moment orders were given for his execution. This case excited universal indignation among the Carlists and, preceded as it had



should men stoop to accept a pardon who were conscious of no crime—who considered themselves better entitled to grant amnesties than to receive them? Such amnesties were repeatedly published in the name of Charles V. so that the Queen's government can claim no peculiar character for humanity on that score.

And then on what different grounds did the generals of the respective parties publish their sanguinary decrees? The Cristinos did not publish theirs as measures of retaliation. They denounced and executed vengeance on their opponents, not because the latter made war like savages, but because they made war at all. Their measures of severity were to continue in force, till what they called the rebellion was extinguished in blood. The Carlists, on the other hand, after repeated attempts to humanize the war, after suffering a long course

been by butlers equally atrocious, showed them what they had to expect, if once the yoke was fastened round their necks. Pamplona, Burgos and Valladolid were particularly distinguished by the butchery of Carlists. In the latter place, during the months of November and December, 22 clergymen were put to death and every where the prisons were crowded with victims. At Alcalá de Henares, even so early as Oct. the Administrator of the Post Office and two *gardes de corps* were shot. Other proofs were given of the determination of the government to exterminate the royalist leaders and imprison their subalterns, as the best means to consolidate the new order of things.

of butcheries, issued on their part similar decrees, but in what manner?—as measures of retaliation, to continue in force till their enemies had withdrawn the bloody proclamations which had provoked their own.

These are the grounds on which Zumalacarre-gui, Zavala, and the other Carlist chiefs exercised occasional severities. But where are the Cris-ting acts of mercy? Can the author of the pamphlet produce a single proclamation on that side where forbearance is offered in return for forbearance; a single act, like those of Zumalacarre-gui at Los Arcos and Echarri-Aranaz? This he must do before he can justify himself for asserting that "the commanders on both sides were equally to blame."

What was the conduct of the Carlists, when Lord Eliot and Colonel Gurwood were sent among them to settle a convention for the mutual exchange of prisoners? They acceded to every thing that was asked, and embraced with eagerness the opportunity, which they had long desired, of humanizing the war. They and their King had received from us nothing but injury, and they requited us by at once entering into our views. But what was the conduct of our allies, of those whom to our own disgrace we had loaded with benefits, if indeed it be a benefit to enable men to commit crimes? They positively refused to accede to

the convention as it was offered to them, and with infinite reluctance consented to, admit it for the armies then serving in the Basque provinces and Navarre. They allowed these favoured regions the rights of "prudence and humanity," but insisted that "law and justice" should range uncontrolled through the rest of Spain.

The humane writer, who applauds the mutilated Eliot convention, and shudders at the Durango decree, assures us that the Christians were fully justified in their resolution to continue the system of what he elsewhere calls "wholesale, cold-blooded butchery." That he may not be accused of misrepresenting him, he will give the justification in his own words. "There appeared at the time not the smallest prospect of the war being extended beyond the limits in which it was then confined, but a formal admission of the probability of such an extension, made by the government of the Queen in a solemn Convention, would have given a prodigious moral force to the Carlists, and would have equally dismayed the partisans of the Queen. This was the reason why the proposal was made and why it was refused." In other words, the Queen's government refused to extend the convention to the rest of Spain, merely because they thought it against their interest to do so. Outrage and bloodshed

appeared to them a better speculation than humanity, and this is the reason of which the author of the pamphlet approves. But his facts are as false as his morality is fragitious. So far was the war from being confined to Navarre and the Basque provinces, with no prospect of spreading, that it was actually raging in Aragon, Catalonia and Galicia; there was every prospect that it would extend into Valencia, and Zumalacarrgui was expecting to carry it into Castile. The real reason why the Cristinos insisted on restricting the convention to Navarre and the Basque provinces, and the armies operating there, was this: in those provinces the Carlists were the stronger party; they had numerous prisoners in their hands, and had every prospect of making more. In the rest of Spain it was otherwise. There the Cristinos expected that the balance of blood would be in their favour, so they were unwilling to bind their hands.

When the convention thus doctored and mutilated was returned to the Carlists, who could have blamed them, had they rejected it altogether. From this however they generously abstained. They accepted the fragment that was returned to them, though it was wholly to the advantage of their enemies. Thus, where the Cristinos were the stronger, they continued their butcheries without restraint,

while the Carlists consented to be bound where they might have exacted a fearful vengeance. I shall now advert to the manner in which their humanity was requited. On the return of our liberals to power, they resolved to reward the compliance of the Carlists by letting loose upon them the lowest and vilest of our urban rabble; refined or still further debased (for I know not which term to choose) by a mixture of Irish peasants. Among them might be here and there scattered a disbanded soldier. Such were the privates of the British Legion. Of the officers, a few were on active service in the British army, many on half-pay, and the remainder now girded on a sword for the first time. The whole was to be commanded by an officer who then held the brevet rank of Lieut. Col. and who had twenty years before served his country in the Peninsula and America, with the utmost distinction that can be acquired by a subaltern. The above will at once be recognized as a faithful description of the privates, by those at least of my readers who witnessed the scenes of riotous and drunken disorder that were of perpetual occurrence while the British Legion was yet encumbering our pot-houses. And such men as these our government let loose with arms in their hands on an unoffending population, and under the control of officers,

who, with a few individual exceptions, had either by long disuse half forgotten their profession, or had it altogether to learn. Charles V. no sooner heard what sort of missionaries were preparing to convert him, than he published the Durango decree.

The writer of the pamphlet opens his fire on this subject by the following attack on Lord Carnarvon: "We confess that the manner in which Lord Carnarvon has treated the question of the Durango decree, has occasioned us equal pain and surprise. His Lordship says, it is severe in principle and has been severe in its operation! Good! Good! is it possible that an English Nobleman, of the most unsullied honour, and of a virtuous and amiable character should thus express himself upon the wholesale cold-blooded butchery, not only of his fellow-creatures, but of his fellow-countrymen! His Lordship does not consider that circumstances altogether justified the amazement of Government at hearing the execution of prisoners; and he even throws the shield of his approbation over the bloody edict, by declaring his opinion that Englishmen were excluded from the beneficial operation of the Eliot Convention, by the spirit of the agreement. It is with unaffected regret that we see such workings of party spirit upon a mind like Lord Carnarvon's."

I could wish that every reader of this para-

graph would turn to the pages that provoked it. They will be fully rewarded, if they are capable of deriving pleasure from the soundest views of policy, and the purest, most just, and most generous sentiments conveyed in the fitting vehicle of a style at once elegant and dignified. I have reason to solicit peculiar indulgence in entering on a subject, which another has discussed with so much ability. On the subject of this decree I have had the advantage and honour of personal communication with the monarch who issued it. I have heard him with his own lips express his deep regret that his motives had been so much misunderstood and so eagerly misrepresented in England. As Foreigners, he condescended to observe to me, do not know this country, nor have they the slightest conception of the exasperation into which its inhabitants have been driven. It rejoices that some have come among us, as you have done, to see things with their own eyes, and judge for themselves. Foreigners also are wholly unacquainted with the state of the law in the provinces. No one abhors bloodshed more than I do. I wished to put the unwary on their guard, and the day will come when they will regret not having attended to our timely warnings. Such were the intentions of Charles V. in issuing the Durango decree. I shall now state

how Lord Palmerston acted on the occasion, and I think every reader, whatever may be his opinion of Charles V., will agree with me, that if Lord Palmerston had positively desired to produce fresh exasperation, and inflame that which already existed, if it had been his intention to cause the Durango decree to be obstinately maintained and rigorously executed, he could not have acted in a manner better calculated to carry such a desire and such an intention into full effect.

I Lieut. Genl. Wyde received orders to repair to the King's head quarters, and read to him the following imperious message, which he was directed to leave signed in his hands.

The undersigned has the honour to acquaint His Royal Highness Don Carlos, that the attention of His Britannic Majesty's government has been drawn to a document purporting to be a decree signed by His Royal Highness, of which the undersigned has the honour to deliver to him a copy. The undersigned is not instructed to ask His Royal Highness whether that document be genuine, because His Majesty's government think that such a question would be derogatory to the honour and good faith of His Royal Highness; but as some of the partisans of His Royal Highness in Spain and elsewhere, have endeavoured to propagate a belief, that whether this document be genuine



or not, His Royal Highness is resolved to carry into effect the intentions announced in the said decree, the undersigned is instructed formally to declare to His Royal Highness, that the British government will not permit the Convention which was negotiated and signed under the mediation of Great Britain to be violated with impunity; that the British government cannot doubt that this Convention will be strictly and faithfully observed with regard to all persons engaged in the service of the Queen of Spain, whether Spaniards or others; and that the British government look specially to his Royal Highness Don Carlos for a fulfilment of the engagements which have been made, and for an observance, on this matter, of the usages of civilized nations.

To this impudent and arrogant lecture, which, as my readers will readily perceive, contains a covert insult in almost every line, the King returned the following temperate reply, which will give in its every words of Gold Wylder:—"His Royal Highness (meaning Don Carlos) said that he had issued that address after mature reflection, and that he considered he was perfectly justified in doing so, and had issued orders to his generals to carry it into effect; that as to the Convention presented to him by Lord Elliot, the employment of foreign troops was not contemplated at that time, or

he should not have agreed to it, and that he looked upon this force as without the pale of that Convention." One would imagine that Lord Palmerston might have been satisfied with the irritating effect of his insolent message; but he seems to have been apprehensive that Don Carlos might have restrained his just indignation, and offered to modify the decree so as to render it harmless, or proposed some alternative which it might have been unpopular to refuse. What ever may have been his motive, he gave Lord Wyke a positive order to abstain from entering into any discussion with Don Carlos on this or any other political subject. His envoy had only to deter his insult, and begone. From this I leave the reader to conjecture whether he wished the mission to succeed; and whether his gracious demeanour to any discussion, his envoy would probably have been told that Don Carlos had, from the first, endeavoured to soften the injuries of war, and that his enemies had only replied by additional cruelties to his repeated acts of forbearance; that though his enemies had received every assistance from England, while he had experienced nothing but causeless hostility, he had nevertheless eagerly acceded to the full extent of the Elliot convention, whereas his enemies

had only consented to it in part, and this with reluctance; that though all he had gained by his late compliance was more determined persecution, he would at once rescind the Durango decree, if the British government would only procure their own convention to be observed in its full extent, as it had already been countenanced by British commissioners; that Lord Eliot and Colonel Gurwood, one an experienced diplomatist, and the other a distinguished military officer, had already sanctioned the convention as applied to the whole of Spain, and if that were now done, he would at once admit the British Legion to the usual courtesies of war; that, consequently, whether the Durango decree was to be maintained, or abolished, depended less on him than on the British government and their Cristino allies; but that, if he were to consent to give quarter to foreigners, while the government whom they came to support were refusing quarter to his adherents, in nine tenths of Spain, he would not be able to restrain the natural indignation of his subjects, and would therefore be agreeing to what he could not perform.

All this and more would probably have been represented to the British negotiator, but the peremptory order to abstain from all discussion, left our countrymen to their fate. And yet I cannot conceive how Lord Palmerston could

have suffered humiliation by treating Don Carlos as one gentleman treats another. If the latter be, as his enemies call him, a miserable King, pent up in a corner and beset with enemies, his very weakness would induce a generous opponent to approach him with more profound respect. But monarchs struggling for existence, or poor paltry South American republics, are just the powers for whom Lord Palmerston reserves all the terrors of his diplomacy.

The Durango decree was known in England before a soldier of the Legion left our shores. Lord Palmerston, therefore, with his eyes open, encouraged the departure of our raw and inexperienced countrymen; he sent them to bear a part in a war of extermination against a prince, justly indignant at repeated injuries, and among a fierce and haughty population, whom intolerable persecutions had inflamed almost to madness. The free natives of the privileged provinces, who had for centuries maintained their liberties against the whole power of the Spanish crown—whose laws condemned to death every foreigner entering their territory in a hostile manner—whose ancestors had executed under the eyes of their sovereign the Jewish minister of Castilian finance, who encroached upon their rights,—these were not men to submit with patience, when they found that, in return,

for their ready compliance with the terms of the Elhiot convention, they were to be assailed by two hordes of foreign adventurers, hired, as they believed, by speculating Jews to take their lives, outrage their families, and destroy their country. Lord Palmerston's conscience must convince him that he was himself the real author of the Durango decree, and that nothing but his own arrogant injustice and outrageous violence have maintained it in force.

It is remarkable that, though the ordinance in question applies as much to the Algerine Legion as to the British adventurers, and though the former from having been more frequently engaged in action, must have suffered from it more, the indignation and outcry has proceeded chiefly, if not entirely, from the latter. The former seem to have been aware that cruelty and injustice, in one party, naturally produce exasperation in the other, and that men, who have been from year to year conquered like wild beasts, will at last imitate, in some degree, the ferocity of those mute denizens of the forest. I have now sufficiently vindicated the Durango decree. What I have said on the subject I beg may be considered as addressed to such only as hold ideas of deliberate cruelty in real and unaffected horror, whoever may be

the victims of them, and from whom ever they  
 have proceeded. There are too many, however,  
 who have shown themselves worse than in-  
 different to the most barbarous excesses, as  
 long as the honourable, the loyal and the re-  
 ligious have been the only sufferers, who have  
 looked on with complacency, and rendered  
 even active assistance, till their destructive  
 engine has recoiled upon themselves. Against  
 such accusers, who never seek pity but for their  
 own pain, I disdain to vindicate the character  
 of Charles. The Commander of the British Legion just  
 before his departure, expressed infinite indig-  
 nation in the House of Commons, when the  
*turno redottieri*, was applied to him. On that  
 occasion if he is rightly reported in the *Morn-  
 ing Chronicle*, he said that the term *condot-  
 tieri* had been applied to a class of men, who  
 hired themselves out, but did not fight much;  
 and it must be owned that of late at least he  
 has proved, though with no great advantage,  
 a good fortune, that he has more of the pacific  
 propensities than he then ascribed to the *con-  
 dottieri*. I entirely acquit him of anything like  
 baseness, or mercenary motives, nor doubt, if  
 he was justified in leading his followers to take  
 part in the Spanish civil war, there was nothing  
 objectionable in his receiving pay and allow-  
 ances, and even in the most affected manner

ances. But I hope I shall not bring about my peaceful dwelling the  
 "Guns, drums, trumpets, blunderbuss and thunder"  
 of his legion, if I presume to doubt whether such an expedition as his is altogether justifiable. Among men, acts must be estimated not merely by their moral turpitude, but by their effect on society, and what can be more generally mischievous, what better calculated to put every thing under the yoke of violence, than to propagate opinions by the sword, and apply to politics, what formerly prevailed in religious matters, the sacrilegious bloody spirit of forcible proselytism. My gallant countryman knows by experience the miseries of war, and can he really think himself justified in inflicting them on the numerous Spaniards who happen to differ from him on points of internal Spanish policy? What would become of society, if every political enthusiast, not satisfied with oppressing our patience by tedious harangues, should force his foolish fancies on our acceptance by military violence? The author of the pamphlet offers, at p. 52, another kind of defence for the expedition in question. "Can it," says he, "with truth and fairness be said that any motive of internal policy should have induced government to for-"

bid a certain number of young men from seeking distinction and crosses, and from going in a time of general tranquillity to learn the art of war in a country, where, from its nature, war must be carried on in a manner, which calls upon the officer for the exertion of all his talents and achievements, nor why should a certain number of unemployed persons of the lower classes have been prevented from gaining an honest livelihood for a year or two, subject to military discipline. I suspect Colonel Evans will not thank the author of the pamphlet for volunteering to enlist as his advocate. Here there is no question though this taken enthusiasm and regard whatever for any cause. Every thing here would have been just as applicable, had the gallant Lieut. Colonel led his legion to assist the Emperor of Russia against the Circassian mountaineers. The morality is in accord with the morality of the pamphlet. With this author nothing is to be regarded in a cause, but what is to be gained by it. What is it to him in what manner distinctions and crosses are won, as long as they are won at last. In his awkward defence, the gallant Lieut. Colonel appears as a being, half *condottiere*, half *exquisite*, whose principal object in drawing his sword is to add to the glitter of his uniform. But I trust Colonel Evans will thank me for exposing the blunder-



ing advocate, whose panegyrics are the most  
 effulgent of flattery. It is not the ruby or the  
 diamond that makes the value of a decoration,  
 but the gallant service of which it is the token  
 and the reward! But in a bad cause no action  
 can be honourable, and every recompense is  
 only an additional disgrace. The simple War-  
 ter medal is worth all the stars that splendours  
 ever gained for courtiers. This, however, is  
 perhaps something more than the author of the  
 pamphlet can comprehend. Hed Isidore Way,  
 can see no difference between a Wilmington  
 and a Potemkin, except that the former wears  
 the garter which the latter longed for in vain.  
 It has not been unusual for individual offi-  
 cers, when their own country has been at  
 peace, and regular wars have been in progress  
 elsewhere, to repair to the contending armies,  
 for the purpose of acquiring military know-  
 ledge and experience. Who, however, but the  
 author of this pamphlet, would compare ends  
 like these with that of an officer leading an  
 auxiliary corps of volunteer adventurers to take  
 part in a civil war, and mix themselves up with  
 all the vindictive passions, and ferocious deeds,  
 that such a war must necessarily engender.  
 That the war is such as to call upon the  
 soldier for the exertion of all his talents and  
 acquisitions, if willingly allow, and I will add  
 that he may exert them all, and find them

too little at last. But it is the first time I ever heard that the strength of a country, and the bravery and patriotism of its martial inhabitants, were valid reasons for attacking it. The difficulty of the wilderness, or the fierceness and spirit of the quarry, may add to the excitement of African, or Asiatic field sports, but God forbid that the youth of Britain should even be brutalized into hunters of their fellow-men and Nimrods of human game! What is the heart of this writer made of, who dares with an honest livelihood to fall sword in hand on men who have never injured you and from whom you apprehend no wrong? My heart, I suppose, he will tell me, is "warped in favour of despotism and ignorance," because I cannot wish success to a band of adventurers, who go to wage a senseless and therefore an unjust and wicked war on the simple peasants, with whom I have conversed, whose cottages I have entered, whose patient industry I have admired, and whose manly frank and independent character possesses a peculiar charm for every genuine Englishman. I would recommend the author of the pamphlet to examine his own heart, and see whether it be not perverted by the most bigoted and incurable blind of ignorance, the ignorance that fancies itself wisdom, and is warped in favour of the worst of all, "despotism," the despotism that

profanes the sacred attributes of liberty, by exercising its oppression in her name. It cannot wonder that a writer, so dead to every generous sentiment should defend, at p. 63, Lord Palmerston's spiteful and barbarous order that our naval commanders should refuse Don Carlos an asylum on board our vessels, in case he should apply for it. I can scarcely indeed believe it possible that Lord Palmerston could have intended his order for any thing more than an empty threat, for he must have been aware that no British Captain would be inhuman enough to obey it. It is however of no consequence, except as far as it affects our national character, for, whatever may be the fortune of the war, our humanity will never be put to the test.

We are asked at p. 59 and 60 of the pamphlet, "will any man assert that British subjects, in their natural character, have no right to expect mercy in war?" I ask in reply, will any man assert that British subjects are in their natural character when they go as volunteers to ravage, destroy and kill without any personal, or national provocation? What has Don Carlos received from us but a succession of outrageous injuries, and yet how has he behaved to the Royal Marines? He immediately admitted them to "mercy in war," because they appeared as "British subjects in

their natural character," acting in obedience to the orders of their government, and obliged by their duty to discharge the hateful errand on which they were sent.

In order that the distinction made between the Legionaries and the Troops belonging to the British Crown may be properly understood, the point relating to them is subjoined.

"ROYAL DECREE, Durango, June 20, 1835.

"Having received information that the revolutionary and usurping government, no longer able to fill up its ranks with fresh Spanish victims, has ordered its agents in France, England and Brussels to recruit foreigners for that purpose, I therefore order and decree as follows:

"Art. 1. All foreigners, without distinction of rank or grade, who shall take up arms against my legitimate rights, or who shall serve, by any means whatsoever, the rebel army of the usurpation, shall be deprived of the benefits of existing Laws, nor shall they be considered as included in the Convention for the exchange of prisoners, signed by my authority by my Commander-in-chief, at Asarta, on the 28th of last April.

"Art. 2. All foreigners above noticed who shall fall into our hands shall, after time being given them to perform their religious duties, be instantly shot.

I do further order that this my Royal Decree be published in all my dominions, and you will take the necessary steps that foreigners may be made acquainted with it as soon as possible."

"ROYAL DECREE, Villareal, July 15, 1836.

"The King our master, being desirous of drawing a just distinction between the regular foreign troops and the mercenary adventurers who, in consequence of crimes against society, are obliged to fly to the standard which the revolution raises in

My anonymous opponent seems in doubt whether the gentlemen of the Isle of Dogs are Englishmen, or Spaniards, though at p. 54 he ranks them among the latter. I am not aware that they have as yet behaved otherwise than like Cristine Spaniards in the field. On the 16th of March 1837, a regiment of the Legion was, according to the dispatch of their own commander, the first to run away. Both sorts of Spaniards went off together, leaving the undoubted Englishmen, the heroic Marines, to bring away themselves and the artillery in the best manner they might. I allow, since my opponent will have it so that these disinterested volunteers are Spaniards in every thing except in receiving pay and allowances, as done by the treaty when the treaty was signed between the British and the other countries, and now directs against Spain, and willing to give a proof of his benevolent principles and high sentiments, I will add the following:

"That the officers and men of the Royal English Marines, who, obliged by order of their Government, have come in compliance with their duty, possibly against the dictates of their own consciences and free will, to the coasts of Guipuscoa and Biscay, and who may fall by the fortune of war into the hands of the troops of the Militia, shall be respected and shall as prisoners of war be treated, according to the Decree of Burago, published before the recruitment, applying alone to adventurers, who, abandoning their own homes and renouncing the laws of their country, come voluntarily to extend anarchy and give foreign assistance to a cause with which they have no concern!"

(Signed) B. B. B.

whenever they can get them, according to the  
 British scale. In this substantial difference  
 they have the advantage both of their Penin-  
 sular allies, and of their Algerine comrades.  
 I shall not waste my reader's time and my  
 own by seriously refuting what (to borrow an  
 expression of Swift's) the poverty of our lan-  
 guage obliges me to call the argument which  
 appears at p. 62. I shall only state it. It is  
 this, that since the words "We same armies  
 at present carrying on war in the Basque  
 Provinces and in the Kingdom of Navarre"  
 include individual recruits subsequently joining  
 their regiments, they must therefore include  
 two legions of foreigners, a description of  
 troops not in existence, or even in contempla-  
 tion, when the treaty was signed. Such an  
 argument as this is sufficiently refuted by men-  
 tioning it, and I shall therefore here take my  
 leave of these ~~transmontane and transmarine~~  
~~Spaniards.~~  
 I have represented the British Ministers  
 as sending out Col. Evans and his Legion,  
 because they gave them, by their defenders  
 own admission, every possible encouragement,  
 and suspended the Foreign Enlistment Bill to  
 facilitate the levy. We are told at p. 51 of the  
 pamphlet that "the law might have been  
 evaded," as in the case of Don Pedro's ex-  
 pedition, which "was raised, equipped and

embarked in England—almost it may be said in defiance of the government.” I should hope the writer of this could not have read the correspondence on the subject between our Foreign Office and Mr. Sanzpayo, or he must have known that so far was the expedition from having been sent in defiance of our government, that the latter resorted to every shift and evasion to enable it to sail, and when, in spite of all the foreign awkwardness of the Miguelite agents, the vessels were stopped, Lord Palmerston was obliged to send a treasury order to release them, under pretence that the seizure was illegal. This was an odd way of forbidding the expedition.

I cannot believe that Lord Palmerston would ever have entered on his present course, if he had foreseen the horrors that were to surround him in the race, and the scenes of blood and vengeance that awaited him at the goal. His conduct is perhaps to be attributed to gross, but at the same time culpable, ignorance, for such ignorance in a statesman is no small crime. Forgetting that power becomes weakness when it is wielded by incapacity, he probably imagined that a mere demonstration by England would fix the throne of Isabel on a solid basis; that the Quadruple Treaty, and the additional articles, fit children of such a parent, would sound a summons to which Don

Carlos would surrender—without firing a shot, or if he should have the boldness to hold out against this, that he surely could not resist the majestic apparition of Brevet Lieut. Col. Evans in the Lieut. General's uniform. His lordship seems to have imbibed the same false notion as his nameless defender has, of the personal character of Charles V. and to have fancied insolence, threats, arrogance, outrage and injury the readiest means of reducing a high-spirited and high-principled King to unconditional submission. He must now be undeceived. He must now see that he has no alternative but to retrace his steps and avow his errors, or run the race of blood to the end. I pity him most sincerely.

The Eliot convention, the author of the pamphlet tells us at p. 60, was “religiously observed” by “both belligerents,” and such an admission from so bigoted and prejudiced a writer is, no doubt, of unimpeachable authority as far as concerns the good faith of the Carlists, but I beg leave to deny his assertion with respect to the Cristinos. He seems, indeed, himself to think that he has gone too far, for in speaking of the king's speech of 1836, though he gives the words “*religiously observed*” the benefit of Italics, he qualifies them with the phrase “at that time,” as if he was aware that at some time or other, the convention had not



been quite so "religiously" observed. If he thought so, he was not mistaken. Not to mention other instances, I need only refer to the case of Col. Reyna and his six companions, taken before Puente de la Reyna, and bayoneted in cold blood on the 13th July 1835, and to that of Brigadier Torres and other officers of the Northern army taken and shot in Catalonia, whose murder was the subject of an indignant remonstrance from Villareal to Cordova, dated 24th June 1836.

Nothing is more natural than that a friend of the Cristines should wish to soften, as much as possible, the odium that must attach to that party, for having restricted the Eliti convention to Navarre and the Basque provinces, and accordingly the author of the pamphlet would at 100 persuade his readers that at some time or other, after the king's speech in 1836, Cordova at the request of Mr. Villiers made a proposal to extend it, which Villareal after some negotiation, rejected.

This assertion, as indeed is usual with this writer, is couched in very general terms, and as far as my recollection goes, no document exists to show that the proposal was ever made. On Cordova's return from Madrid in June, 1836, he certainly had a conference with Villareal for purposes yet unexplained, and supposed to have had reference to a very different

object, but in his justification, written by him when an exile at Bayonne, and dated the 5th of the subsequent September, in which he replies to several charges brought against him by his enemies, he makes no allusion whatever to any proposal made on his part to extend the limits of the Elliot convention, though such a proposal, if it had been made, would have been in the eyes of his accusers the most flagrant of his offences.

The anarchists of the clubs, and the revolutionary members of the Cortes exclaimed against the Elliot convention, even in the narrow limits to which it was confined. How then can we imagine that they would have tolerated an attempt to extend it, or that Cordova would have dared to make such a proposal? If indeed Mr. Villiers had applied to Cordova by the authority of Lord Palmerston; if the weight of the British government had been thrown into the scale of humanity; and such a powerful intercessor had been in earnest, then perhaps the demagogues might have feared to disgust an ally by whose support they existed, and the general might have made the proposal with impunity. But the writer of the pamphlet has not ventured to assert that Mr. Villiers's request was any thing more than a private suggestion of his own. Under such circumstances, to have put Cordova on making

the proposal in question, however creditable it may be to the heart of Mr. Villiers, does not say much for his understanding. By entering upon such a negotiation, without the assurance of British co-operation, the general would only have strengthened the democratic outcry against himself, and accelerated his own fall. He therefore exercised a sound discretion, if (as I believe he did) he declined to act on the private and personal suggestion of the British Envoy. I shall now dismiss the subject with the following question. This proposal, if it was ever made, could not have been made later than the middle of last summer; how is it that it has never been heard of till now?

My readers must by this time be convinced that the ministerial pamphlet is replete with miracles, both of argument and assertion, and among these miracles, I think they will agree with me that the passage on the King's speech of 1836 holds a conspicuous place. This is the "prudent and vigorous" speech that at the time made so much noise and excited such general indignation. On this subject Lord Carnarvon has used the language of common sense and common humanity, and is consequently taken to task at p. 98 of the pamphlet, in the following curious paragraph. Verily his Lordship's credulity must have been sadly practised upon, when he made this declaration,

for we take upon ourselves to affirm, that the speech of the King of England had as much to do with the increase of crime in Spain, as that of the President of the United States. An infinitesimal portion of knowledge of Spain, is sufficient to make any man aware that Spaniards never know, nor care, about what is passing in other countries, or what is thought of them by foreigners, for whom they entertain almost Chinese feelings of disregard. The King of England's speech was little circulated in Spain—it could have been read but by very few of those who took part in the popular excesses, and upon those into whose hands it may have fallen, it must have produced an effect the very reverse of that imagined, by Lord Carnarvon, because it was obviously an exhortation to the Spanish Government, to use in its administration of affairs that prudence and vigour which the speech made mention of; and the more those qualities were excited, the less would necessarily become the chance of impunity for the anarchists."

The writer of the pamphlet has very prudently abstained from quoting the speech in question, but I shall supply his omission. The only passage in the speech relative to Spanish affairs, is that which follows. "I have still to lament the continuance of the civil contest in the Northern Provinces of Spain. The measures

which I have taken, and the engagements into which I have entered, sufficiently prove my deep anxiety for its termination; and the prudent and vigorous conduct of the present government of Spain inspires me with the hope that the authority of the Queen will soon be established in every part of her dominions, and that the Spanish nation, so long connected by friendship with Great Britain, will again enjoy the blessings of internal tranquillity and union." Now I confidently appeal to any person, who possesses even "an infinitesimal portion" of common sense and an ordinary knowledge of common English, whether any "exhortation" whatever is to be found here, whether this reference to the character of our ally is not rather approbation than reproof, and far more a hint to persevere in old habits than to adopt new ones. The whole paragraph is evidently directed against the Carlists, and the expressions relative to "internal tranquillity and union," clearly allude to the prognosticated termination of the civil war, and to that alone. Nothing whatever is said about the "impunity of anarchists," though there was the strongest reason for a friendly "exhortation" on the subject, as the last and worst massacre of Barcelona had been perpetrated with "impunity" a month before.

The warlike operations of the Queen's go-

vernment had been, as is repeatedly acknowledged in the pamphlet, conducted throughout with notorious imbecility; the only vigour shown by her generals was in ordering military executions; their nearest approach to prudence that outrageous and inhuman precaution which makes mere suspicion stand for proof. To talk of the prudence and vigour of such a government, was to instigate it to fresh excesses, by applauding the past. This is the evident tendency of the passage, and it is no wonder that it excited universal disgust. As to the author of the pamphlet, I will not so libel his intellect as to suppose that he believes in the correctness of his own quibbling interpretation. But if this paragraph is in itself disgraceful, what terms can we find to stigmatize it, as it deserves, when we consider under what circumstances it was penned? The news of the Barcelona massacre had so recently arrived in England, that it must have occupied the attention of ministers at the very time the King's speech was composing; one thing, at least, is certain, that Lord Palmerston's dispatch to Mr. Villiers, on the subject of the massacre, is dated on the 4th of February, 1836, the very same day on which the speech was delivered from the throne. Both documents must have reached the Madrid ministers at the same time. From the dispatch they must have learned that

"the authorities of the Queen ought to have saved her cause from the disgrace such deeds attach to it; from the speech, that the conduct of her government was prudent and vigorous. I give Lord Palmerston full credit for his dispatch, which is just the kind of document which circumstances required. It contrasts most advantageously with the extracts from that of Mr. Villiers, and the covert reproof to that gentleman (conveyed in the words "It is no palliation of these massacres that similar crimes had previously been committed by the Carlists") though founded on misinformation, does honour to the writer. But when the dispatch came accompanied with the speech, who could have believed him sincere?"

The writer of the pamphlet, at p. 99, declares, in opposition to Lord Carnarvon, "that, with the exception of the inexecutable act of Mina and Nogueras, atrocities did not increase, nor

The following extract from a proclamation by General Latorre, Governor of Galicia, will show how well the Spanish government in April 1836, attended to the exhortations of the King's speech, "to use in its administration of affairs that prudence and vigour which the speech made mention of. "The penalty of death shall be inflicted on all the factions," and all persons known by public notoriety, on other instances, to have formed part of the rebellious bands, also upon all persons taken with arms in their hands. Furthermore, all spies and persons concealing the factions whatever may be their status,

was the Eliot convention more decidedly violated" after the King's speech. The latter part of this assertion I have already contradicted, and with regard to the former, it certainly is an odd way of refuting Lord Carnarvon to admit his principal fact. But the "inexorable act" alluded to above should fill every Englishman, as well as every Spaniard, with regret and shame \* It is no palliation of these massacres that

similar crimes had previously been committed, or condition, shall be shot as soon as taken, and the parents of insurgents are to be made responsible for the acts of their children, and conducted as hostages to Ferrol, &c. It would almost appear from this horrible document, that the act of Mora was in the spirit of a system, rather than an outbreak of individual ferocity. The writer of the paragraph at p. 100 of the

Towards the middle of February, steps were taken for the expulsion of the monks, preparatory to church spoliation, and on the 10th of the ensuing March, a decree appeared for the suppression of "all convents, colleges and other religious communities, including those of the secular clergy and the four military orders." The Zaragoza butcheries followed on the 25th, when the national guards (compelled the General Court to condemn four Carlists to the garrote, and this sentence was carried into immediate execution." The murder of these unfortunate men has sufficed to quench the thirst for blood of the "citizen soldiers," they called for the heads of two of the Judges, Pereda and Arriola, who had refused to sanction the sanguinary decree of their court, and whose lives were saved only by flight. Terror drove several clergymen and peaceable residents into exile, and so completely overawed were the authorities by the military mobs as to be unable to prevent nightly



It is with repugnance that I am again obliged to mention General Mina. He has been summoned before that all-just and all-merciful tribunal, where the widow and orphan are the most formidable of accusers, and where his employers and abettors must appear at their appointed time. It is not my purpose to dwell on this execrable and enormous offence, which however was visited by no earthly punishment, and has not prevented its perpetrator from being attended to his grave with every honour that a corrupt and merciless government can bestow. But let us not be unjust even to Mina. He had been hardened by scenes of desolation and bloodshed; he had passed years in banishment, under circumstances of strong political exasperation, and, when he returned to his country and native province, invested with supreme command, and both able and willing to realize in his viceroyalty the Roman adage,

*regnabit sanguine multo,*

*Ad regnum quisquis venit ab exilio,*

he perpetrated his most atrocious excesses without remonstrance, though the allied commissioners were in his camp. Savage and cruel

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**Assassinations.** With difficulty they protected the wives of absentees, including those of the two Judges. About this time the deportations for political offences were also at their height.

as he was both by nature and habit, he might have placed some restraint on his ferocity, had he imagined that it might offend the most powerful support of his faction, the British government. The man, who almost under British inspection, without hearing a whisper of reproof or remonstrance, had shot the unarmed peasant before the eyes of his kindred, and bayoneted the sick and wounded in their beds, might naturally feel some surprise at finding the murder of an innocent woman denounced as an "inexpiable offence."

The King's speech was delivered on the 4th of February; eleven days after, the venerable mother of Cabrera atoned with her life for the alleged crime of her son. The speech therefore had probably reached Barcelona shortly before the death warrant was signed. If Mina had been only wavering in his savage design (and great crimes are seldom committed without some misgivings) how different a result might have followed, had the speech been such as a British ministry should have prepared for a British King!

The Madrid ministers must, I think, have laughed in their sleeves at the bustling interference of Mr. Villiers. He read them a lecture on the subject, in what the writer of the pamphlet calls "becoming language," complaining, I presume, that Mina had gone a step beyond

his Northern precedents, and displayed a reprehensible excess of "prudence and vigour." "The answer," we are told, "of the Spanish government was such as might be expected." Just so. The subaltern Noguera was put on his trial, but as to the hero of Lecaroz, who is justly termed in the pamphlet "the more guilty and responsible of the two," the Madrid people "frankly declared that he was beyond their reach." This eminent patriot, yet reeking with the blood of his fellow-provincials, was, if we are to believe the pamphlet, "in the zenith of popularity and power," he had "lately arrived in Catalonia," where he "had already rendered important services, both in re-establishing tranquillity and in dispersing the Carlist hordes," in other words, he had expiated the "inexpiable crimes" by a multitude of subaltern murders. It is therefore quite in the natural spirit of liberalism that the writer of the pamphlet observes— "Can it be wondered at that the Spanish government should have felt a difficulty in disgracing a man who held such a position?"\* Noguera produced similar testimonials from Valencia, "where his zeal and activity had

At the latter end of January, and consequently after the massacres of Barcelona and La Horta, Maza had the grand cross of the order of Charles III. bestowed upon him.

made him the terror of the insurgents, but in his case we are told they were not listened to. I cannot but think that, "between Mr. Villiers and the Spanish government, this deserv- ing citizen was rather hardly used. Such were the circumstances that followed the murder of Madame Cabrera. Lord Carnarvon asserts that they prove the decline of British influence in Spain, and for so doing is politely assured, by his anonymous opponent, that he asserts that with respect to which he proves himself ignorant. This really is too bad of the gentleman without a name. I give him credit for an infinite quantity of diplomatic enunciation, but surely it is going a little too far to put on upon the unwary his own express resemblance for a portrait of Lord Carnarvon! At p. 65 this reviewer of the ignorant would make us believe that public opinion was by no means strongly pronounced against the execution of Cabrera's mother, and that in Spain such events produce little of the horror which they elsewhere inspire. I can assure him that Spain is not so thoroughly liberalized as he seems to imagine. What he says may perhaps be applicable to the more exalted reformers, who run their bloody course unencumbered by remorse or pity, but very different are the feelings of Spaniards in general.

On the 5th of the following April, Isturiz, in

the chamber of Procuradores, mentioned the dastardly conduct of the government on this occasion as one of his reasons for declining to join Mendizabal's administration; and Don Manuel Pontiveros, whose wife was the first person who perished by Cabrera's retaliating order, immediately addressed to the Queen a petition, which contained the following remarkable passage: "It may be said that this victim has been immolated by the partizan Cabrera. No, madam, no; my innocent wife has been assassinated by the most atrocious despotism into which we have degenerated, and which is maintained by a certain set of men who, under the mask of good Spaniards, seek for nothing else than the ruin of the throne of Isabel II, as well as that of every honourable liberal. Madam, they are deceiving you and us. The throne of your Majesty's daughter and the liberals are between the fires of two factions, that is to say, between that of the Carlists, and that of another party, which, under the pretext of a love of order, seeks to extend its dominion, as if faction was its peculiar attribute." Surely it can be no matter of wonder, if, bowed down by the weight of a ferocious despotism, which mocks its victims by mimicking the accents of liberty, every moral and religious Spaniard prays, in the heart-sick agony of hope deferred, for the triumph of the Legitimate King!

With the arrogance which liberals usually display, when they speak of the humble and needy, the writer of the pamphlet, in a note at p. 99, denounces Cabrera's mother for the offence of being "very poor," and "of the lowest class," while her son is described as having been "the Sacristan of a village church."\* He will find, I suspect, if he takes the trouble to enquire, that Cabrera's parents, though not of elevated origin, were people of substance, and that the chief himself had been educated at a university and taken deacon's orders, before he renounced the church for the profession of arms.

The character which this ingenious author has given us of the gallant Catalan, is certainly sketched in the most determined and uncompromising style of Romance. He is, if we are to believe this accurate historian, a sort of modern Polyphemus; "than whom a more fiendish monster never drew the breath of life—who for the last two years has wallowed in blood, who has with his own hands dashed out the brains of his captives, and whose boast it is, that mercy and compunction are alike unknown to him." I really must soften the

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\* He was a *capellan*, not a sacristan, and perhaps the pamphleteer will have the generosity to ascertain the difference among his Madrid prompters.

lines of this truculent portrait. That Cabrera, who has been hunted like a wild beast for the last two years, and whose adherents are regularly shot as soon as caught, should have repaid violence by violence, is not unlikely; but the reader will take the eloquence of the pamphlet, with the requisite allowance, when he hears that this Carlist Mira intimated to General Rotor, in June last, his desire that their respective troops should be admitted to the benefit of the Eliot convention. Though Cabrera accompanied his request with a threat that, in case of refusal, he would shoot 600 prisoners whom he had just captured, the humane Cristino treated his proposal with contempt, yet the "most fiendish monster that ever drew the breath of life" never put his threat into execution. In like manner, though in the first heat of passionate frenzy, he put to death Madame de Fontiveros and three other females to revenge the murder of his mother, we have no sort of evidence to show that he executed his threat with regard to those whom he declared he had marked down. He has recently published a document which I insert below, together with his first order, as a curious contrast to the foolish rant of the pamphlet.

ORDER OF DON RAMON CABRERA.—Val de Robles, 20th February, 1836. Head Quarters of the Commander General of

This communication and, that to General  
 Roten were known to all the world at the time

Lower Aragon.—The barbarous and sanguinary Don Augustin Nogueras, who calls himself Commander General of Lower Aragon, has just proclaimed as an heroic act the atrocious assassination which, at this instance, has taken place at Tortosa, of my innocent and unfortunate mother, who, on the morning of the 16th instant, was (phrenically) shot in the square of the Barbican, and the ill-treatment of my three sisters, although two of them were married to National Guards of that place, all of whom are now imprisoned. Filled with horror, but at the same time not shaken in my coolness and fixed resolution by the melancholy past and cowardly act, worthy only of 1000 determined to bring about the triumph of the cause which they have embraced by deeds of terrorism, however infamous, although thereby plunging the country and all its families into grief and mourning, and supposing that their enlightened conduct will be sufficient to ensure the criminal usurpation which has occasioned so many victims, I, in the exercise of the faculties which heaven and justice grant to me as Commander General of this province, in the name of our Kings and Catholic Lord, Don Carlos V. and in conformity with the powers vested in me have resolved as follows:—

1st. The so-called Brigadier Don Augustin Nogueras and all those who actually may be serving in the army, or holding any office under the government of the Queen called Regent, are hereby declared traitors to his Majesty.

2d. All those who, in conformity with the preceding declaration, may be taken shall be shot.

3rd. The wife of Don Manuel Fontiveros, late Commandant of Chelva, in the Kingdom of Valencia, who was arrested in order to check the rage of the cruel revolutionists, shall forthwith be shot, in just retribution for the assassination of my innocent mother, as well as three ladies more, namely, Cinta Tos-



they were made; they were not (like the apocryphal proposal by Cordova to Villareal) kept

Mariana Guardia and Francisca Urquessa, and others to the number of thirty, who I shall point out, in order to avenge the infamous punishment inflicted upon the worthiest and best of mothers.

"4th. Although my heart is broken and my eyes deluged with tears at the moment that I dictate this determination, I hereby declare, though with pain, that although I highly abhor the atrocities which have thrown me into mourning and affliction, this sanguinary thirst of blood shall be ruthlessly avenged by the death of twenty individuals for every victim of such murders as may in future be perpetrated.

Subjoined is a copy of General Cabrera's proposals to obviate the shooting of prisoners.

FROM GEN. DON RAMON CABRERA TO THE CARLIST MINISTER OF WAR.

"Excellent Sir,—On the 26th of February I addressed the following circular to the Captains-General named by the usurpation in Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia; and to the governors of Tortosa, Alcaniz, Morella, Cantavieja, Castellón de la Plana and Teruel:—

"In the glorious action gained by my brave troops on the field of Buñol, they made 322 prisoners belonging to the regiments of Savoy, Ceuta, and the Queen; these men are now in my power, and it is my intention to send them to Ballestar, a town I have chosen for that purpose, and for the erection of hospitals for the sick and wounded, in which will be also placed the wounded prisoners. I have thought proper to make this known to your excellency, in order that you may give instructions to respect this place, and for your troops not to approach it within a circle of six leagues. Should, however, your troops find it necessary to approach within this limit, then

secret and hidden six months, or more, under a bushel, to be brought out at a convenient season to glitter in a party pamphlet.

—must not be made to be a subject of discussion (but, I repeat) —  
 —since it is not a subject of discussion —  
 may I request that previous advice be given to the depot that it may be either transferred elsewhere, or remain according to such instructions as I may give. Should your excellency accede to this offer, purely philanthropic, be pleased to answer this circular immediately, and forward to the chiefs and commanders of columns under your orders a copy of the arrangement which we have entered into; for I give you notice, that, should the limit I have traced be passed without previous information, all the prisoners shall be instantly shot. I shall act in the same manner, should your excellency not give instructions that in future all individuals belonging to my army, who shall be taken prisoners by your army, whether ill or well, be respected, considered as prisoners of war, and treated as such. I repeat, that should one of my men fall a victim to your accustomed atrocities, the instant this is known to me I will order to be shot, without remission, all the prisoners above-mentioned.

“It is worthy of the satellites of the usurpation to sully my character, by attributing to me barbarous inclinations, so foreign to my feelings, and which were never exercised by me but as just reprisals. The proposition which I now make shows what are my real sentiments, and that I am desirous, as far as in me lies, to civilize this war, so rigorous and so sanguinary.

“I beg to inform your excellency that I shall transmit a copy of the circular to his Majesty, and shall endeavour to give it every publicity, in order that those who have been deceived may now be set right, and that, should I hereafter be forced to execute hard but just reprisals, I still am second to no one in clemency and generosity; and that should the perfidy of those

The case of the Pole and the five French Royalist officers, who were shot in 1835 by Lopez Baños, at Santander, must excite horror in every breast except perhaps one. The author of the pamphlet professes, at p. 94, to wish these victims had been spared, but he stoutly maintains that they were justly sacrificed. On this, as on some other occasions, there seems a complete civil war between this gentleman's heart and his head—between his humanity and his justice. The principal of these unfortunate officers was a French colonel, excluded from his country by his politics, a man with a wife and family, and no means of support but his sword. He had applied to the Bishop of Leon in London, who frankly told him that Charles V. did not want the services of foreigners, and least of all, those of Frenchmen, as it was his desire to avoid giving any ground of complaint to the King of the French.

The Colonel, however, having no other resource, proceeded to Jersey, where he was joined by five volunteers, and thence to the

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chiefs not permit them to accede to my offer, then the victims of my justice be on their heads. Let others tremble and tear themselves from those who make use of all species of seduction to satisfy their ambition, and their love of blood and gold, for these are their only idols. God protect your excellency.

“RAMON CABRERA.”

“Head-quarters, Val de Robles, March 4, 1837.”

coast of Spain, intending to land on a part occupied by the Carlists ; but by a mistake of the master of their little vessel, they were landed in a district held by the Cristinos. They neither " raised a cry of Don Carlos in the villages," nor committed any act of hostility whatever, and indeed they were by no means certain of being received into the ranks of the Prince whom they came to serve. Nevertheless, they were seized and immediately shot, notwithstanding the humane intercession of some officers of the British Legion, who had thus an early opportunity of discovering how lightly they were regarded by their Spanish allies.

On this occasion, the author of the pamphlet puts the following question to Lord Carnarvon. " If, in the Irish rebellion, five or six foreigners had disembarked near Cork, and had raised the French standard upon that coast, we ask, whether the commander of the King's troops in that neighbourhood would have hesitated to hang these intruders, and whether the government or the public would have reprobated his so doing." Lord Carnarvon would, I think, find little difficulty in demolishing this formidable query. The two cases are not in point, for hoisting the French flag in Ireland, when we were at war with France, would have been an unquestionable act of hostility, but the victims of Lopez Baños had committed no hos-

tile act. Foreigners in uniform landing among us, in time of war and under a French flag, would, I should suppose, if taken, be considered as prisoners of war, at least if they were in the service of France, but unauthorized foreigners, or natives acting in a hostile manner, in a district where martial law had been proclaimed, might in strictness suffer all the severity of that summary justice, which seems so much in favour with the author of the pamphlet.

The opinion expressed in the pamphlet completely justifies General Moreno, who some years ago was exposed to so much unmerited obloquy for the execution of General Torrijos and his eighteen companions, and who has recently been denounced as the assassin of the latter by no less a personage than Lieut. Col. Evans. I shall not enter into the secret intrigues and treacherous manoeuvres that were connected with the transaction, because my object is not to expose the culpable, but to exonerate the blameless, and I should not perhaps have alluded at all to these intrigues and manoeuvres, but from a fear that my silence might cause it to be supposed that I was not fully aware of them. I was personally acquainted with General Torrijos, as I am with General Moreno, and cannot but lament the unfortunate end of the former, notwithstanding all the errors of his political career. The lat-

ter, however, who was then only governor of Malaga, did not act with the full rigour which the author of the pamphlet allows, for instead of executing his prisoners on the spot, as recommended in the supposed Irish case, at p. 94 of the pamphlet, he referred the matter to his superior officer, the Captain-General of Granada, who transmitted the same to the competent authorities at Madrid, and the latter sent down a peremptory order to shoot the unfortunate men within a certain time. The only particular in which Moreno swerved from his orders was, in delaying the execution many hours beyond that time, from motives of humanity, a delay which might have cost him his commission, and for which he did, I believe, receive a severe reprimand. This, I know for certain, is all the part that General Moreno bore in the transaction, and his duty as a faithful officer and loyal subject required him to act as he did.

I have now to notice, not without shame, the seizure of the 27 Carlist officers on board the Isabella Anna, an event that deeply disgraced the character of our country, and I must beg the reader at the same time to examine the 95th page of the pamphlet, where he will find a remarkable specimen of that bastard sort of falsehood (a favourite weapon of the author's) which consists in the suppression of truth.

He tells us that these officers were captured at sea; but he does not tell us that they were captured in a British vessel, and beyond the maritime jurisdiction of Spain. He thus conceals the insult to our flag, and the illegality of the capture. He does not tell us that they were captured by a British steamer, the *Royal Tar*, commanded by a British naval officer, and that being so captured by a vessel so commanded, they were delivered up into the hands of the Queen's Government "at a moment when," to use Mr. Villiers's own words, "the most savage acts of reprisal were practised by both belligerent parties."

And to what sort of a government were they delivered up? To the Government of "prudence and vigour;" the Government which is described at p. 66 of the pamphlet, as being about this very time "feeble, tottering and surrounded with difficulties," and which, though exhorted by the "becoming language" of Mr. Villiers, "dared not disgrace" the murderer of Madame Cabrera. These unfortunate men, many of them of the first families in Spain (but whom it is ridiculous in the pamphleteer to style "military men of rank and importance" for the principal military service of most of them was having served as a body guard to Don Carlos when in Portugal) were nearly assassinated by a mob in passing from the shore to the

for the interference of Lord John Hay and the officer who captured them. Had they perished, our nation would have been as guilty of their blood, as the ruffians who shed it.

These officers having been taken out of a British vessel, beyond the maritime jurisdiction of Spain, should not have been detained at all; and satisfaction should moreover have been insisted upon for such an unwarrantable outrage. If however it were to be granted that they were captured in Spanish waters, the coast of Biscay was the nearest land, and they would have been entitled to the benefit of the Enot convention. Lord Palmerston himself asserts in his dispatch of the 10th of March, 1856, that the "spirit of that agreement was applicable to them," and in consequence instructs Mr. Villiers to "press for their exchange." But whatever may have been the merits of Lord Palmerston, as an instructor, Mr. Villiers was any thing but a promising pupil.

I have before, when alluding to the Barcelona massacre, noticed the contrast presented by the correspondence between these two official characters. The same contrast appears on the present occasion. Lord Palmerston evidently has the power of thinking for himself, and thinking like an Englishman and a man



This influence however, such as it was, of common sense. Nothing can be more just and humane than his remark on the cruelty of removing these poor sufferers to Puerto Rico, after they had already been worn down by a twelvemonth's confinement in different Spanish dungeons; but this remark, though sufficiently obvious, was a flight above the capacity of Mr. Villiers.

In reading the dispatches of the latter, it is amazing to observe with what unconscious simplicity he betrays the transparent secret of his own nullity. His words are the mere accents of an English tongue in a Spanish head. He appears throughout to be completely under the thumb of Senor Mendizabal, and to receive whatever drops from the lips of the latter, with blind and undoubting faith, as if it had been

all sworn to on the Pentateuch.\* The Spaniard seems to exercise over his mind the ascendancy of a superior intelligence, and (if I may apply the words without profaneness) to "work in him both to will and to do." If Senor Mendizabal ever cast his eye on the dispatch of the 22nd March, 1836, how he must have been amused at the passage where the British Envoy talks of his influence with the Spanish government!

our consul at  
the Philippine Islands, and with being told by  
soners that Puerto Rico was not so far off as

This influence, however, such as it was, appears, from this very dispatch, to have been used, from Sept. 1835, till the end of March, 1836, for the purpose of procuring the release of these injured men. Every body who was applied to, military or civil, expressed a readiness to comply with "the wishes of his Majesty's government;" every body even thought "the measure highly desirable," yet with all this nothing was done. The government, so prudent and vigorous in the opinion of Lord Palmerston, so "feeble and tottering" in that of his defender, had recourse to their usual excuse. "They were prevented," according to Mr. Villiers, "from carrying their good intentions into effect by public opinion, which would have been most unfavourably pronounced against the exchange."

Such was the disgraceful confession, or subterfuge, of the Madrid government. The sequel may quickly be told. Señor Mendizabal proved more than a match for the united efforts of Lord Palmerston and Mr. Villiers. He had determined to send his captives to Puerto Rico, and to Puerto Rico they were sent. The British Envoy seems to have been quite satisfied with hearing from some friends of some of the prisoners that Puerto Rico was not so far off as the Philippine Islands, and with being told by our consul at Cadiz (what was no doubt per-

(fully true) that the prisoners themselves pre-  
 ferred any banishment to the hourly apprehen-  
 sion of being massacred at home.  
 In this case, and in that of Madame Cadez,  
 the British government exerted their utmost  
 influence, and utterly failed in both, in spite  
 of all their efforts, the 27 officers have not re-  
 leased, and their "inexplicable" detention is not  
 justified with the slightest punishment. But, if  
 we are to believe page 75 of the pamphlet,  
 English influence in Spain never was greater  
 than it has been during the last three years.  
 "I suppose then that our influence in that coun-  
 try, like the lever's wound in the tragedy, is  
 great because it is so small;" perhaps it has  
 already reached the last extreme of greatness,  
 amplified in the famous logic of the anti-pro-  
 posal—*movi a lev or levaret ad, ut lo-  
 zel of way, has received so vast a  
 To turn out a thing in such a manner as  
 for* Most of these 27 officers contracted to escape  
 from their West India banishment, and, being  
 men of courage, honour and loyalty, made their  
 way through every hazard to the seat of war,  
 and once more offered their swords to their  
 persecuted sovereign. That the author of the  
 pamphlet should revile them for thus discharg-  
 ing their duty, and that he should tell us that  
 these faithful subjects, "like their master, had  
 contracted a moral obligation not to return to  
 the Peninsula, for the purpose of disturbing its

-tranquillity," is just what might be expected  
 -from his head and heart. I shall take this  
 opportunity of considering what "moral obli-  
 -gation" Don Carlos and his followers had con-  
 -tracted towards this country, in being "allowed  
 to depart from Portugal." It is well known, and indeed the writer of  
 the pamphlet does not venture to deny, that  
 Charles V. has never entered into any verbal,  
 or written engagement to abandon his claims,  
 but that he has on that subject, under the most  
 "trying circumstances been proof against all  
 the power of menace or persuasion, whether  
 supplied by open enemies, or pretended friends.  
 It is for this reason that we are told of a  
 "moral obligation." Charles V. forsook, by  
 accepting a passage on board an English ves-  
 sel of war, has received so vast a favour—we  
 are his creditors in such a mighty account of  
 gratitude, that he has become our man for  
 good, and is bound to do nothing hereafter that  
 may even prejudice his masters. This can be  
 the only meaning of the phrase in the pam-  
 phlet, if it has any meaning at all.  
 Now I cannot imagine how any man can  
 incur such an obligation to another, even to  
 the greatest and most generous of benefactors,  
 merely by accepting his good offices. I will  
 allow what I believe to be the case, that the  
 life of Don Carlos was endangered, yet because

he accepted our unconditional offer to save it, did he by that act contract a moral obligation never henceforth to interfere with our designs against the rights of his children, the interests of his religion, and the well-being of his country? Sooner than contract such an obligation as this, he would probably have placed himself at the merciless mercy of Rodil, as at the worst he could but have lost his life without staining his honour.

But, in fact, so far from being his benefactors—so far from having any claim on his gratitude, we had ourselves a principal share in reducing him to these difficulties from which we make a merit of having relieved him. The Madrid government sent Rodil's army into Portugal with the sanction of England, and though the troops crossed the frontier before the Quadruple treaty was signed, and accomplished their object (as far at least as it was accomplished) before the ratifications were exchanged, that only shows that the intentions of the British government were so fully ascertained, that it was thought superfluous to wait for the formality of signatures.\*

*before never exchanged and the latter never entered*

\* Happening to have before me the dispatch addressed by Queen Christina's minister to the Lisbon government on the 3rd of June, 1834, showing 1st, that the object of the Quadruple Treaty had been accomplished before the ratifications were

The author of the pamphlet is reduced to confess at p. 95, that the massacre of Barcelona equaled in horror the worst excesses of the French Revolution, but this does not prevent him from making a desperate effort to palliate it by alleged previous provocations. It was not, he tells us, without an exciting cause, it was an act of savage retaliation for the massacre of a number of prisoners, whom the Carlists had carried to a fortified castle. The castle was subsequently besieged by Min. The prisoners to the number of 170 were either killed by the volleys of musketry fired at them as they fell, or were dashed to pieces on the rocks below. These unfortunate men were all inhabitants of Barcelona, and nearly at the same time that the intelligence of this massacre reached that town, new arrivals at that place, a company of National Guards and a detachment of a regiment of the line, which had left Barcelona to escort the mail, had been surprised and slaughtered by some Carlist bands lying in wait for them. *Punto exasperation* for that it was thought sufficient to wait for

\* *Exasperation to villainy* and

exchanged; 2dly, that Don Carlos and his followers never entered into any engagements with their enemies, and 3dly, the circumstances which in the opinion of the Madrid government rendered the Additional Articles to the Treaty necessary, notwithstanding its length, I have deemed it proper to translate and insert it entire in Appendix B.

was in consequence raised to the highest pitch, &c.

This account is almost a transcript of the extracts from Mr. Villiers's dispatch of the 16th of January, a document to which I have already alluded, and which has already twice appeared in print. Four days after it reached Downing Street, these extracts constituted, with scarcely a verbal discrepancy, the principal part of a Madrid letter, in the *Morning Chronicle*. It was there prefaced by some remarks on the enormity of the crime, which seem to have proceeded from the pen of the editor. On the 21st of April, almost three months after they had appeared in the *Chronicle*, these extracts were ordered to be printed for the information of Parliament.\*

I suppose even the writer of the pamphlet lays very little stress on the disaster of the detachment that was surprised and cut to pieces by the Carlists, though Mr. Villiers chooses to use the words "massacre" and "lie in wait" to express the same transaction. The latter seems to think that an ambush during war is a crime, and that not to give quarter to a merciless enemy is an "inexpiable act." The massacre of the captive Cristinos by the garbison of La Horta would have been, I allow, an

be lost in M.

\* Vide Appendix C.

act of infernal cruelty, if it had ever been committed. It was however nothing but an idle tale, which even the credulous Mr. Villiers, writing twelve days after the massacre, can scarcely be excused for having inserted in his dispatch. What then shall we say of a writer, who pretends to enlighten us on Spanish affairs, when we find him giving fresh circulation to a fiction which had been disproved twelve months ago, in most of the public journals? I shall mention the origin of this fable, which Mr. Villiers's informant seems to have adorned with some melodramatic ornaments, before he put it off on his patron.

At the time of the massacres, Mina was absent from Barcelona, and besieging the small fort of La Horta, which he was particularly anxious to reduce, from a motive of private hatred and revenge.

In 1823 he had pillaged and burnt to the ground the neighbouring village of San Llorens del Piteus, and shot every male inhabitant from 16 to 60, for the offence of having refused a contribution. Those who on that occasion escaped, afterwards returned, and re-built their ruined dwellings. They naturally joined the Carlists when the insurrection broke out, zealously assisted in fortifying La Horta, formed part of the garrison, and, in common with the rest, made a desperate defence. Mina resolved



to show them no mercy, and at the same time to exasperate his soldiers, and give a colour to his own bloody design, circulated a report that the garrison had determined to shoot 54 Christiano prisoners. The supplement to the Madrid Gazette of the 1st of February, announced that the fort had been taken, and the whole of the garrison, above 200 in number, had been put to death with their commander Miralles. The conquerors found in the fort alive and well the very prisoners, whose execution, according to Mr. Villiers and his anonymous panegyrist, provoked the Barcelona massacres. I have been assured by a credible eye-witness that thirty of these murdered men entered Barcelona in a body.

This sanguinary fable, how greedily so ever it may have been devoured by the ravenous credulity of our countrymen, was even at the time treated with contemptuous silence by those whose interest it was to have made the most of it, if it had been true, or even capable of being made to pass for truth. Neither General Alvarez, the sub-governor of Barcelona, in his proclamation of the 6th of January, nor the Municipality and Board of Trade in their address of the same date, nor Mina himself in his proclamation of the 8th, says a word about the "exciting cause" that fills one scale of the bloody balance, so steadily held by the

author of the pamphlet. In the subsequent discussions in both Chambers, when the ministers were put on their defence, and had every inducement to extenuate the atrocity of the massacres, the same profound silence was kept on the subject of any previous provocation. They knew the fiction would never pass current in Spain, so it was put off on the British Envoy. There it seems to have fully answered its purpose.

It is in fact notorious to every body in Spain, except the circle of the British Embassy, that the massacre had been long premeditated, and even threatened. It was the result of a plan formed by the Isabelinos, a noted club extensively ramified, which held its sittings at the Noria Coffee House. The design of the conspirators was something more than the massacre of a few hundred Carlists; it was to subvert the existing government, and establish the Cadiz Constitution. Barcelona was selected as the centre of their operations, and Reus, Tarragona, and other leading towns in the principality were to follow its example.

I need not enter into the particulars of the massacres, as I have already detailed them in

\* This Coffee House was afterwards closed by order of General Alvarez.

my work on the Revolutions of Spain; I must  
 however observe that it was not so much the  
 number of the victims, the cannibal outrages  
 perpetrated on their bodies, or the merciless  
 violation of the hospitals, that rendered these  
 atrocities remarkable, as the cool deliberation  
 with which they were perpetrated. Lists of the  
 intended victims had been previously formed,  
 their names were regularly called over, and every  
 one perished in the order of the catalogue.  
 Every thing denoted forethought and prepara-  
 tion. Some such outbreak had in fact been long  
 foreseen, and from the time that Col. O'Donnell  
 was removed from Figueras to Barcelona, his  
 friends considered that his doom was sealed,  
 and their apprehensions were confirmed by  
 the obstinate refusal of the Crístico authori-  
 ties to exchange him, though as belonging to  
 Gueorgue's division of the Northern army he  
 was included in the Eñot convention.  
 I myself received letters from Oñate, dated  
 so far back as the 25th November 1835, in  
 which from the spirit prevailing at Barcelona  
 dreadful excesses were anticipated, and fears  
 were expressed lest, in that case, it might be  
 impossible to prevent retaliation in the North-  
 ern Provinces. These fears fortunately proved  
 groundless. There were at that time in the  
 depôts of Oñate, Salinas and Guernica, 1000  
 officers and 5000 privates, (principally *pesteros*

and urbanos, the regulars having mostly joined the Carlists) yet not a single life was sacrificed, though all must acknowledge that the Royalists were amply provided with an "exciting cause." I need not observe that this glorious act of forbearance is unnoticed in the pamphlet.\*

On this occasion Charles IV. published a proclamation from which the following is an extract.

"The detestable assassinations, lately perpetrated at Barcelona, in presence and with the consent of the authorities constituted by the rebellious Government (if that can be called a Government) where such heinous deeds were committed, by violating sacred ties, and guaranteeing by the respective Bowers and outraging even dead bodies, atrocities which cannot be recorded and only to be expected from a barbarous and inhuman race, fill us with indignation, and justly so; but those examples must not be followed. If the rebels have no Government—no laws—no religion—no humanity, you possess heroic virtues; and therefore, the prisoners kept in the hospitals and those that you have lately made at St. Sebastian, Valseseda, and Mendocillo, can say whether my army is disciplined, and whether my people observe the laws. However, trust in me; I shall take the most energetic measures to prevent the renewal of such heinous excesses."

On beholding the joyful protection of Heaven over our illustrious victories, the general opinion of the Spanish people, tokens of devotion to my cause, and the proofs of support that I daily receive within and without my kingdom, in the glorious task of delivering the nation from the calamities that overwhelm it, redouble your efforts, O Spaniards, truly worthy of that name ascribed to this Religion and our King, and with my faithful defenders. Let them, without further hesitation and delay,



inquiry was with great difficulty prevented on the ground of informality, but addresses to the Crown on the subject were presented by both Chambers, and the minister of the interior read the dispatch of the government to General Mina, deploring the event, and calling upon him to execute the powers of punishment with which he was invested. In fact, some of the ringleaders were seized and transported by General Mina to the Canary Islands.

I think the reader will agree with me, that to refuse to prevent an inquiry on the ground of informality is much the same as to refuse it altogether, and that this answer to Lord Carnarvon, so far from being a contradiction, is all but an assent. Mina seized and sent on board the Rodney some of the individuals who were supposed to have borne a part in the riots of the 5th, when the Constitution was proclaimed, but no punishment whatever was inflicted on any of the savages who had massacred the Carlists the day before. Probably they were not thought to have committed a crime. It is plain, even from the statement in the pamphlet, that nothing was done. So much for the "prompt energy" of General Mina! So much for Lord Palmerston's exhortation to the Spanish government "to take such steps with regard to the criminals who perpetrated these murders, or who, by not resisting the mob,

allowed those murders to be committed, as they  
 be consistent with the honour of the Queen's  
 government, and the dictates of justice!" So  
 much for "English influence" altogether! I  
 shall not here dwell on the horrible per-  
 sistence of the Madrid messengers as in the  
 work to which I recently alluded I have al-  
 ready described them, as far at least as they  
 are fit to be described. Here the "exciting  
 cause" was a report raised by the liberals, who,  
 taking advantage of the appearance of the  
 cholera, accused the Jesuits of having poisoned  
 the fountains, which, being supplied with run-  
 ning water brought in pipes from distant  
 springs, presented forsooth peculiar facilities  
 for the evil practices of those religionists. I  
 cannot compliment our good allies on their  
 judgment in the selection of an "exciting  
 cause." But "a friend in need is a friend  
 indeed;" and it is not a slight matter that can  
 deter the resolute advocacy of the anonymous  
 author. Here, however, the only excuse that  
 he can offer for his clients is a reference to  
 the comparatively trifling disturbances that  
 were produced in other countries by the storm  
 of cholera. I leave him to the undisturbed en-  
 joyment of his Scotch, French, Russian, and  
 Hungarian comparisons. But when he talks of the authorities, and  
 tells us that "the troops and National Guards

might have prevented those foul deeds, he states over facts that cannot be passed by in silence. Were not the National Guards not merely passive spectators, but some of them, particularly of the regiment of Granada, active agents and ringleaders in the massacres? Were not many of the more obscure rioters seized and yet none punished? Were not the more conspicuous well known, and yet all left unpunished? If the Captain-General was brought to account for all, as this writer says, what was he sentenced to? Was he in truth ever tried, or sentenced at all? No satisfactory answer can be given to any one of these questions. These massacres were distinguished by revolting and heinous excesses, exceeding in horror, if it be possible, even the cannibal orgies of Barcelona; yet no punishment was inflicted on a single ringleader or preparation made to punish the followers who escaped with their lives. Masses of all who were ordered to be hanged for the souls of the murdered, an order which, coming from profligate and infidel rulers, was rather a mockery than a warning. The author of the pamphlet is not satisfied with doing all he can to palliate and excuse the massacres; at p. 92 he excuses in the gross the excesses of the Spanish liberals, and asks us whether the people of Southern France enjoy an intervisible monopoly of brutal pas-



sions," and whether patriots "have not been murdered in Holland?" I allow that not merely in Spain or Holland, but in all countries, climes and ages, whenever the passions of the populace have been unchained, they have spent themselves in outrageous excesses. History is a very old almanack. It is more than twenty-two centuries since a statesman and philosopher, perhaps the most profound, and certainly the most impartial of historians, drew in unflinching colours the appalling picture of similar crimes. All who have any acquaintance with his immortal pages must be aware that the Barcelona democrats are not the first who have massacred their opponents, while the ships of a powerful ally were at anchor in their harbours. But what is the use that should be made of these bloody precedents? They should serve as warnings to posterity; they leave without excuse those unprincipled statesmen, traitors not merely to kings, but to society, who, "to serve their own selfish and ambitious ends, have in various ages inflamed the passions of the needy and ignorant against their natural superiors." But his continental forces are not sufficient for the defender of the Quadruple alliance. This *condottiere* of the pen comes among us with his recruiting drum, and in Ireland and at Bristol beats up for a British Legion of misstatements and fallacies. He has the def-

frontery, to say at p. 92 that "though some of the provinces of Spain are larger than Ireland, it may be doubted if in the course of a twelve months the balance of prime would not be against the sister island, and in favour of any province that might be selected." What are Irishmen shot in cold blood under the auspices of the government? has Trinity College been burnt? have the fellows been murdered, torn piecemeal and partly devoured by a Dublin mob under the eyes of Lord Mulgrave and the military? Ireland, I allow, is in a hopeful way, but at present it is far behind Spain in the race of liberalism. The writer does well to conceal his name, or this novel argument of his in favour of the Spanish origin of the Irish might chance to be refuted with a shillelagh.

But most of all am I astonished at his hardihood, when he, a liberal and reformer, ventures to allude to "the catastrophe of Bristol, the inefficiency of the military, and the cowardice of the civil authorities," and lastly to "the unsatisfactory nature of the subsequent investigations." Why did the civil authorities act like cowards? Because the military were backward in supporting them. Why were the military backward? Because their commander shrunk from his duty. Why did their commander shrink from his duty? For the

selected men that the Spanish authorities should  
 from their side because, of the very nature of  
 the government he served. When he had to  
 look to his ministers, who themselves looked  
 to the democracy—when were the creatures of  
 agitation and the principle of ministerial life  
 was not the pursuit from without? When the  
 cabinet depended on the physical force of the  
 country, and the ministers of the crown were  
 the servants of the movement, what could be  
 more natural that both civil and military officers  
 should be shy of facing against the superior  
 authority? But the subsequent investigation,  
 though it allowed them to have been "unsatis-  
 factory," being so scandalous, to compare them  
 with the determined rapine of the Spanish  
 government. With us, the commanding officer,  
 again, who was much to be pitied as he was,  
 was tried by a court-martial, and during the  
 trial ended his days by his own hand. Had it  
 not been for this, his instructions must have  
 been produced. An inferior officer was tried,  
 condemned and dismissed from the service. The  
 most conspicuous of the actual perpetrators were  
 executed. Where shall we find a parallel to  
 all this in the history of the Spanish *enslaved*?  
 The civil authorities were put on their trial  
 and acquitted; for whom could blame a peaceful  
 magistracy, who were deserted by their armed  
 protectors? I allow "the unsatisfactory nature

of this investigation? and as far as regarded the  
 interests of the town, many who had previ-  
 ously been regarded as sober and were for that  
 far from desiring of punishment, that they  
 were now so bold, they would not, or the  
 fair and virtuous who were delivered to the  
 hands of W. It certainly was necessary, in order  
 both to preserve the living and the dead in the  
 memory of the dead, that in Colonel B. B. B. B.  
 and of the living, should have some before  
 the public, why they were kept back is not  
 my business to explain. The then secretary  
 for the home department could have indicated  
 the difficulty. The spirit of this pamphlet must  
 remember, that the case of our domestic grand-  
 quality, was at that time committed, to the  
 hands of the Secretary of the War, and it  
 was not his business to refer him to the govern-  
 ment, why let him ask him, he constantly bring-  
 ing forward the weakness of the Spanish gov-  
 ernment as its excuse. I have no doubt in my  
 own mind that it was wanted, good intentions as well  
 as power, but I have no desire at present to  
 draw aside the veil from the dark secrets of  
 the State. Does the nation however know,  
 that the execution of the laws of govern-  
 ment, that is, government without strength, is  
 divested of its chief attribute, and that scarcely  
 be called a government at all? But all gov-  
 ernments that hate the democracy, or some  
 protectors; I allow "the unsatisfactory nature

their existence to it) are naturally weak; when  
 the democracy is to be controlled, and is apt  
 to bow before that portion of society which  
 most requires a master. From this inherent weakness springs the  
 difficulties that beset the present ruler of  
 France, though the profound politician of the  
 pamphlet is of opinion that the strong hold  
 Louis Philippe has on his people consists in  
 his being thought the King of July—the elected  
 of the revolution. Why, this strong hold  
 is the least tenable of all positions! He reigns  
 not by his own right but by the choice of  
 others. What then can be more natural, or  
 even just, than that they who made him what  
 he is, should expect him to govern (if I may  
 so abuse the term) according to their good  
 pleasure rather than his own? If however these revolutionary electors ex-  
 pected to find a tool in Louis Philippe, they  
 have reckoned without their host. He has at  
 least too elevated a mind to fill the degrading  
 station which the author of the pamphlet re-  
 commends to him, and if he has dethroned his  
 kinsman, it was to gain not the empty title  
 but the substantial power of a king. He moves  
 along a path beset with perils, in the midst of  
 implacable foes—the pistol, the dagger, the in-  
 fernal machine, all the deadly devices that in-  
 genuity can invent, and hate on revenge can

plots are pointed at him by unseen hands; he dies daily; but anything is better than to be dalled a king, and be the vassal of the vilest of subjects. This degradation he has escaped; and whatever may be our opinion of his title, and the means by which he won his throne, it is impossible not to admire the dauntless courage and untiring energy, with which he breasts the torrent of revolution, and equanimity and self-possessed calm, and more sagacious, than the present Sovereign of France, even to satirise a "throne!"—says the author of the pamphlet, "and yet France has pursued a policy with respect to Spain which seems to us inexplicable." And where is the wonder? Louis Philippe certainly is a most clear-sighted and sagacious person, and besides has the most profound knowledge of Spanish affairs; what therefore can be more natural than that his policy should be quite "inexplicable" to the author of this pamphlet? It is to be hoped that Louis Philippe not doubt wished to keep on fair terms with England, and would have been glad to see a young female firmly established on the throne of Spain, not as a puppet of the movement, but as a Queen; these were valid reasons for signing the Quadruple treaty; but can any one imagine that Louis Philippe would wish to ruin the French Basques by abolishing the *fueros* of



in the cutting sarcasm on the British Legion contained in Louis Philippe's speech, and the only allusion of our King's speech on the subject of France, showed all the world that there was a difference of opinion between France and England: Louis Philippe no doubt felt that he was making a known that Don Carlos, if successful, would be satisfied with promoting the happiness of his own subjects, and he was well aware that republicanism was ten thousand times more dangerous than legitimism. Louis Philippe is allowed on all hands, to be "clear-sighted," "sagacious" and well acquainted with Spain, if such a man differs on the Spanish question from Lord Palmerston, I need not say what must be the natural inference.

I have already had occasion to expose the sordid spirit of jobbing speculation that infects the pamphlet throughout; it is not therefore necessary to refer to this subject more particularly, especially as nothing can be more vague and undefined than the golden lures with which the author seeks to entice his gaping countrymen. He somewhere assures us that we are the most philanthropic people in the world, but if we can judge of what he thinks of us by the nature of the temptations which he sets before our eyes, he must consider every Englishman to be a law-grubbing, rapacious, and religiously sound, who



their brethren, and placing Spanish custom-house officers at Lundy, or that he would run the risk of debauching the French army, to establish republicanism in Spain. The course of events has shown that the "innocent Isabel" has no party in this country; there is no choice but between republicanism and legitimism, and from which of these has Louis Philippe the most to fear? His speech makes where his real danger lies rather better than the author of the pamphlet.

Philippe is allowed on all hands to be "clearly defined" as a "liberal" in reference to *liberalised Spain*, exactly the same as that of the older Bourbons in the days of 1822, when the most fearful despoticism was protection on the other side of the Pyrenees. The clubs of Barcelona and other places correspond with the republican associations in France, and so great is the rage for secret societies among the Spanish regenerators, that many of them are proud of placing on the *Drinks: to the King* and being numbered among the *Amis de la Liberté*. There is a *Jeune France* and also *Le Jeune Espagnol*. In both countries there are "Brothers of the Grand Union," and of all these lodges affiliated branches extend to Portugal. In vain, for appearance sake, do the ostensible Madrid authorities fulminate against secret societies. These societies were a long time not only tolerated but also employed to manage the Queen and silence her *camarilla*. To their influence and support, after Lord Palmerston's introduction, Mendizabal owes that ascendancy which he has for some time enjoyed. And can it be supposed that Louis Philippe, a fond parent and a vigilant watchman, could ever seek a coalition with Carder and Sanjurjo, or even with Mendizabal and Salazar?

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would flounder through the filthiest lane, if there was only a guinea at the end of it. But ambition, in its baser, as well as in its moral elevated modifications, is apt to overleap itself, and then nothing is more disgraceful than its fall. I would advise my countrymen (unless they have a passion for empty pockets) to put no trust in this author's juggling promises, to let him have his free waste field of romantic political and commercial speculation, to let him amuse himself, and to keep their feet well out of the crooked dirty paths that lead to his palace of Mammon, as well out as to his prison and sad

In treating of the future, the author, like a prudent prophet, deals in generals, but with regard to the past (at p. 75) his ventures to be more defined. We have already, if we allow to credit him, secured three important advantages, in our intercourse with Spain; and they have all been owing to the eminent exertions of the British mission at Madrid. In the first place, we have obtained a treaty by which the connivance of Spanish authorities in the Havannah and other places is checked, and the prevention of the Spanish slave trade placed wholly within the means of England. I wish, for the sake of humanity, that this treaty was something more than a wretched juggle, which may serve to amuse a child, or a British Envoy, but which every one who has any

knowledge of Cuba, must receive with derision. As long as swift sailing vessels can be built in the United States, and the pecuniary temptation is as great as it is at present, not all the efforts of authorities residing at the Havannah, even if they were willing, I could prevent (the importation of slaves. But Mr. Villiers ought to have known that the authority of Spain in Cuba has been scarcely more than nominal for many years; and even that nominal authority is now in a manner at an end. The Cadiz constitution, which prevails at Madrid, has been rejected at the Havannah, and General Lorenzo, who supported it, sent back to Spain. And among its able and long-acting members we may judge from this, what obedience will be shown at Cuba, to this or any other act of the Madrid government, if it should interfere with the internal regulations of the island, and the pecuniary interests of its inhabitants. All that we have gained is permission from Spain to attempt a difficult, if not impossible, task by our own expeditions, and at our own expense. In fact, the treaty is a piece of waste paper, at least as far as "the Negro race" is concerned; but I admit that the late member for Thiverton would be the most unthankful of mortals, if he at least did not "bless the influence of Great Britain in Spain."

Our second advantage is, that during the

last two years, through the commanding influence of Mr. Villiers, the Spanish Guarda-costas have rarely made free with our vessels, while formerly that frequently happened. Squabbles about the conduct of the Guarda-costas have been of odd dates since the commencement of the war, and have even amounted to wars, but will not deny that occasionally they may have stopped vessels that should have been left untroubled, and when this writer tells you that seizures are now as rare as they were formerly, frequent tales are asserted, granting it to be true, give credit to a story, which is a supposition, that will do commerce and Mr. Villiers has not persuaded the Spaniards to lower their duties, therefore, the temptation to smuggle is as strong as ever, and the distracted state of the interior must afford additional aid and facilities to multiply illegal practices. If, therefore, the Guarda-costas rarely make captures, it can only be because they are diverted from their original duty to the service of the war, or because from the poverty and wretchedness of the people, who used to purchase all kinds, even that of the smuggler, is ruined. No other causes can be assigned, but that seems at least that will bear the light. Well, the writer of the pamphlet alleges it as a matter of opinion, to the British nation, that advantage has been taken of the troubled and dependent condition of our wretched Christian allies to



though professedly levied for the purposes of the state, and particularly to discharge the interest of the national debt and the expenses of the war, it was destined in part to supply the cravings of official embezzlement.

As a measure of finance it proved a complete failure, in spite of the vaunted "*prestige* of M. Mendizabal." What shall we say then to the conduct of the British government in this case? Spanish rulers, existing as ministers only by British assistance, impose a burdensome tax, in support of measures of which the British government highly approves, and in which it actively concurs, when the British legation interferes to avert the burden from the necks of British subjects, and procures them an unjust and unfair exemption from the task of supporting our own policy.

What follows I will insert in the words of the pamphlet, that I may not be accused of libelling the author: "These and many other facts which might be named would, we suspect, be looked upon by all those knowing any thing about Spain, or really caring for British interests in that country, as more than a set off for the retention of General Mina, or the removal of Mr. Honan." So, according to this humane and generous person, it is no matter if a great province is exposed to a ferocious despotism, that murders the prisoner, violates the

hospital and assassinates the parent for the offences of the child, as long as British merchants can seize a paltry and dishonest advantage, which turns out to be no advantage after all.

The recognition by Spain of the independence of the American states, that all-important question which has now been so happily terminated, I had nearly forgotten to mention. It is certainly just that the Liberals should attempt to close the wounds which they originally inflicted, but the statement in the pamphlet is incorrect, as Mexico alone has been acknowledged independent. I should fancy the influence of France and the United States to have been at least as efficacious as that of Mr. Villiers in advancing the cause of South American independence. But these acknowledgments are, in the present state of things, mere formalities, which nobody but some diplomatic underling would exalt into matters of importance.

There is yet another proof of the prevalence of British influence, which appears at p. 77. Mr. Villiers's passport is "a talisman" of sovereign efficacy to protect the traveller against the evil genii, so numerous in Spain, who have a hankering after a well-filled purse. It will not indeed be of service against those formid-



able Afrites, the Carlists, but it will carry an honest man safe and sound through every other danger. So writes in other words the author of the pamphlet. Now as to highwaymen and robbers, we all know that no less a personage than Señor Isturiz himself, after he had escaped from Madrid with the aid of a British passport and a pair of green spectacles, chanced to fall among thieves, and was "left penniless by the way-side," in spite of the "talisman," but British passports have invariably been respected by the supporters of Charles V. I deny altogether the assertion of my nameless antagonist, that a traveller with such a passport "might doubtless meet with ill-treatment from detached bands of Carlists." I trust however, that, if he should chance himself to fall in their way, they will for once transgress their rule of forbearance, and make him both in purse and person the unique proof of his own veracity.

He will next, I suppose deny, that the Carlists under Basilio Garcia, in August last, returned unopened to the courier from Zaragoza the French and English dispatches and the private correspondence which he was conveying, and that when the same bag reached La Granja, it was pillaged by the Queen's soldiers under Sergeant Garcia, the dispatches read, and the letters torn in pieces. Such is the

difference between the "ignorant masses" who support Don Carlos, and the "true conservative party in Spain!"\*

I have now contradicted the most serious misstatements, and refuted the most mischievous fallacies of this anonymous author, and am approaching the conclusion of my wearisome task. The reader must be told, however, that out of compassion to myself and him, I have unravelled but a small portion of this tissue of fraud and falsehood. To do more would indeed have been impossible within the limits of a pamphlet. Even as I write, an unblushing misstatement impudently stares me in the face. It is said, at p. 145, that "Bilboa was not even summoned to surrender," whereas it was not merely summoned, but the summons appeared in the public journals, and the author of the pamphlet must therefore have been aware of the fact, which he has thought proper to deny.

He then goes on to reproach the Carlists with bombarding the town, and even with firing

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\* The case of Mr. Cornwell, which he himself gave to the public in a recent pamphlet, is another proof of the difference between the two parties in Spain. Here was a British subject to whom General Gomez gave a "talisman," which caused him to be "revered and protected" in the midst of the "ignorant fanatics," but he could find no such "talisman" against the vexations of our friends, the Spanish "conservatives." Much good did his "character of a British subject" do him with them.

till their ammunition was exhausted, as if it were a monstrous crime to resort to the most ordinary operations of war, and all this mawkish sentimentality trickles from the same tongue which had before thundered out that bloody sentence of "law and justice" which condemned every Carlist to the death of a traitor. The whole of the long flourish about the siege of Bilbao is as false, both in fact and sentiment, as the portion which I have just noticed, but though he enters a good deal into detail on the performances of the garrison, I have not observed any notice taken of the murder of Captain Sanz, shot from the walls while bearing a flag of truce. Perhaps he passed it over because such exploits are not unusual among the Cristinos.\*

\* From the first, the Cristinos treated the Carlists as outlaws, with whom faith was not to be kept, while the latter set an opposite example. When the Iron-works of Orbaizeta surrendered to Zumalacárregui, (January 14th, 1834,) Colonel Bayona and his garrison were allowed to proceed to France with all the honours of war. This was the first time the Carlists had it in their power to retaliate, and they did not do it, notwithstanding Rodil in Portugal, Castañon in the Northern Provinces, and the Queen's generals in other parts shot all Carlists they could capture.

Their treatment of flags of truce was worse. Eraso's summons to the garrison of fort De Mena shows the tone in which the Carlists spoke so early as January 4th, 1834. The instance of Cabrera's flag of truce murdered at Alcoriza, was most

But I must hasten to the conclusion. The different governments that have successively "started their brief hour" on the theatre of Madrid, all equally profligate and trash, and scarcely differing one from the other, but by different shades of liberalism, have for three years wasted their country by an exterminating civil war. They wielded all the resources of the state, (the pamphlet even goes so far as to say, at p. 111, that "the Queen's government was supported by the wealth, the talent, the industry of the country") and were actively supported by England and France. When the

revolting. When Gomez was at Lucena, he sent Colonel Rodrigues Alcantara as a flag of truce, with a trumpeter and an orderly to Alaix, who seized and sent them prisoners to the Alhambra, at Granada. They are now among the prisoners kept at La Isla de Leon. Captain Sanz, mentioned in the text, was the bearer of an answer from Egua to the British Consul respecting the capture of an American brig.

I have before me the charges preferred on the 25th and 26th of January before a court martial held at Cadiz, against the Dean of Cordova and others appointed there as a junta to preserve order, in which the fiscal demands the penalty of death against them. They were afterwards attached to Gomez's army and seized, some on shore at Algeciras and others in the British sloop Ariel. These charges, preferred in the names of the "Angelic Christina and the Innocent Isabel," breathe blood and vengeance. And yet these men, as forming part of Gomez's army, are protected by the Eliot convention.

Quadruple treaty was signed, the moral force of England and of France (to repeat the profane and immoral boast of the pamphlet which as usual preaches the right of the strongest) was raised to its highest pitch, for all the world acknowledged that what the two Powers willed must come to pass, and that resistance to their will was idle and useless. To add obtrusive gain. And what is the Power that has, for three years, defied the thunders of this terrestrial omnipotence, and gained ground on its all-mighty will? A few royal and determined men, with a few hundred followers like themselves, destitute of the *matériel* of war, but reckoning on the sympathy of their country, and supported by a moral force by which a liberal seems incapable of comprehending the moral force of a just cause. Such at least in my fancy was the now formidable Power which shakes to its foundation the tottering throne of Isabel II. I do not mean to give out now good. To investigate the causes of this mighty change would be to rehearse the history of the war. That task I have already performed in my work on the Revolutions of Spain, and if I had not, it could not be done within my present limits. I must observe, however, that the success of the Carlists has not been obtained without occasional reverses, and that the trifling effect which those reverses have produced,

is other most conclusive proof of the inherent  
 strength of their cause. First, and of England and  
 of the death of Zumalacarde in the second re-  
 (liege of Bilbao, the serious though pleasure ac-  
 tresses of Catalonia have caused them indeed  
 to retreat, but never to retreat in the face of  
 victory, and they now maintain a more menac-  
 ing attitude than at any former period. If the  
 almost unassisted march of Gomez through  
 every province of Spain, but Aragon and Cata-  
 lonia, revealed to the world that Garçon was  
 the prevalent feeling even in those parts which  
 were reckoned most attached to Christianity. At  
 the present moment, the whole of Catalonia,  
 Aragon and Valencia, except the fortified points,  
 are in the power of the Carlists; Galicia is  
 governed by their hands, Ciudad is threatened,  
 and even where the population is most opul-  
 lent there prevails but a deceitful calm. The  
 three principal causes of the failure at  
 Bilbao were the vigour of the British officers,  
 the dissensions between the Carlist commanders,  
 and, (the last but not the least) an accidental  
 rain storm. The evils of that surprise have  
 been already more than remedied; the appoint-  
 ment of Don Sebastian has reconciled all jar-  
 ring pretensions, and the active energy of that  
 prince (though less could not have been ex-  
 pected from the son of such parents) has al-  
 ready achieved the most splendid success, and

inspired his followers with the fairest hopes of the future. I suspect that the panegyrist of the British Legion will not be in a hurry to sneer again at the retreat from Constantinople.

While the Carlists are assuming this commanding attitude, the government of Madrid exhibits the miserable union of unblushing corruption, irreconcilable discord, and paralytic weakness. The author of the pamphlet, at p. 6

I have said scarcely anything of the state of the clergy in Spain, as it would far exceed my limits to enter fully on so important a subject, and I have besides adverted to it in my work on the Revolutions of that country. Even the author of the pamphlet, at p. 80, professes to regret the abolition of the convents; but his expressions in the passage are not very intelligible. I must however notice a passage at p. 142, which partly concerns the church. "To satisfy their animal wants, to bask in the sun, to conceal their little savings from the rapacious grasp of the priest and the petty official tyrant of the village, is all that the common people in Spain have, for years past, ventured to aspire to." I will answer this in four or five words; acquire of property or person for arrears of tithes or taxes was a thing not heard of in Spain. We may judge, from this, of the severity of the priests and tax-gatherers. The old government of Spain had plenty of faults, but it certainly lay lightly on the lower orders. I speak only of former times; since the liberals have been in power, the financial burdens have been more than tripled, while the sources of taxation have been dried up, and at present no doubt the common people "are ground down by mis-government" to the lowest state of misery. Charles V. I should add, has had little if any assistance from church support; the mistaken notions that prevail on this subject I have also endeavoured to rectify in my work on the Revolutions of Spain.

181, talks of its "moderation," and it really seems to be reduced to such a state of collapse and prostration, as scarcely to have strength left even to commit crimes. It certainly is utterly unable to discharge the ordinary functions of a ministry. We can scarcely complain that Carlist prisoners have been massacred with impunity, when the blood of the Queen's own defenders of St. Just, Donadía and Quesada, all victims of the movement, cries for vengeance in vain. This caricature of a government is so little able to control its generals as its mobs; Rodil, Alaix, Narvaez, Espartero, Sarsfield, and I cannot tell how many more, have evinced contempt and contumacy in various ways, yet none have been tried, none imprisoned, and some not even displaced.

The high rank of the Queen Regent has only served as her title to supreme and unparalleled contumely. She has been treated by her servant as no gentlemen would treat the most degraded of her sex; she has not been allowed the independent sovereignty even of her own bedchamber, but, with just though impotent indignation, has seen its pure and sacred frontiers violated by an armed intervention of drunken sergeants. She must now also be too well aware that, in any event, her daughter can never reign. If by any possibility Don Carlos should fail, it is not



the *despotismo ilustrado* that will succeed, and still less the miserable *juste milieu*. The triumph will remain with the men of the movement, the unmitigated republicans, the bitter haters of the whole race of sovereigns, male or female, mature or immature. Indeed the most fortunate event that could happen to the unconscious pretender, Isabel, would be the success of her uncle, for the state of a Spanish Princess is at least superior to that of a private exile.

What a contrast to this wretched picture is presented by the government of Charles VI. Encompassed with dangers, attacked by four armies at once, he preserves the same serene composure and inflexible resolution that have distinguished him through life, and exercises every function of a ruler as if in the quiet possession of an undisputed throne. He has not to crouch to the despotism of his generals, nor have his generals the humour of the turbulence of their soldiers, nor have either to connive at the excesses of the populace. His subjects are only disturbed by the incursions of the enemy and within the circle of his dominion mobs and *asomadas*, prison-massacres and hospital-butcheries, are things unknown.

In the equipment of his army he has overcome innumerable difficulties, and here I must acknowledge that he is under everlasting obli-

battalions to Lord Palmerston. The troops of  
 Offistime indeed have at times been little  
 better than a sort of middle men between  
 the British Ordnance Office and the legitimate  
 sovereign of Spain. But he has been still  
 more largely indebted to his own wise econo-  
 my, which has caused his scanty resources  
 to multiply as by a miracle in his hands.  
 It is not at his simple court that prostitutes  
 are paraded in confiscated carriages; and the  
 public distress insulted and aggravated by  
 the riotous luxury and excess of individuals.  
 In the quiet and orderly establishment of  
 Charles V. Virtue and Frugality are the rigid  
 stewards that divide every superfluous farthing  
 between the claims of charity and the service  
 of the war. Such is the Prince whom his enemies are  
 now making perhaps their last effort to destroy.  
 The pamphlet indeed lays bare the embryo  
 of a future project, which it may not be amiss  
 to examine before I close this little work.  
 My anonymous opponent observes at p. 69.  
 "Who would not have dissuaded Englishmen  
 from staking their capital on the contingencies  
 of a civil war, and on the results of a disputed  
 succession?" After this just observation, which  
 I quote to eulogize, we have at p. 126 the  
 following information. "For three years Spain  
 has been the great gambling House of Europe;

Both politically and financially speaking. Every writer on Spanish affairs has had his party, his paper, or his job, together with his prejudices, his passions, and generally his ignorance of every thing but his own objects. I am afraid my anonymous friend himself is no exception to his own sweeping assertion, for at p. 159 I find the following passage, and I appeal to every reader who has "eyes to see, ears to hear, or a heart to understand," whether it be not pregnant and blown up with a job of the most Herculean proportions.

We should feel that England is rich enough, strong enough, and bold enough (bravo!) "to pursue single handed" (i.e. without France) "the course which humanity dictates, and which is most conducive to her honour and her interests. She has done so before, and she is not degenerated now. How trifling too would be our outlay—how great and how rapid our return. The guarantee of a loan, for which Spain is able and willing to give ample security, would provide for the exigencies of the state, and would render the government politically strong; a land force which should occupy the frontier of France, and which, South of the Pyrenees, should carry into effect that article of the treaty which France has failed to execute to the North of those mountains, would blockade the Carlists

in their rocky citadels and would reorganize and reanimate the Spanish army. The British standard would be a pledge that what England undertakes, England will perform; and in a few short weeks we should not only have the glory of finishing this fratricidal war, but should find ourselves in the proud position of having established peace upon a lasting foundation."

Now, gentlemen, readers! that I have acted the part of accoucheur, look at the result of the delivery! Who would lay this infant Hercules at the door of Lord Palmerston, or Mr. Villiers? who would believe either of them up to such a begetting as this? Does not every feature—does not the very first squall speak of a Hebrew father? To speak seriously, it is almost a waste of words to expose the enormous folly of such a scheme. England, I suppose, is to guarantee the loan for which "Spain is able and willing to give ample security." But what state, or what individual *that is able and willing to give ample security* requires the guarantee of a third party to be enabled to raise money? The very proposal carries fraud and falsehood on the face of it—it is in itself a proof that the borrower has no adequate security to give. I know my opponent's meaning; but after this I have no need to travel to Cuba to put him down.

Now for the military part of this marvellous plan. Can any body out of Bedlam believe that France would allow an English expedition to blockade her South-Western frontier, and ruin her Basque districts? Would not this precious mode of "establishing peace upon a lasting foundation" unite every party in France, all of whom are already the enemies of England, in a determination to resist even by a war such an absurd attempt, and should we not by this ingenious device at once consolidate the power of Louis Philippe, and compel him to employ it in support of Don Carlos?

As a well-wisher to the legitimate sovereign of Spain, I ought not to have exposed this monstrous folly, but as an Englishman it is my paramount duty to do so. In spite of all the whispers afloat at present, I cannot believe that Lord Palmerston ever countenanced this insane scheme. Nothing short of hearing it from his own mouth would make me credit it.

The same folly is reproduced at the close of the pamphlet. "A few troops sent to Spain, to which Spanish divisions would be attached, and a *guarantee of a loan for which ample security might be given us*, are all that are wanted to make Spain tranquil," &c. &c. It is then hinted that the matter may be produced in Parliament, and "of the success, no man who knows any thing of Spain can possibly doubt."

Here we have nothing of blockading the French frontier; and the few English troops with Spanish divisions attached to be employed against the Carlists in the interior. We have already had a few British troops with not only Spanish divisions but a British Legion attached, and defeat and disgrace have been the result. If by "a few" he means 12000 or 20000 men, (and who will say we can spare either number?) such a force might possibly drive the Carlists from the more level country, and reduce the struggle to a partizan and mountain warfare. We should then have the real struggle to begin. It is my firm belief that in the end, after infinite suffering on both sides, we should utterly and completely fail. The brave men, whom their government might compel to proceed on such an infernal errand, would scarcely, I think, wish to succeed. But it is useless to discuss this matter myself, as I have an authority which the author of the pamphlet will probably consider irrefragable, for it is no less than himself.

He tells us at p. 13 that "7000 ill-appointed troops" under Mina "succeeded in baffling 40000 French, commanded by some of the best officers of the empire," and he attributes this wholly to the nature of the country, for he admits that the same Mina "in the same country completely failed against the Carlist

faction!" In the next page too he tells us that these same French were "the best troops in the world." And yet he would have us believe that a few of such secondary warriors as the conquerors of Waterloo, outnumbered rather than assisted by Cristino divisions, if possible more hostile to us than the Carlists themselves, would subjugate the same country "in a few short weeks!"

After a long experience in the world, I am thoroughly convinced that for one idiot it contains at least a hundred knaves, and the chances therefore, I should say, were at least a hundred to one that the author of such absurdities and contradictions as those which I have just exposed is utterly insincere. He never could have imagined such portentous follies could have been brought forward even by a liberal minister, or tolerated for a moment even by a reformed parliament. But I suspect, after all, that there has been much to do about next to nothing, and that the whole object of this formidable battery of 151 pages, in black and white, was to impart a momentary galvanic life to the long suspended animation of Spanish bonds.

A careful study of the pamphlet has finally convinced me, that neither our Foreign Office, nor our Madrid Legation have had any thing to do with the author or his work. Both the

Foreign Office and the Madrid Legation may be rich in ignorance and incapacity, but every individual attached to them is at least presumed to be a gentleman. If Lord Palmerston has said something in parliament in favour of such a production, as he is reported to have done, I am sure that it was a stretch of his goodnature, not the deliberate expression of his opinion.

Should any of my readers think that, unlike Lord Palmerston, I have run into the opposite extreme of harshness and asperity in my own expressions, I must refer for my justification to the pamphlet itself. \* If the errors of the author had been only those of ignorance and incapacity, I should have used very different language. I know not who he may be. I only judge of him from his work, and I am confident that every Christian, every gentleman, and every man of common honesty, will think with me, that it would have been a gross violation of all propriety to speak of such a person in the language of respect.



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## **APPENDIX.**

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101/113

1. The first step is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the problem.

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# APPENDIX.

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(A.)

THE TWENTY-SEVEN CARLISTS CAPTURED IN THE ISABELLA  
ANNA.

*George Villiers Esquire to Viscount Palmerston.*

My Lord,

Madrid, 22d February, 1836.

I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that upon various occasions I have called the attention of M. Mendizabal to the subject of the twenty-seven Carlist prisoners confined at Corunna, and the importance on every account of their being protected from insult and injury. M. Mendizabal has in consequence always given the most precise orders to that effect to the local authorities.

Some time since there appeared reason to apprehend an attack by the mob at Corunna upon the fortress where the prisoners were confined, and they were accordingly transported to Cadiz.

There likewise, as scarcely any regular troops are quartered in the town, they are not considered in security should any popular tumult take place, and M. Mendizabal has this day informed me that orders have been issued for immediately conveying the prisoners to Puerto Rico.

I have, &c. (Signed) GEORGE VILLIERS.

Viscount Palmerston, G. C. B. &c. &c. &c.

*Viscount Palmerston to George Villiers Esquire.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, 10th March, 1836.

Your dispatches to the 27th ultimo have been received, and laid before the King.

With reference to your dispatch of the 22d ultimo, I have to instruct you to press for the exchange of the twenty-seven Carlist prisoners, who it appears have been removed from Corunna to Cadiz, and whom it is now intended to send to Porto Rico. It surely cannot be contended that there is any thing so peculiar in the talents or personal influence of these prisoners that any greater inconvenience would arise to the Queen's cause from exchanging them, than from exchanging any equal number of experienced officers of the Carlist troops taken in action.

It is quite true, that as these officers were captured before the convention of April, 1835, they do not strictly come within the letter of that convention, but surely the spirit of that agreement must be considered as applicable to them. The refusal to exchange these individuals appears to attach a degree of importance to them which it is hardly possible to suppose can actually belong to them. And M. Mendizabal should remember, that to send to confinement in a tropical climate Europeans whose health must already have suffered by a year's close imprisonment, is a measure very likely to end in the death of the greater part of the prisoners; while, if, on the other hand, they are to be allowed to go at large at Porto Rico, the probability is, that they will soon release themselves without any exchange at all. I am, &c.

(Signed)

PALMERSTON,

George Villiers, Esquire, &c. &c. &c.

*George Villiers, Esquire, to Viscount Palmerston. (Received 1st April.)*

(Extract.)

Madrid, 22d March, 1836:

My dispatch of the 22d of February will have already informed your Lordship of the measures taken by the Spanish government upon the subject of the twenty-seven Carlist pri-

soners lately confined at Cadiz; but with reference to your Lordship's dispatch of the 10th of March, upon which I have conferred with M. Mendizabal, I think it necessary to state more fully the motives upon which that measure appears to have been founded.

The officers in question were captured at a moment when the most savage acts of reprisal were practised by both belligerent parties. Their lives were spared by the Government, though not without difficulty saved from popular fury, upon the grounds that they were not taken in battle or with arms in their hands; these same grounds, however, prevented their being exchanged under the treaty subsequently concluded in favour of prisoners made under such circumstances.

Measures were accordingly taken to provide for their security, with the expectation that the time was not far distant when they, in common with others, might be liberated, without prejudice to the public tranquillity or the cause of her Catholic Majesty.

This expectation was, unfortunately, not realized; and, in obedience to the instructions contained in your lordship's dispatches of the 1st of September, 1835, I used my influence with the Spanish government to procure the exchange of the twenty-seven officers then confined at Corunna. I took various opportunities of urging upon M. Mendizabal and the Minister of War the wishes of his Majesty's Government, and I likewise wrote to General Cordoba upon the subject. I procured their consent to the exchange; for the Government and General Cordoba were of the opinion which has been subsequently expressed by your Lordship, that there was not anything so peculiar in the talents or personal influence of the prisoners as to render their exchange dangerous to the Queen; nay, more, the measure was looked upon as highly desirable, in order to effect the release of some of the Queen's officers, who, to the number of eighty, were at that time in the power of Don Carlos.

All things, therefore, combined to induce the government to lend themselves to the arrangement, but they were prevented

from carrying their good intentions into effect by public opinion, which with all the excitement incidental to a state of civil war, catches at every circumstance, however trifling, as indicative of ~~views and intentions on the part of the government, and which~~ would have been most unfavourably pronounced against the exchange.

Upon the occurrence of the lamentable events at Barcelona, I requested of M. Mendizabal that measures might be taken for effectually protecting the twenty-seven prisoners from popular fury; and the most express orders were accordingly sent to the Captain-General of Galicia.

Not being considered in complete safety at Corunna, they were subsequently removed to Cadiz, and the government, as before, remained desirous of exchanging them as soon as possible. In the course of the last month there was too much reason to fear that at Cadiz, in the event of any popular commotion, the lives of these officers would be in danger; and the government then determined upon sending them to the Philippine Islands.

It having been represented to me by some relations of the prisoners that it would be desirable they should be sent to Porto Rico, instead of to the Philippine Islands, as being easier of access to their friends, I made an application to that effect to M. Mendizabal, who immediately granted the request.

An excellent vessel was fitted out for their conveyance, permission was given to the wives and children of those who were married to accompany them, and orders have been issued that, both during the passage and on their arrival at the colony, they should be treated with all the consideration consistent with their safe custody, due to officers and gentlemen. His Majesty's Consul at Cadiz informs me that the prisoners have expressed their satisfaction, as they could not be exchanged, that they were sent out of the country, where any day they might have been exposed to the fate of the unfortunate individuals massacred at Barcelona.

(Signed) GEORGE VILLIERS,  
Viscount Palmerston, &c. &c. &c.

(B.)

*Minister Martínez de la Rosa to the Minister of Foreign Affairs  
of Her Most Faithful Majesty, &c.*

Aranjuez, June 3d, 1834.

It is extremely gratifying that the first time I open an official correspondence with Your Excellency should be under such favourable circumstances, and when at the close of a contest which has so long desolated your kingdom, a new era of tranquillity and glory beams upon it. It is not the less grateful to my feelings to reflect that the government of Her Most Faithful Majesty will have seen in the noble and loyal conduct of the Spanish government, the sincere wish entertained by the Queen, my mistress, to maintain with your Monarchy the closest relations of friendship and alliance.

In proof of these sentiments, before the Treaty was signed in London, Spanish troops had crossed the Portuguese frontiers, in order to contribute all in their power to the triumph of the legitimate cause, and it is a remarkable circumstance that before the exchange of the ratifications of that Treaty was officially known, the contest had terminated which gave rise to it.

But, for the very reason that the triumph has been rapid and complete, a want of foresight would be inexcusable in not securing the consequences, and the Spanish government, faithful not only to the letter of the Treaty, but also to its spirit and meaning, will consider this as the rule of their conduct in the various transactions conducive to its ulterior execution.

Her Majesty has with the greatest pleasure seen that, agreeably to these sentiments, the government of H. M. F. M. ordered her minister at this court to manifest, in the most unequivocal manner (as was done by Chev. Sarmento in his note to me of the 29th ultimo) that the opinion of H. M. F. M.'s cabinet was, that neither the Spanish Pretender, nor the Usurper of Portugal, ought to be set at liberty, even when it should be to remove them to a distance from the Peninsula,



without a previous renunciation by each abandoning the respective governments."

This basis, so conformable to the principles of justice and cautious policy, is the same as that adopted by the government of Her Majesty, and in conformity thereto as soon as the approaching denouement of the affairs of your kingdom was known at this Royal Residence, the Spanish minister hastened to manifest to the ambassador of H. M. the King of the French, and to the minister of His Britannic Majesty, what were the wishes and intentions of H. M. the Queen Governess, in order that the four Powers who signed the Treaty of London should in every thing proceed in accordance regarding the fate and ulterior destination of both princes, as the natural consequence of the said convention.

The close of the civil war and the generous amnesty granted to the fallen party by H. I. M. the Duke of Braganza, in the name of his August Daughter, were afterwards made known, the 7th Article of which, most remarkable for its foresight and wisdom, is to the following effect:—S. Dom Miguel engages to quit the Peninsula within fifteen days, declaring that he will never return to any part of the Spanish provinces and dominions of Portugal, or in any way disturb the tranquillity of these kingdoms. In the contrary case, he shall lose his right to the pension agreed upon and remain liable to the other consequences of such proceeding."

It therefore results from the tenour of the official documents received from the government of H. M. F. M., that it was right in judging that two important points necessarily ought to be secured, viz.—1st, That neither the Spanish Pretender, nor the Usurper of Portugal, should be set at liberty without the previous consent of the respective governments. 2dly, That, even supposing this consent to have been obtained, prudence counselled that, previous to their quitting the Peninsula, each Prince should be required to give an explicit promise not to return to either kingdom, or in any way disturb their tranquillity, under the penalty of losing such allowance as might have been

granted to him in consideration of his elevated rank, and exposing himself to the risks and consequences of his ulterior conduct.

These conditions were imposed upon Don Miguel, in the very country in which he had reigned *de facto* for several years, at a time when there were still some bodies of troops which had not laid down their arms and several fortified places still hoisted his flag.

But, on the contrary, the Prince Don Carlos was in a foreign kingdom, merely followed by a band of rebels, in danger of being taken by the troops of the legitimate Queen, and without any other support, or refuge, than such as he might expect from the intercession of the Allied Powers and the noble sentiments of the Queen-Governess.

Nevertheless, the Spanish government has received no information beyond that of his having been allowed to quit Evora and proceed to Aldea Gallega, for the purpose of there embarking on board of a British ship-of-war, without Her Majesty having received information either of any pledges, or guarantees having been required of him, or that the previous consent of the Spanish government, as being the most interested regarding him, was waited for in order to arrange his departure and ulterior destination.

And although Her Majesty trusts that, agreeably to the sentiments which actuate her august Allies, no step will have been taken, in a matter of such great importance, that may be deemed precipitate, Her Majesty has expressly commanded me to guard against every contingency and to make suitable communications, as well to the cabinet of H. M. F. M. as those of Paris and London, not only manifesting, with corresponding dignity and good faith, what are the views and intentions of Her Majesty respecting the grave matter in question; but also for the purpose of calling the attention of her august Allies to three important points, viz.—

1st. The justice and expediency of requiring from Don Carlos, at least the same conditions and pledges as those exacted from Don Miguel in the 7th. article above quoted; 2dly, the right

which the Spanish government has of not allowing the said Prince to fix his ulterior residence, without the previous consent of Her Majesty and the concurrence of the Powers who signed the Treaty of London; ~~Sdly, That, in order not to run the risk of this Treaty being rendered illusory, or rather to render it firm and binding, even after the expulsion of the two Princes,~~ it would be advisable for the said Powers to publish a solemn declaration, manifesting that the Treaty subsists, in order to secure the common objects therein proposed; and that always and whensoever it should unfortunately occur that Don Miguel, or Don Carlos, returns to these kingdoms, or disturbs the quiet possession of the crowns thereof by their two legitimate queens; that the Powers aforesaid will consider themselves bound to fulfil the stipulations of the same, by reuniting their endeavours and exertions in order to counteract any attempt, or usurpation, and thus secure the peace of the Peninsula, so essential to the repose of Europe.

In this same sense I have, by command of Her Majesty, the Queen, transmitted notes to this effect to the ambassador of His Majesty, the King of the French; and to the minister of His Britannic Majesty at this court; and Her Majesty is desirous that the best understanding and harmony should continue to subsist between the four Powers who signed the Treaty of London, until the entire accomplishment of so important an enterprise.

In consequence whereof Her Majesty has commanded me to make the present communication to Y. B. in order that you may make the same known to H. I. M. the Duke de Braganza; and thus secure the attainment of an object so essential to the pacification of both kingdoms. I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) FRANCISCO MARTINEZ DE LA ROSA

N. B. It will be borne in mind that neither Prince accepted any pension, or allowance from enemies who felt so great an anxiety for their welfare and safe-keeping.

1836 and 1837. (C.)

Barcelona Massacres.

*George Villiers Esquire to Viscount Palmerston. (Received 24th January.)*

(Extract.) Madrid, 16th January, 1836.

It appears that on the 3d instant news was received at Barcelona, that a large body of Carlists having been driven out of the village of San Lorenzo del Pitxus by General Mina, had retreated to a fortified castle in the neighbourhood, carrying with them a considerable number of prisoners which they had recently made, all of whom were inhabitants of Barcelona.

The castle being besieged by General Mina, the Carlists threw their prisoners, to the number of one hundred and seventy, from the ramparts, who were either killed by the volleys of musketry fired at them as they fell, or dashed to pieces on the rocks below.

Nearly at the same time that intelligence of this atrocity was received in Barcelona, arrived the news that a company of National Guards and of a Regiment of the Line, which had left the town to escort the mail on its way to Madrid, had been surprised and massacred by some Carlist bands lying in wait for them.

Public exasperation was in consequence raised to the highest pitch, and on the 4th instant the mob proceeded tumultuously to the residence of General Alvarez, commanding in General Mina's absence, and demanded that the Carlist prisoners confined in the different forts should be delivered to them for instant execution. General Alvarez endeavoured, but without effect, to temporize with them; they rushed to the Citadel, where they found no resistance on the part either of the Governor or the Guard, and eighty-five unfortunate individuals were massacred, among whom were Colonel O'Donnell, who commanded the Carlist cavalry in the recent expedition into Cata-

lonia; a high Dignitary of the Church, and a French Lieutenant-Colonel. On the same evening the Carlist prisoners in the fort of Altapuzanos, and even those confined in the hospital, were delivered up to the people, and shot. On the following day the body of O'Donnel was burnt, and his head paraded through the streets.

(Signed) GEORGE VILLIERS.  
Viscount Palmerston, &c. &c. &c.

*Viscount Palmerston to George Villiers Esquire.*

Sir, Foreign Office, 4th Feb. 1836.

The accounts which had reached this country of the atrocities committed at Barcelona, and which have since been confirmed by your dispatch of the 16th ultimo, have excited universal horror and indignation. It is no palliation of these massacres that similar crimes had previously been committed by the Carlists. The authorities of the Queen ought to have saved her cause from the disgrace such deeds attach to it.

The Spanish Government will no doubt take such steps with regard to the criminals who perpetrated these murders, or who, by not resisting the mob, allowed those murders to be committed, as may be consistent with the honour of the Queen's government and the dictates of justice. But you are instructed to urge the Spanish government, in the strongest manner, to adopt, without delay, effectual measures of precaution for preventing any other prisoners whom they may any where have in confinement from sharing the fate of the victims at Barcelona.

I am, &c. (Signed) PALMERSTON.  
George Villiers, Esq. &c. &c. &c.

*George Villiers Esquire to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received 6th March.)*

(Extract.)

Madrid, 27th February, 1836.

I did not fail to communicate to M. Mendizabal the contents of your Lordship's dispatch of the 4th instant.

His Excellency said that he deeply regretted, although it did not surprise him, the horror and indignation excited in England by the atrocities committed at Barcelona; and he assured me that these feelings were shared by the government, and all persons in this country who sincerely wished well to the Queen's cause.

His Excellency further stated, that at Tarragona and Reus General Mina had displayed a prompt energy, and had effectually prevented the horrible example of Barcelona from being imitated.

The Government likewise, upon learning the events which had taken place in that city, immediately dispatched couriers to every part of the kingdom with the strictest orders to the civil and military Authorities to be upon their guard against the perpetration of similar acts.

This measure, I am happy to inform your Lordship, was successful, for in no other part of Spain has the Queen's cause been disgraced as at Barcelona.

(Signed)

GEORGE VILLIERS.

Viscount Palmerston, &c. &c. &c.


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